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Abstract 
This thesis is concerned with the general trade theoretic issue of what explains tariffs. 
Two possible theories are investigated: (i) the optimum tariff a r g u m e n ~ ~ where countries 
exploit their market power to affect world prices, and (ii) the political economy 
argument, where well-organised interest groups who have a preference for the tariff 
protection level can influence their governments through lobbying. 
The main contribution of this thesis is the use of the many-country, two-good trade 
model, which can be found in the customs union literature, to investigate the importance 
of the (world) market structure on the welfare effects of tariffs. This model, where a 
good is exported by more than one country, allows us to examine the welfare effects of 
tariffs which vary with how the goods are divided initially among the countries. The 
theory of optimum tariffs and retaliation, usually in the two-country. two-good context, 
suggests that the country whose endowments of goods are relatively large tends to 'win' 
a trade war. Still, the analysis in this chapter shows that there is a greater possibility for 
a country to win even if the country's endowments are relatively small if the world 
market of its exportable moves closer to the monopolistic market, i.e. there are less 
countries exporting the same good and/or the world endowment of that good is divided 
more disproportionately among its exporters. 
An important feature of the many-country, two-good trade model is that tariffs are 
strategic complements between countries that have the same trade pattern and are 
strategic substitutes otherwise. Therefore, two possible trade agreements can be 
investigated: (i) an agreement between countries whose tariffs are strategic 
complements, and (ii) an agreement between countries whose tariffs are strategic 
substitutes. Since these trade agreements imply different sources of gain for a country 
(gain from an improvement in terms of trade for the former and gain from an increase in 
volume of trade for the latter), this thesis examines the choice of a country by 
comparing the welfare implications between the two possibilities. It is found that a 
country would prefer to have a trade agreement with the country whose endowments of 
goods are relatively large regardless of the strategic complementarity or substitutability 
of their tariffs. 
Finally, this thesis attempts to endogenise the lobby formation by modelling an 
individual's decision to participate in lobbying prior to the stages of interaction between 
a government and lobbies studied by Grossman and Helpman (1994). It is found that no 
one lobbies individually in equilibrium if the total population and/or the fixed cost of 
lobbying are too large. An incentive that leads individuals to form a lobby is the ability 
of the group to restrain the individuals' otherwise offsetting lobbying efforts. An 
interesting result is that, in equilibrium, some individuals might choose to join the 
lobbies that lobby against their interests to moderate their efforts rather than to join the 
lobbies that lobby in their favour. This result raises a question whether the standard 
industry-lobby in the literature might exaggerate the actual lobbying activities. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This thesis consists of three theoretical works based on the terms of trade and the political 
economy arguments for tariffs. The theory of optimum tariffs and retaliation is revisited 
in the multilateral context in which the countries' tariffs can be strategic complements 
as well as strategic substitutes. Then the framework is extended to study international 
trade agreements. Finally, the study is confined to a 'small' open country of which the 
trade policy is formulated politically. 
The methodology is based on the general equilibrium analysis. We abstract from 
modelling the production structure by assuming some fixed endowments of goods to be 
traded within and between countries. On the consumption side, consumers' preferences 
are assumed to be identical across all individuals and all countries. In chapters 3 and 4, 
they are represented by the Cobb-Douglas utility function. However, in chapter 5, the 
consumers' preferences are represented by a quasi-linear utility function so that explicit 
solutions can be obtained for fmther investigation on lobby formation. In all chapters, 
the game theoretical framework is employed to study the interactions between countries 
and between a government and its citizen. 
It is argued that a 'large' country can benefit from imposing an import tariff through 
its effect on world relative price. 1 When a country is large, its contracting import de-
1 As is typical in the literature, the terms 'large' and 'small' country are used to discriminate countries 
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mand due to its import tariff reduces the world relative price of its import which is an 
improvement in its terms of trade. The tenn 'optimum tariff' refers to the tariff rate 
which is not so large that the cost from reduction in volume of trade exceeds terms of 
trade benefit. However, the terms of trade benefit for one country apparently comes at 
the cost of its trading partner and it is likely that the trading partner will retaliate also in 
the fonn of an optimum tariff. Therefore, the framework in which countries impose the 
optimum tariffs (non-cooperatively) in retaliation to each other is used to study interna-
tional trade wars. It has been shown, usually in the t w ~ c o u n t r y , , t w ~ g o o d d context, that 
the country whose endowments of goods are relatively large tends to 'win' a trade war.2 
This is due to the positive relationship between country size (measured by the level of its 
endowments in this thesis) and its price elasticity of import demand and hence its market 
power- the country with greater market power is able to impose a larger tariff (relative 
to its trading partner) so that world relative price is shifted in its favour compared to 
the world relative price under free trade. 
However, in chapter 3, we construct a many-country, t w ~ g o o d d trade model in which 
there exists more than one country trading under the same trade pattern so that their 
tariffs are strategic complements. Therefore, apart from its own tariff, whether a country 
wins a trade war depends not only on the tariff of its rival (the country with different 
trade pattern) as is typically examined in the literature but also the tariff of its 'ally' 
(the country with the same trade pattern).3 This thesis investigates the importance of 
the (world) market structure on the welfare effects of tariffs. It is shown that there is a 
greater possibility for a country to win, even if the country's endowments are relatively 
small4 , if the world market of its exportable moves closer to the monopolistic market, i.e. 
with respect to their market power to influence world prices in this thesis. 
2 A country's welfare must rise in the non-cooperative equilibrium relative to the free trade equilibrium 
for that country to win the trade war. 
3Since this thesis also looks at the cooperative tariff setting, it is important to note that the term 
'ally' here represents the natural ally that shares common interest over the movement of world relative 
price, not the ally as a result of an agreement. 
4The country whose endowments are relatively small needs not be a small country as long as its 
endowments are not too small to have the ability to influence the world prices. 
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there are less countries exporting the same good and/or the world endowment of that 
good is divided more disproportionately among its exporters. 
Based on the same many-country, two-good trade model, chapter 4 studies the ne-
gotiation of trade agreement. It is argued that countries trade at the level less than 
efficient in the trade war equilibrium since their unilateral tariffs are too high. The role 
of eliminating this inefficiency is a rationale for trade agreement provided in the liter-
ature. It has been shown that the efficient trade agreement between any two countries 
is not unique. In fact, there exists a set of trade agreements which are Pareto efficient. 
Recent works on trade agreement, therefore, devote to the study of trade negotiation 
to select a unique agreement among those efficient ones. In general, the source of gain 
from trade agreement in this line of literature is from an increase in the countries' trade 
volume. However, as recognised in the customs union literature, another source of gain 
from the trade agreement is that it enables its member countries to exploit their collective 
market power to improve their terms of trade. It is argued that countries that import the 
same good can internalise their (positive) tariff externality by setting their tariff jointly 
in a customs union. 
Within the many-country, two-good trade model, the countries' tariffs can be strategic 
complements as well as strategic substitutes. Therefore, the trade agreement of which 
the member countries exploit their collective market power to improve their terms of 
trade can be studied as well as the trade agreement of which the member countries agree 
to adjust their trade policies to increase their trade volume. Since the two types of trade 
agreement imply different sources of gain, chapter 4 investigates the conditions in which 
a country might prefer one type of agreement to the other. It is found that a country 
would prefer to have a trade agreement with the country whose endowments of goods are 
relatively large regardless of the types of agreement. 
The results in chapters 3 and 4 are based on the assumption of the benevolent gov-
ernment that maximises the aggregate welfare of its citizen. However, this assumption 
subjects to the criticism that it neglects the reality that politics play a significant role 
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in the trade policy formation. To address this criticism, among others! Grossman and 
Helpman (1994) view trade policy as the outcome of politica1lobbying.5 It is assumed 
that interest groups can influence the government's decision by offering campaign con-
tributions contingent on the trade policies implemented by the government. Instead of 
being benevolent, the government is willing to trade off some reduction in the general 
welfare in return for the campaign contribution. As a result, groups that can be organised 
will be able to obtain the trade policies which favour their interests at the expense of the 
public as a whole. However, while the model can explain the political process in which 
particular groups can translate their interests into the government policies, the existence 
of the lobbies is still exogenous. 
Chapter 5 extends the influence driven contribution approach of Grossman and Help-
man (1994) by endogenising the lobby formation. To restrict their attention to the 
interaction between the lobbies and the government, the previous works simply assume 
that individuals or firms will not buy influence individually but through group formation 
and it is usually assumed that a lobby is formed only within a well-defined group, such 
as firms within the same industry. By allowing an individual to choose his/her choice 
freely whether to lobby individually and which lobby to join, this chapter shows explicitly 
that an individual would not lobby individually when the total population and/or the 
fixed cost of lobbying are too large. Furthermore, it is shown that a lobby can consist of 
the individuals whose policy preferences are diverse (for example, relative to free trade, 
there might be some members who prefer an import subsidy as well as some members 
who prefer an import tariff within the same lobby). Therefore, if lobbying is the effort to 
shift one dimensional trade policy from free trade toward one way or the other, not only 
a lobby's influence on the government's decision is moderated by its opposing lobby, its 
a.ggressiveness in lobbying (the rate of the tariff/subsidy it is lobbying for) would also be 
5There are a few other approaches on the political economy of tariffs. Mayer {1984} views trade 
policy as the outcome of majority voting over tariff levels. Magee, Brock and Young (1989) view the 
trade policy as the outcome of electoral competition in which political parties choose their trade policy 
stances to attract campaign contributions from interest groups which are positively related with their 
chance of winning the election. 
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moderated by its own members. The analysis in this chapter also reveals that individuals 
tend to be better off than lobbying individually when they lobby through groups. This 
is because, when the individuals lobby individually, their campaign contributions tend to 
offset each other so that their campaign contributions are merely to prevent t he outcome 
which is even worse given the campaign contributions of the others: a case of the pris-
oner's dilemma problem. The lobby that emerges in this chapter can be considered as 
the means through which the individuals can restrain their otherwise offsetting campaign 
contributions. This finding explains an incentive of the individuals to form a lobby. 
In general, this thesis is concerned with the general trade theoretic issue of what 
explains tariffs. Two possible theories are investigated: the optimum tariff and the 
political economy arguments. After an introduction in chapter 1 and a literature review 
in chapter 2, based on the optimum tariff argument, the non-cooperative (trade wars) and 
the cooperative (trade agreements) international tariff settings are considered in chapter 
3 and chapter 4, respectively. Then, chapter 5 considers the tariff setting of a small 
country based on the political economy argument. A conclusion in chapter 6 closes the 
thesis. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Revie'W 
Under the assumption of large country, an international trade war is due to the unilateral 
incentive of each country to impose an import tariff to improve its terms of trade. The 
trade war is usually modelled as a non-cooperative international tariff setting game. 
However, it has been shown that the trade war equilibrium is inefficient in the sense 
that all countries can be made better off if they can coordinate their tariff settings. A 
trade agreement is viewed as the device to eliminate this inefficiency. Negotiation of a 
trade agreement is usually modelled as a bargaining game between countries to mutually 
remove the terms of trade incentive. The trade war and trade agreement based on the 
terms of trade argument are studied in chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis and their previous 
theoretical works are reviewed in section 2.1 of this chapter. 
Under the terms of trade argument, it is implied that the optimal trade policy for a 
small country which has no market power is always free trade. This conclusion, however, 
contradicts to the tariffs empirically observed in most developing countries. The political 
economy argument for tariffs, the second argument dealt with by this thesis, is capable 
of dealing with this criticism. Under this argument, a tariff might be the optimal policy 
for the policy maker even in a small country since the policy maker is assumed to have an 
objective function which differs from the one who maximises the general welfare under 
the tenns of trade argument. Such an object.ive function depends on the political and 
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institutional settings assumed in each particular model. Under the Downsian paradigm 
of political economy in which the policy maker's prime objective is to stay in power. 
the policy maker may choose to maximise the welfare of the median voter to please the 
majority of the population or to trade off some loss in the general welfare with political 
contribution made by lobbies to increase their chance of winning elections. The study 
of trade policy in chapter 5 of this thesis is based on this argument and its previous 
theoretical works are considered in section 2.2 of this chapter. 
2.1 Terms of trade argument 
This thesis studies the negotiation of trade agreement as a cooperative international tariff 
setting game. However, we also need a benchmark against which the welfare analysis of 
the trade agreement can be done, i.e. how the countries' welfare are affected compared to 
the equilibrium without the agreement. The non-cooperative international tariff setting 
game is also studied to serve this objective. This section reviews the previous theoretical 
works on optimum tariffs and retaliation and on international trade agreements in sections 
2.1.1 and 2.1.2, respectively. Since the many-country, tw<rgood trade model in this thesis 
is similar to a trade model used in the customs union literature and since the nature of 
a trade agreement considered in this thesis is related to the CU agreement in the way 
that the member countries exploit their collective market power to manipulate the world 
relative price against the non-member countries, the relevant theoretical literature on CU 
are reviewed in section 2.1.3. A summary in section 2.1.4 points out the status of the 
literature and the contributions of this thesis. 
2.1.1 Optimum tariffs and retaliation 
COIlventionally, the term 'optimwn tariff' refers to the tariff justified by the terms of 
trade argwnent. The terms of trade argument for tariffs is based on the assumption 
t hat countries are large enough to influence the world relative prices of their imports 
13 
and exports. The contracting import demand of a large country due to its import tariff 
reduces the world relative price of its import which is an improvement in its terms of trade. 
Even though the country suffers from a reduction in its volume of trade due to an irnport 
tariff (a common argument for free trade), it also benefits from the tariff through an 
improvement in its terms of trade. The theory of optimum tariffs shows that there exists 
a tariff rate which is not so large that the cost from reduction in volume of trade exceeds 
the terms of trade benefit. As the theory of optimum tariffs is based on the assumption 
that the tariff imposing country possesses the market power to influence world prices, the 
country's optimisation problem with respect to its tariff choice is analogous to the pricing 
behaviour of a monopoly firm. Even if the monopoly firm is the price setter in a market. 
it cannot increase the price without bound to increase the profit since the higher price 
also means the contracting demand for its product. The extent to which the monopoly 
firm can increase the price (the firm's market power), therefore, depends on the extent 
to which the demand for its product reacts to the higher price, i.e. the price elasticity of 
demand. Similarly, a large country's import tariff has an effect of increasing the world 
relative price of its export (reducing the world relative price of its import) which is an 
improvement in its terms of trade, the extent to which the country can impose the tariff 
depends on the price elasticity of foreign demand for its export. Assume countries A and 
B trading goods x and y. It is shown in all of the international economics textbooks, 
such as Krugman and Obstfeld (2003), that the formula for A's optimum tariff is 
A 1 
r =---
fA -1 (2.1) 
where rA is A's optimum tariff and fA is the price elasticity of foreign demand for A's 
export (B's price elasticity of import demand). The optimum tariff that A can iIIlpose 
is higher when B's demand is less elastic so that there is less reduction in the vohuue of 
trade for a marginal increase in A's tariff. A always benefits from irnposing rA as long 
as B has zero tariff. 
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However, since A's gain from imposing the tariff comes at the cost of B, this appar-
ently invites 'retaliation' from B also in the form of an optimum tariff.l The term "trade 
war' is used to represent this equilibrium in which the large countries imposing their 
optimum tariffs in retaliation to each other. It is now uncertain that a large country can 
win the trade war, Le. can raise its welfare relative to free trade, but it is certain that 
at least one country willlose.2 Note that B's optimum tariff also depends on the price 
elasticity of foreign demand for its export denoted by fB. 
Johnson (1953) represents the countries' trade preferences by a utility function in 
which their price elasticity of import demand are constant. By simulations, he shows 
that A will win the trade war if fA is sufficiently smaller than fB, i.e. A faces sufficiently 
less elastic foreign demand for its export than B. Since the world relative price depends 
positively on one country's tariff and negatively on the other's, the world relative price 
will be shifted from free trade to the advantage of the country whose market power is 
greater to impose a larger tariff. Analogous to the monopolist, the country that has a 
greater market power to impose a larger tariff must face less elastic foreign demand for 
its export. Kennan and Riezman (1988) were the first to relate the country's market 
power to impose an import tariff to its size. They construct a two-country, two-good 
trade model in which the Cobb-Douglas preference and a world fixed endowment of each 
good are assumed (so that they measure the country's size by the level of its endowment). 
Also with the help of simulations, they show that the country whose endowment is larger, 
tends to win the trade war. In general, both papers show that both countries will lose 
when they are not too dissimilar. 
More recently, Syropoulos (2002) obtains the same results as in Kennan and Riezman 
(1988) in a more general framework. Syropoulos clarifies the Kennan and Riezman (1988) 
IThe term tariff retaliation is used differently by Baldwin (1990) as having a strategic role of de-
terring undesirable trade policies of a foreign government. With the foreign government's trade policy 
determined under lobbying from its private sectors, Baldwin (1990) examines the use of tariff retaliation 
by a home government to deter the lobbying activities of those foreign lobbies. 
2There is no case in which both countries will win the trade war since the tariffs reduce the world 
welfare as a whole compared to the free trade equilibrium. Therefore, with positive tariffs, for one 
country's welfare to raise above the free trade equilibrium. the other country's welfare must be reduced. 
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results in a more general production and consumption structure. Within the standard 
two-country, two-good setting, he establishes how the country with s u f f i c i e n t l ~ ! ! large rela-
tive size wins the trade war. An interesting finding is that in the limit where one country 
is infinitesimally small (which means the other country is infinitely large), the infinitely 
large country is indifferent between the autarky, free trade and the Nash equilibrium (the 
trade war) which leaves an open ended question about the incentive of the infinitely large 
country to intervene in free trade.3 
Still assume countries A and B trading goods x and y. It is assumed that the con-
sumers have identical and homothetic preferences and the technology used in t he pro-
duction is constant return to scale using a vector Vi of factors including labour Li, for 
i = A, B. The factors are fixed in supply and each country produces both goods. Each 
citizen owns one unit of labour so that Li also represents the number of country i's pop-
ulation. As the objective of Syropoulos is to reexamine the effect of country size on the 
trade war outcome, a definition of country size is required. An increase in country i's size 
is defined to be the simultaneous increase by the same proportion in the fixed supply of 
all factors Vi. Since Syropoulos formulates his analysis in per capita term and Li is one 
of the factors Vi, he defines a variable to represent the relative size of country i to be 
)..i = B- for i i= j = A, B and refers to the change in country i's relative size as a change 
in ).. i leaving the per capita factor endowment vi = r;. always constant. 
For clarity, consider country A. By algebraic manipulations, Syropoulos obtains an 
expresSIon 
(2.2) 
eA is A's aggregate expenditure and duA represents the change in A's per capita utility. 
3 A similar question is raised in this thesis in chapter 3. It is shown that in the limit where both 
countries monopolise their exports, their optimum tariffs will be trade prohibitive. As the countries 
always prefer some trade to autarky, the problem whether t he countries will intervene in free trade in 
t.he limit also arises. 
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rnB is the per capita import demand of country B and rA is A's ad valorem import tariff. 
fA = -c:;:;: ! ~ ~ > 0 is the price elasticity of foreign demand for A's export and qA = ~ : :
is the percentage change in A's terms of trade (qA = ;ftr). (3B = - c::: ltaEt > 0 and rB is 
B's ad valorem import tariff. (2.2) is the well known decomposition of the welfare effect 
of tariff into the terms of trade and the volume of trade effects. The first term indicates 
the change in A's terms of trade and the second term indicates the change in A's volume 
of trade. 
(2.2) allows Syropoulos to fulfil his main objective to identify the channels through 
which the country relative size affects the outcome of the trade war. In terms of the 
expression in (2.2), he considers how A's per capita utility uA is affected by a change in 
the other country relative size).. B (= tx). 
Under the trade war with positive trade, I.e. the interior Nash equilibrium, the 
countries impose their optimum tariffs which satisfy (2.1). Therefore, the first term in 
(2.2) is eliminated and hence 
(2.3) 
(2.3) shows that, in the trade war equilibrium, the change in B's relative size affects 
A's per capita utility u ~ , , only through its effect on A's per capita volume of trade. The 
effect of the country relative size on the per capita volume of trade consists of a direct 
effect and a strategic effect. The direct effect is represented by the first term in the 
square bracket d)..B, an increase in )..B raises u ~ ~ since an increase in )..B raises A's per 
capita import. As represented by the second term in the square bracket, the strategic 
effect of an increase in )..B on A's per capita import and hence u ~ ~ is through its effect 
on B's optimum tariff r ~ . . It is clear that the sign of d r ~ ~ due to a change in the country 
relative size cannot be determined in this general setting, and, therefore, the aggregate 
effect of a change in B's relative size on A's per capita utility is still ambiguous. 
Illstpad of imposing Inore assumptions on the consumption and production structure 
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of the model like the previous works such as Kennan and Riezman (1988). Syropoulos 
evaluates (2.3) in the limit when B becomes infinitesimally small .x B --+ O. As a result, 
from (2.3), the strategic effect of a change in.xB on u ~ ~ becomes negligible and an increase 
in .x B will always benefit A in the trade war equilibrium. This is because when B is 
infinitesimally small, the equilibrium converges to autarky, i.e. there is nearly no trade. 
When .xB increases, A always benefits from an increase in the volume of trade. ~ I o r e e
fonnally, lim;\B-+o ~ ~ i i > O. This finding identifies the channel through which a change in 
the country relative size affects the trade war outcome. However, to determine whether 
the big country can win the trade war, the free trade equilibrium must be considered for 
compariSon. 
Under free trade, T ~ ~ = 0 for i = A, B, (2.2) reduces to eAdu: = . x B m ~ ~ (_qA). 
~ B B
Syropoulos shows that, under free trade, (_qA) = fA;fB-l where fA + fB - 1 > 0 and 
.-..B B 
.x = d;B . Consequently, 
(2.4) 
(2.4) states that under free trade, A's per capita utility is raised when B's relative 
size increases. This is because when B's relative size increases, its import demand in-
creases, and to restore equilibrium, the price of A's export must increase which implies 
~ B B
an improvement in A's terms of trade and its welfare, i.e. from (2.4), _qA = fA;fB-l > 0 
.-..B 
for.x > 0 => eAduA > O. 
In the limit when .x B --+ 0, similar to the trade war equilibrium, the free trade equilib-
rium also converges to autarky, m ~ ~ --+ 0 which, by (2.4), implies that lim;\B-+o ~ ~ , , = O. 
Since lim;\B-+o ~ ~ , , = 0, lim;\B-+o ~ ~ i i > 0 and both u ~ ~ and u: converge to u1 (A's per 
capita utility under autarky), this means that u ~ ~ > u: in the neighbourhood of .xB --+ 0 
which implies that A always wins the trade war when its relative size is very large. This 
is shown in Figure 2-1. 
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Figure 2-1: Syropoulos (2002) Relative size effect. 
A A is the threshold relative size of A for the relative size above which A can win 
the trade war. This limit analysis allows Syropoulos to conclude that a country can 
win a trade war if its relative size is sufficiently large. And as shown in Figure 2-1, 
lim,\B-+o u1 = lim,\B-+o u ~ ~ = lim,\B-+o u ~ , , i.e. the infinitely large country A is indifferent 
between autarky, free trade, and the trade war equilibrium, which raises a question of 
the infinitely large country's incentive to intervene in free trade. 
The same threshold value for which country B will win the trade war, A B, also exists. 
From the fact that AA = ftr' there exists another threshold value AA = =l! for A's 
relative size below which A surely loses. Therefore, country A will lose and B will win 
for A A E (0, A A) and country A will win and B will lose for A A E (A A, 00 ). However, 
within the general structure of the model the trade war outcome when AA E [A A, ,\ A] 
is indeterminate as the functions u ~ ~ and u ~ ~ in Figure 2-1 do not necessarily intersect 
only once at A A = A A. Syropoulos identifies the sufficient assumptions on the countries' 
price elasticities of import demand which ensure that the intersection between u: and 
u ~ ~ in Figure 2-1 at AA = ,\ A is unique. It is shown in Figure 2-1 that if the intersection 
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is unique, both countries lose in the trade war equilibrium for the intermediate values of 
,XA E [,XA,,X A] . 
In general, in the two-country, two-good model, the theory of optimum tariffs and 
retaliation argues that the trade war arises from the countries' unilateral incentive to 
manipulate their terms of trade using their tariffs. The country that wins t he trade 
war must be able to impose a larger tariff. The relative market power of a country to 
impose a tariff depends on its own price elasticity of import demand and that of the other 
country. The country whose price elasticity of import demand is higher will have greater 
market power to impose the larger tariff. The literature suggests that the country's price 
elasticity of import demand is positively related with the country's size. Therefore, it is 
argued that the country whose size is larger can win the trade war. 
2.1.2 International trade agreements 
Due to the countries' unilateral incentive to impose tariffs and hence their tariffs' mcter-
nalities, there exists an inefficiency in the trade war equilibrium. The role of eliminating 
this inefficiency is a rationale for the trade agreement provided in the literature. 4 The 
literature views the trade agreement as the product of cooperative international tariff 
setting. In fact, there exists a set of trade agreements (combinations of the countries' 
trade policies) which are Pareto efficient. Each of which implies different welfare effects 
on the negotiating countries. The Nash bargaining solution models the negotiation of 
the trade agreement to select a unique agreement among those efficient ones. The static 
model of trade negotiation, therefore, focuses on how the gain from the cooperation is to 
be divided among the negotiating countries. 5 
-lIn fact, there is another rationale for the trade agreement which is termed by Bagwell and Staiger 
(2002) as the 'commitment approach'. The commitment approach views the trade agreement as one way 
for governments to credibly distance themselves from the domestic political pressure over trade policies. 
An example of this approach is Mitra (2002). 
SIn light of the fact that there is no supra-national organisation which can punish the countries who 
fail to comply with the trade agreement, the trade agreement must be self enforcing. The literature 
addresses this issue in the dynamic repeated game framework. The fact that the equilibrium trade 
agreement must be sustainable such that no member country has an incentive to defect restricts the ~ t t
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Role of trade agreements 
In the standard two-country, two-good model, Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2(02) show that 
the inefficiency in the trade war equilibrium arises solely from the countries' unilateral 
incentive to manipulate their terms of trade and the trade agreement is the means by 
which this terms of trade incentive can be removed. 
Given countries A and B trading goods x and y, A is assumed to export good x and 
import good y. Consumption and production of the two goods take place under perfect 
competition and are the functions of the domestic relative price denoted by pi = !f for 
Pz 
i = A, B, where p; is the domestic price of good j in country i. Each country imposes 
a non-prohibitive ad varolem tariff ri on its imports. Therefore, given -r = 1 + ri, it 
B 
is implied that pA = TApw - pA (TA ,pw) and pB = ¥i- where pW = ~ ~ represents the 
world relative price. The trade balance and market clearing condition imply that the 
equilibrium world relative price denoted by fJ» can be represented by jJ» (TA, TB). Note 
that ~ t ~ ~ < 0 < ~ t ~ ~ and it is assumed that :;r:i < 0 < :t:;. 
Bagwell and Staiger represent each government's objective function as Ui (pi, jJ») to 
isolate the tariff's terms of trade effect (the terms of trade effect amounts to the change 
in fJ»).6 Given this general class of the objective function, it is assumed that U; = 
lJUA{pA,i?) 0 aUB{pB,i?) - UB · . h d .. h ·11 BP'W < < ap-w = p'W, I.e. gIven t e omestIc pnce, eac government WI 
be better off when its country's terms of trade improves. The non-cooperative first order 
. . . . au' (p' ,i?) 
condItIons, gIven U; = bpi, can be represented by 
B (2.5) 
of the possible agreements. The sustainable trade agreements may not be fully efficient, however, the 
resulted equilibrium is more efficient than the non-cooperative one. Examples of works which consider 
the issue of enforcement are Dixit (1987), Furusawa (1999) and Park (2000). 
6Ui (pi, PW) does not necessarily represent the country's aggregate welfare since Bagwell and Staiger 
also allow for the government's political considerations, the second argument for tariffs dealt with by 
this thesis. 
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A lJPW/{J'J'A B {Jp_/{J'J'B 
where.,x = 8PAj{J'J'A and.,x = ijpBj{J'J'B. Bagwell and Staiger define the efficient trade 
agreement as any tariff combination which satisfies 
(2.6) 
~ ; ; I and ~ ; ; I are the slopes of A's and B's indifference curves in the tariffs 
dUA=O dUB=O 
space, respectively. Therefore, (2.6) simply defines the locus where the two countries' 
indifference curves are tangent. 
Bagwell and Staiger show that the non-cooperative equilibrium tariffs implied by (2.5) 
are not efficient as they cannot satisfy (2.6) simultaneously. This will be possible only if, 
hypothetically, both countries take.,xA = 0 = .,xB in (2.5), i.e. the two governments are not 
motivated by the terms of trade incentive. Therefore, it is implied that the inefficiency 
arises solely from the countries' unilateral incentive to manipulate their terms of trade. 
Intuitively, the trade war is inefficient since A and B can still gain from an increase in 
their trade volume if they can mutually reduce their unilateral tariffs of which the effects 
on the world relative price tend to offset each other. 
It can be shown without going further into details that the countries act as if they set 
their tariffs unilaterally taking .,x A = 0 = .,x B when they set their tariffs cooperatively. 7 
As will be clear shortly, reciprocal free trade is an efficient agreement which satisfies (2.6) 
and can be achieved only in the negotiation between symmetric countries. It is clear that 
the reciprocal free trade also satisfies {2.5} if .,xA = 0 = .,xB.8 Therefore, it can be argued 
7 Bagwell and Staiger show that the countries act as if they set their tariffs unilaterally taking A A = 0 
- AB if they reduce their tariffs under the GATT's principle of reciprocity. They distinguish the 
approaches to trade negotiation between the 'rules-based' and 'power-based' negotiation. Under the 
rules-based negotiation, as practised under the GATT, the governments agree upon a set of negotiation 
rules which will be abided by all subsequent negotiations. On the contrary, the agreement under the 
power-based negotiation purely reflects the bargaining power of the negotiating parties as they are 
unconstrained by any previous agreed upon rules. They show that the rules-based might be preferable to 
the power-based negotiation for the relatively weaker countries as it moderates the power asymmetries 
between countries. The trade negotiation studied in this thesis can be classified as the power-based 
negotiation. 
8Under the terms of trade argument for tariffs, the unilateral optimal trade policy for both countries 
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that the trade agreement is efficiency enhancing by its ability to remove the cOlUltries' 
tenns of trade incentive. 
Efficient trade agreements 
Indeed, the efficient tariff combination between A and B as implied by (2.6) is not unique. 
Mayer (1981) is the first to show that the efficient tariff combination can be any pair of 
TA and TB which satisfy 
(2.7) 
This is because these combinations of tariffs equalise the domestic relative prices of 
both countries.9 The equal domestic relative prices is the condition for both cOlUltries to 
trade at the efficient frontier. If the countries still find their imports cheaper abroad they 
can still gain from a larger trade volume by reducing their tariffs. Clearly, the reciprocal 
free trade where TA = TB = 1 is among those efficient tariff combinations. However, 
whether the free trade agreement can be attained still depends on the relative market 
power of the two countries. This is because even if a trade agreement is efficient, both 
countries must be at least as well off with the trade agreement as in the non-cooperative 
equilibrium for the trade agreement to be acceptable. If, in the non-cooperative equilib-
rium, a country already has a utility level above the free trade level, i.e. it can win the 
trade war, the free trade agreement will not be acceptable to that country.1O This point 
is free trade if they cannot or do not want to influence the world relative price, ,\ A = 0 = ,\ B . 
9 Recall that the domestic relative prices of both countries are pA = TApw and pB = ;;. Therefore, 
pA = pB ~ ~ TATB = 1. 
lOThis conclusion neglects the possibility that the losing country may bribe the winning country in 
the trade war to move to free trade by offering a lump-sum transfer to compensate the winning count ry 
their forgone welfare from imposing tariff. An example of the papers which consider this type of trade 
agreement is Park (2000). In the repeated game framework, he finds that, relative to the negotiation 
without direct transfer, the n ~ g o t i a t i o n n with direct transfer between a small and a large country can 
improve the set of sustainable agreements to the advantage of the small country and hence improv(' its 
bargaining position. Park (2000) argues that the non-tariff concessions such as stricter protection of 
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is made by Riezman (1982) who shows that the free trade agreement can be attained only 
between the symmetric countries. Therefore, from (2.7), the trade agreement between 
the asymmetric countries must be a subsidy-tariff combination. 
Nash bargaining solution 
As the efficient trade agreement is not unique, additional assumption is needed to select 
a unique equilibrium trade agreement among those efficient trade agreements. A trade 
negotiation between two countries is usually modelled as a Nash bargaining galne in 
which the two countries cooperatively maximise the product of their gains over the non-
cooperative outcome, i.e. 
max (UA - U ~ r ~ ~ (U B - U ~ ) ) 1-0 s.t. UA > U ~ ~ and UB > U ~ ~ (2.8) 
UA,UB 
ui and U ~ ~ are country i's cooperative and non-cooperative utility level. a captures 
the relative bargaining power of A. The constraints U A > U ~ ~ and U B > U ~ ~ require that 
both countries must be at least as well off as in the non-cooperative equilibrium. The 
curve LL' in Figure 2-2 represents the efficient frontier of welfare combinations underlain 
by the efficient tariff combinations which satisfy (2.7). 
The unique equilibrium trade agreement is determined by the tangency between the 
level curve (U A - U ~ ) O O (UB - U ~ ) 1 - 0 0 and the efficient frontier LL'. Figure 2-2 is drawn 
assunung that both countries have symmetric market power ( U ~ ~ = U ~ ~ < U# = UP)· 
However, it is assumed that B has greater bargaining power than A, i.e. a < ~ . l l l
intellectual property, changes in other domestic policies, etc. (which the small countries usually make to 
favor their large trading partners to gain access to their markets in the real world trade negotiations), 
can be interpreted as a form of the direct transfer. 
11 Furusawa (1999) interprets 0 as reflecting the government's time patience. He models a trade nego-
tiation between two governments, which are different only in their time patience, as a Nash bargaining 
game. The outcome of which will be implemented by the two governments and must be sustained over 
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Figure 2-2: Nash bargaining solution 
Therefore, the distribution of gain from the agreement agreed by the two countries is 
at point C where B's gain is higher than A's. The equilibrium trade agreement is 
the tariff pair ( T ~ , , Tg) which implies A's and B's utility level at point C. 12 As men-
tioned earlier, lliezman (1982) shows that F will be the tangency between the level curve 
(UA - U ~ ) O : : (UB - U ~ ) ) 1-0: and the efficient frontier LL' which implies a reciprocal free 
trade when both countries are symmetric in terms of their market and bargaining power. 13 
infinite periods. He finds that the outcome will be in favour of the more patient government when the 
time lag between a defection and punishment in the implementation phase is short and the opposite is 
true if the time lag is long. 
12 According to (2.7), (Tg, Tg) which underlie point C in Figure 2-2 must be a subsidy-tariff combi-
nation in which there are an import subsidy by A and an import tariff by B. 
131£ an international transfer mechanism is available, both A and B can agree to implement free 
trade which underlies point F in Figure 2-2 straightforwardly. However, due to the asymmetry in their 
bargaining power assumed in Figure 2-2, B must obtain a level of utility at U g which is higher than 
the level of utility Up implied by the reciprocal free trade agreement. Therefore, it is possible that A 
can bargain the amount of direct transfer required by B to implement the reciprocal free trade. Figure 
2-2 shows that the equilibrium agreement between the two countries in addition to the reciprocal trade 
agreement must be the amount of direct transfer equal to ug - Up that A must make to support the 
agreement. It is clear that free trade is still a possible outcome even if one country's welfare without an 
agreement is already higher than the level it obtains under the reciprocal free trade. 
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2.1.3 Customs union 
The theory of customs union has concerned the welfare effects of a customs union on 
its members as well as the rest of the world. Pioneered by Viner (1950), the welfare 
effects of a customs union is studied along the trade creation-trade diversion approach. 
However, there is also the terms of trade approach, as called by lliezman (1979a), which 
usually employs more restrictive models (e.g. the three-country, two good model) but 
uses general equilibrium analysis. In this approach, such as lliezman (1979a, 1979b), 
Kennan and lliezman (1990) and Syropoulos (1999), it is recognised that the resulting 
changes in trade volumes, and possibly in the direction and composition of trade flows 
due to the intra-union trade liberalisation and the coordination of external tariff policies 
may improve the terms of trade of its members against the outsiders. 
lliezman (1979a, 1979b) examines the condition for two countries to benefit frOIn 
forming a customs union in the three-country, two-good and the three-country, three 
good models. Assume that two of the three countries can form a customs union by 
reducing tariffs on imports from each other but keep their tariffs on import from the 
third country at the pre-union level. He examines the welfare effects of the decrease in 
the tariffs. He finds that, in the three-good model, change in the terms of trade between 
the wlion members due to the integration is indeterminate while, in the two-good model, 
one member benefits at the expense of the other .14 However, he also finds that the 
union's terms of trade with the third country is necessarily improved. Therefore, it is 
argued that the pre-union trade between the two members must be small so that the 
tenns of trade benefit against the third country dominates and hence both countries can 
gain frOIn the customs union. 
Kennan and lliezman (1990) construct a three-country, three-good model in which 
members of the customs union have internal free trade and jointly set a common opt i-
141n a partial equilibrium analysis, Panagariya (2000) shows that the intra-union trade liberalisation 
creates the 'revenue-transfer effect' in which the liberalisation causes one country to lose its tariff rev-
enue but the other country gains in the form of the producer surplus relative to the non-cooperative 
equilibrium. 
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mum external tariff against the optimum tariff of the third country. They find that the 
coordination of external tariff policies by the customs union members enables t hem to 
internalise the positive terms of trade externalities they generate for each other when 
they import similar products from the third country. 
Syropoulos (1999), within the Kennan and lliezman (1990) framework, argues that 
there exists a 'trade liberalising' force, generated by the intra-union trade liberalisation, 
that moderates the collective market power of the union members to impose a common 
optimum external tariff. However, he finds that the customs union still benefits the Inem-
bers and harms the outsider depending on trade patterns and comparative advantage. 
2.1.4 Summary 
It can be seen that the study of trade negotiation is usually made in the two-country 
context in which the trade agreement is negotiated between countries that import and 
export different goods. Therefore, the source of gain from the trade agreement in this line 
of literature is from an increase in the countries' trade volume. However, as recognised 
in the customs union literature, another source of gain from the trade agreement is 
that it enables the member countries to exploit their collective market power to improve 
their terms of trade. It is argued that the countries that import the same good can 
internalise their positive tariff externality by setting their tariff jointly in a customs 
union. Clearly, a country can expect different sources of gain from trade agreement from 
different negotiating partners. 
Chapter 4 examines the choice of a country to negotiate a trade agreement if there 
are different negotiating partners and hence different sources of gain available to that 
country. Despite the popularity of the three-country, three-good model in the customs 
union literature,15 we base our analysis on a many-country, two-good model which shares 
15Richard50n (1994) points out that the popularity of the 3x3 model stems from its symmetry and the 
fact that all countries trade with each other - both of which cannot hold in the 3x2 model. Lloyd (1982) 
points out that the 3x3 model introduces several effects which cannot be present in the 3x2 model. 
27 
the same trade patterns with the t h r ~ c o u n t r y , , two-good model in the customs union 
literature. The similarity is that there exists more than one country that exports one 
good. 16 The advantage of this trade pattern is that it reduces the dimensions of the 
model which eases the derivations that are complicate even in the two-country, two-good 
setting. Base on this model, chapter 3 also investigates the importance of the world 
market structure of a good, which depends on the market share distribution between its 
exporters and the number of them, in determining a trade war outcome which seems to 
be missing in the literature. 
2.2 Political economy of trade policy 
The terms of trade argument for tariffs discussed in the previous section is based on the 
assumption that the governments maximise the national welfare. However, in the real 
world where the existence of the governments depends largely on politics, it is reasonable 
to view the governments' objectives, particularly with regard to the making of trade 
policy, as not only to serve the national welfare but also to serve their political concerns. 
Despite this common belief about the importance of politics in the trade policy formation 
and the various approaches to explain it, there still exists no coherent theory. This 
apparently reflects the fact that there are many ways through which individuals can 
influence their government's decision on economic policies which in turn affect their 
individual well-being. Those ways vary across times and countries depending on their 
specific political and institutional settings. Theoretical works on the political economy of 
trade policy attempt to model this relationship between the government and its people 
in determining trade policies through different approaches. 
Mayer (1984) 's median voter model views the trade policy as the outcome of majority 
16Richardson (1994) chooses the three-country, two-good model to investigate the possibility that the 
union members can circumvent the commitment to liberalise their trade with the other member by the 
use of domestic policy since it is critical for his analysis that the union common external tariff has the 
discriminatory nature and this is not possible if imports of the union member come from only one source. 
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voting over a tarifIlevel. Given the difference in the individuals' single-peaked preferences 
toward the tariff level due to the difference in their factor endowments (equal labour 
but uneven capital endowments across individuals), over the continuum of individuals 
ranked in ascending order of their factor endowments hence their tariff level preferences, 
the political equilibrium trade policy predicted by the model is the one most preferred 
by the median voter under the majority voting rule. This is because at this tariff level, 
neither those who prefer smaller nor those who prefer larger tariff rate than the one 
preferred by the median voter will be the majority. Laussel and Riezman (2001) extend 
this framework to consider the trade policy formation in the representative democracy. 
In the two-country two-good setting and the 'citizen candidate' model,17 they find that 
the trade policy tends to be biased against trade as, due to the terms of trade effect of 
tariffs, the citizens in each country tend to delegate the trade policy choice to somebody 
who is more protectionist than themselves to credibly commit their respective country 
to a more aggressive trade policy. 
Magee et. ale (1989), differently, view the trade policy as the outcome of electoral 
competition in which political parties choose their trade policy stances to attract cam-
paign contributions from interest groups which are positively related with their chance of 
winning the election. In the electoral competition model, the lobbies choose their levels 
of contribution to maximise the sum of their members' income less contribution expendi-
ture given the policy stances previously announced by the political parties. Anticipating 
their probabilities of winning the election (which depend on the campaign contributions), 
the political parties choose their policy stances to maximise such probabilities and the 
equilibrium trade policy is the outcome of this process. 
Hillman (1982) postulates the government's objective function as the political-support 
function which positively depends on the industry's profits and negatively depends on 
17 As opposed to the standard theory in which the policy maker is not one of the citizens and has no 
personal preference toward any policy, the citizen candidate model is the model in which a policy maker 
is elected from the set of citizens who decide to run for election and set the policy according to his/her 
preference. 
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the consumer's welfare lose from the trade policy which induces domestic price increase. 
Similarly, Findlay and Wellisz {1982} simply assumes a functional relationship between 
lobbying contributions and tariffs, i.e. a tariff function which positively depends on 
the contribution from pro-tariff lobby and negatively depends on the contribution from 
anti-tariff lobby. Given the tariff function, the interest groups choose their contribution 
level to maximise their payoffs. It is found that the trade policy outcome depends on 
the relative weight the government attaches to the industry profit and the consumer 
welfare in Hillman {1982} and depends on the marginal rate of substitution between the 
opposing lobbies' contributions in the tariff function in Findlay and Wellisz {1982}. In 
general, these two works provide a better understanding of the forces that shape the 
structure of tariffs. However, by abstracting from explaining the political process in 
which the government interacts with the individuals or interest groups, no fundamental 
determinant of trade policy is provided by these two approaches. 
The interaction between the government and the interest groups is modelled explic-
itly in Grossman and Helpman {1994}. Applying the price-menu auction framework of 
Bernheim and Whinston (1986), the government is viewed as the auctioneer and the lob-
bies as the bidders. Within the specific-factor model, it is assumed that the lobby group 
is formed between the factor owners along the sectoral line and the number of sectors 
in which a lobby is formed is constant. First, the given set of lobbies non-cooperatively 
announce their contribution schedules which specify the amount of contribution they will 
make against every possible trade policy vector which will be implemented by the govern-
ment. Then, given the contribution schedules announced by the lobbies, the government 
chooses a trade policy vector to maximise the weighted sum between the contributions 
from lobbies and the general welfare, implements the policy and collects the contribu-
tions. As a result, it is shown that the government is effectively maximising the weighted 
sum between the interest groups' and the aggregate welfare which is clearly a form of 
the more general Hillman {1982} political support function. I8 The political equilibrium 
U1Mitra (1999) claims that the Grossman and Helpman {1994} model provides microfoundations for 
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trade policy derived by Grossman and Helpman (1994) is 
Ti Ii - Q Zi 
1 + Ti a + Q €i (2.9) 
for i = 1,2, ... , M, M is the number of non-numeraire sectors. Ti, Zi and €i are the 
equilibrium ad valorem tariff, domestic output to imports ratio and the elasticity of 
import demand in sector i, respectively (Zi and €i are negative for the export sectors). 
Ii equal 1 if sector i is represented by a lobby and 0 otherwise. a is the weight the 
government attaches to the general welfare relative to the contribution from the lobbies 
in its objective function and Q E [0,1] denotes the fraction of the total population whose 
sectors are organised and represented by a lobby, the set of which is treated as exogenous. 
It can be seen that sectors that can be organised will be able to obtain the policies which 
favour their interests (the policies which increase the domestic prices in their sectors), 
however, at the expense of the public as a whole (higher prices in the protected sectors 
faced by the consumers). The level of protection for the organised sectors will be higher 
when the ratio of domestic output to imports in that sector is higher, and lower when 
the import demand elasticity in that sector, the weight the government attaches to the 
general welfare and the fraction of population represented by a lobby are higher. 
However, while the model can explain the political process in which particular groups 
can translate their interests into the government policies, the existence of the lobbies is 
still exogenous. Reuben (2002) points out the need to concentrate on lobby formation 
as the best way of continuing with research on interest groups. He argues that 'Not 
modelling group formation would leave a big gap in our understanding ... (and} our models 
will be limited to explaining short term, static situations in which interest groups neither 
form nor expire.' 
models that use the political support function approach. 
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2.2.1 Lobby formation 
Mitra (1999) extends the Grossman and Helpman (1994) framework by endogenising 
the number of lobbies which is kept constant. He analyses the relationship between the 
number of lobbies and the country income inequality and finds the general conditions 
of a sector of production in which a lobby group will be organised. He employs the 
specific-factor model to study the lobbying and trade policy in a small open economy 
with N total population and M sectors. Consumer preferences are identical represented 
by the additive separable utility function and the technology of production using both 
sector-specific factors and labour (except production of numeraire good using only labour 
where the wage rate is normalised to 1) is assumed to be constant return to scale. Each 
individual owns equal amount of labour and at most one type of M sector-specific factors. 
To simplify his analysis, unlike Grossman and Helpman (1994), all sectors are asswned 
to be symmetric such that there are equal number of specific factor owners n and equal 
amount of sector-specific factor. The only difference between sectors is their fixed cost 
of forming a lobby group to represent their sectors, Fi Vi = 1,2, ... , M. 
The lobbies non-cooperatively announce their contribution schedules and then, given 
the announced contribution schedules, the government chooses a trade policy vector to 
maximise the weighted sum of contributions and the general welfare, the Grossman and 
Helpman result identical to (2.9) is obtained. 
where m E (0, N] is the number of sectors which are organised. It is clear that 
";yn = a in (2.9) which represents the fraction of the total population whose sectors 
are represented by a lobby group. Mitra defines () = n: which is the proportion of 
population that owns some specific factors of production and interprets it as a IIle3Sure 
of the degree of inCOlne inequality, i.e. a decrease in () means a greater incOIne inequality 
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in the economy. Substitute () into the result above. 
(2.10) 
A decrease in () leads to a higher level of protection in all organised sectors which 
implies a higher benefit from lobbying keeping the number of organised sectors m con-
stant. However, if the number of lobbies is to be endogenised, the higher benefit from 
lobbying from a decrease in () also attracts a greater number of organised sectors m which 
reduces the level of protection in all organised sectors. Therefore, it is no longer clear 
that a greater income inequality would lead to more or less protection when the number 
of lobbies is endogenised. Similarly, the effect of a change in the weight the government 
attaches to the general welfare, a, on the level of protection, predicted to be negative in 
Grossman and Helpman (1994), is also ambiguous. The effects of a change in () and a on 
the level of protection, therefore, depend on whether the direct effect or the entry effect 
will dominate. It is from this point which Mitra extends the Grossman and Helpman 
framework. 
Prior to the stages in which a set of lobbies interacts with the government, it is 
assumed that the owners of each kind of the specific factor decide whether to contribute 
to the financing of the fixed cost of forming a lobby Fi . When there are m lobbies, let 
- -f2o{m) and f2u{m) denote the equilibrium gross welfare of an organised group and that of 
an unorganised group, respectively, and C (m) denotes the equilibrium contribution each 
organised lobby has to make.19 Let sectors be ranked and indexed in ascending order of 
their fixed cost ~ ~ such that Fmin < Fl < F2 .•• < Fm- 1 < Fm < Fm+1 ... < FM < Fmax. 
Taking i-I groups as organised and let the members of another group decide whether 
to form a lobby or remain unorganised. It is argued that a lobby group will be formed 
19!1o(m) and fiu(m) are the sum of welfare of the individuals who own the same specific factor. The 
former represents their aggregate welfare if their sector is represented by a lobby and the latter if not. 
fio(m), fiu(m) and C(m) are the same for all sectors since they are assumed to be identical. 
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in sector i if 
no(i) - nu(i -1) - C (i) = N B (i) represents the net benefit from forming a lobby for 
sector i given all sectors indexed by j < i are organised.20 Therefore, the above expression 
states that the owners of the specific factor in sector i will form a lobby if the net benefit 
from forming a lobby to the group as a whole exceeds their fixed organisational costs. 
Consider the continuum of sectors normalised to 1. Mitra shows that 8N:Jam) < 0, i.e. 
the net benefit from forming a lobby for a sector declines as more sectors are represented 
by a lobby group (the number of lobbies rises). The net benefit from forming a lobby 
is diminishing with the number of lobbies because there will be more lobbies working 
against each other and a smaller unorganised population to exploit. Since the continuum 
of sectors is ranked in ascending order of their fixed cost of lobbying, the fixed cost can be 
written as a function of the number of lobbies as F (m) and it is obvious that 8Z) > O. 
Consequently, a unique equilibrium number of lobbies can be determined in Figure 2-3. 
It is shown that not every sector will always be organised. Given the asymmetry in 
the fixed cost across sectors and the fact that the net benefit from lobbying is dimin-
ishing with the number of lobbies, sectors with high fixed cost will be the ones that are 
unorganised. Comparative statics with respect to 0 and a reveals that greater income 
inequality (decrease in 0) results in an increase in the equilibrium number of lobbies (it 
shifts the function N B in Figure 2-3 outward) and its direct effect on the level of pro-
tection dominates the entry effect such that the level of protection is higher. A higher 
affinity of the government for political contributions (decrease in a) also results in an 
20Mitra shows that, for a continuum of identical sectors ranked and indexed in ascending order of their 
fixed cost, if an infinitesimal mass around sector indexed by i is organised, then masses with a lowpr 
fixed cost, i.e. 'tIj < i, should also be organised. 
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F(m) 
o m* No. of lobbies 
Figure 2-3: Mitra (1999) Equilibrium number of lobbies. 
increase in the equilibrium number of lobbies, however, the level of protection each or-
ganised sector obtains in equilibrium will rise or fall depending on the slope of the fixed 
cost function F (m). Relative to F (m) in Figure 2-3, the direct effect will be more likely 
to dominate the entry effect, i.e. a decrease in a is more likely to increase the level of 
protection for organised sectors, when F (m) is steeper so that given the same decrease 
in a, the number of entries is smaller. 
Mitra imposes more restrictive assumptions on the model to examine the effects of 
some other factors in addition to the fixed cost on the lobby formation. In general, 
he shows that those sectors that have the advantage of having high capital stock, high 
concentration of the specific-factor owners, more inelastic demand in addition to having 
less fixed cost examined above, will be organised. 
In general, Olson (1971) argues that organised groups are usually small in their num-
ber of members since if a group is so big that each member's action is imperceptible, 
every individual member would decide to free ride on the efforts of the other group mem-
bers and the collective good is not produced. The literature addresses this issue in the 
repeated g8Jne frrunework in which the threat of ending cooperation keeps individuals 
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from free riding. 
Pecorino (1998), like Findlay and Wellisz (1982), assumes a general tariff function 
which positively depends on the total contribution made by the firms in an industry, i.e. 
T (8), r' (8) > 0, r" (8) < 0 and T (0) = 0 where S = L ~ l l Si and Si represents the 
contribution made by firm i and n is the number of firms in the industry. Given the 
tariff function, the firms choose the contribution cooperatively to maximise the industry 
net profit, i.e. the sum of their profits, which depend positively on the tariff, less the 
aggregate contribution expenditure. In the cooperative equilibrium, the firms obtain the 
level of protection denoted by T e. By the assumption that all firms are identical, they 
pay the cooperative contribution equally, i.e. sh = Sc = ~ ~ for all i = 1, "" n. Given 
Te and Se and let 7r denotes each firm profit, the net profit accruing to each firm in this 
cooperative equilibrium is 7re - se. In an infinitely repeated game, each firm receives the 
net profit 7r c - Se in each period as long as no one defected in the previous period. If any 
one defected in the previous period, the cooperation is terminated and the equilibriunl 
will be reverted to the non-cooperative equilibrium forever. When any firm defects, it 
chooses to pay an amount denoted by SD < Se (which maximises its individual net profit 
given that all other firms are paying se) and obtains a higher level of net profit in that 
period denoted by 7rD - SD > 7re - se.21 In the periods of punishment, each firm makes 
their contribution non-cooperatively denoted by S N and obtains the net benefit lower 
than the cooperative one denoted by 7r N - S N < 7r e - Sc. 22 Therefore, the necessary 
condition to maintain the cooperation over the infinite periods is 
211T D - S D > 1T e - Se since the defecting firm pays a smaller amount of contribution S D < Se and 
obtains a level of tariff TD which is not much less than Te if Se is small. 
221T N - SN < 1Te - Se since the level of protection they obtain in the non-cooperative equilibrium is 
TN < Te. Even if they pay SN < Se, their profit loss from the reduction in the level of protection is 
larger. Compared to the defecting equilibrium, TD > TN since all firms except the defecting firm still 
contribute Se > SN, i.e. (n - 1) Se + SD > nSN ~ ~ TD > TN as T' (S) > O. 
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The cooperation can be maintained if the present discounted value of defecting and 
suffering the punishment is not greater than the present discounted value of cooperating. 
The difficulty in maintaining the cooperation is measured by the value of the discount fac-
tor 6* which satisfies this condition with equality. The cooperation cannot be maintained 
for the values of discount factor below 6*. Therefore, a rise in 6* indicates the greater 
difficulty in maintaining the cooperation. Solving the above expression with equality, 8-
is obtained. 
6* = (7rD - SD) - (7rC - sc) 
(7rD - SD) - (7rN - SN) (2.11) 
Since (7r N - S N) < (7r C - sc) < (7r D - S D)' 6* < 1. Pecorino shows that an increase 
in the number of firms n has two effects on the minimum discount factor 6-. First, it 
increases 6* by increasing the desirability for defection, i.e. (7r D - S D) is increased when 
the number of firms increases.23 Second, it decreases 6* by increasing the severity of pun-
ishment, i.e. (7rN - SN) is decreased when the number of firms increases. 2·' The change 
in the number of firms does not affect the net profit each firm obtains in the cooperative 
equilibrium (7rC - sc) since the total contribution made by all firms to Inaximise the 
industry net profit hence the level of protection remain unchanged. This is due to the 
fact that the size of the industry is kept constant and the size of each firm and the contri-
bution each of them makes decreases proportionately as the number of firms rises. Given 
these two contrasting effects of an increase in n on 6* and not being able to determine 
which one dominates, Pecorino concludes that there is no presumption that the free rider 
23When the industry size is kept constant and all firms in the industry are identical, an increase in 
the number of firms implies a smaller size of each firm. When each firm is smaller, its contribution is 
smaller and, therefore, a reduction in anyone firm's contribution from Se to SD reduces less the level 
of protection, i.e. T D moves closer to T e from below when n increases. Consequently, anyone firm 
can defect by paying less contribution and yet sacrificing less protection when there is larger number of 
firms. 
24When each firm is smaller as a result of an increase in the number of firms, each of them pays less 
amount of contribution in the non-cooperative equilibrium which lowers the level of the tariff protection 
they receive, i.e. TN decreases as n increases, leading to their lower profit. 
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problem is worse when the number of firms is larger. 
Magee (2002) follows Pecorino by considering the free rider problem within the re-
peated game framework and measuring the difficulty in maintaining the firms' coopera-
tion by the minimum discount factor 8*. He finds the same expression for 8* as in (2.11). 
However, by endogenising the Pecorino's tariff function as the outcome of the Nash bar-
gaining game between the government and the industry over the level of contribution 
against each level of tariff, he finds the condition in which the second effect of an increase 
in the number of firms n on 8* (the effect which decreases fJ* through its negative effect 
on 1r N) is zero and is able to conclude that, under such condition, an increase in the 
number of firms always worsens the free rider problem. 
Magee employs the specific factor model with only one non-numeraire import-conlpeting 
sector, producing with constant return to scale technology, and using the specific factor 
and labour which are fixed in supply. Consumer preferences are identical and represented 
by the general additive separable utility function. Since there is only one non-numeraire 
sector, only one lobby operates in this model. In the first stage, the industry initially 
forms an exploratory group whose purpose is to discover the cost of achieving their pol-
icy goals (it is implicit that they can do so without cost). Their representatives meet 
and bargain over the contribution they will pay the government against each level of 
tariff. The outcome determines a tariff function which depends on the total contribution 
made by the industry. In the second stage, given the tariff function, the firms in the 
industry decide whether to contribute to the lobbying effort by comparing between the 
present values of their net profit if they defect and are punished by the reversion to the 
non-cooperative equilibrium and if they cooperate over the infinite periods. 
Given that n firms in the industry are identical and each firm's profit is represented 
by 1r, let U (p) and II (p) = n1r (p) represent the aggregate welfare and the industry 
aggregate profit respectively. Both depend on the domestic price p. Given that T is 
the tariff rate, and pW is the world price of the good produced by the industry which is 
constant, p = pW + T. Due to the fact that all firms are identical, they pay equal aIllOunt 
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of political contribution denoted by s and S = ns represents the total contribution the 
firms make to the government. The government's objective function is similar to that of 
Grossman and Helpman (1994), i.e. S + aU (P), where a is the weight the government 
attaches to the general welfare relative to the industry contribution. Since Nlagee views 
lobbying as the Nash bargaining between the government and the industry over the 
political contribution, the bargaining problem is such that 
() is the government's bargaining power relative to the industry lobby. As pW is 
constant, the government will implement free trade without lobbying, therefore, the 
threat point if the bargaining breaks down is the equilibrium in which there is free trade, 
r = 0, and no political contribution is made, S = 0. 
Solving the above bargaining problem gives 
S (r) = () [II (pW + r) - II (pW)] + (1 - ()) [aU (pW) - aU (pW + r)] (2.12) 
Solving (2.12) for r, a tariff function r (S) is implied. By examining (2.12) in its 
general form, Magee shows that the tariff function implied by the bargaining between 
the government and the industry lobby has the properties of the tariff function assumed 
by Pecorino and all other works which use the tariff formation function approach, that is 
r' (S) > 0, r" (S) < 0, and r (0) = 0. Therefore, Magee claims that this result provides 
microfoundations for the tariff formation function approach. 
In the second stage of the game where the cooperation is to be maintained over the 
infinite periods, Magee obtains the minimum discount factor 8· represented by (2.11). 
He points out that if the firms contribute nothing in the non-cooperative equilibrium, i.e. 
no firm lobbies the government individually, the tariff protection in the non-cooperative 
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equilibrium will be zero, i.e. SN = 0 =} SN = nSN = 0 =} TN = 0 and dividing the 
industry into smaller firms (an increase in the number of firms) will have no impact on 
the non-cooperative outcome. Therefore, unlike the Pecorino's result, an increase in the 
number of firms will only raise the one-period benefit of defecting, i.e. a rise in n only 
increases (-TrD - SD) hence {)*. Magee finds the condition in which this can occur, i.e. 
firms do not make contributions in the non-cooperative equilibrium, and hence is able to 
give a sharper conclusion than Pecorino that, under such condition, an increase in the 
number of firms will always worsen the free rider problem. 
When firms do not cooperate, given the tariff function T (S) implied by (2.12) and the 
political contributions made by the other firms, each firm chooses an amount of political 
contribution to maximise its individual net profit, i.e. the optimisation problem for firm 
.. 
1, IS 
where S-i is the sum of the political contributions made by firms other than i. Since 
&;' > 0 and -G;r > 0 for all i, it can be said that the firms' political contributions 
are strategic complements. However, for firm i to pay a positive amount of political 
contribution in the non-cooperative equilibrium, the profit it earns from the first unit of 
the political contribution must exceed the political contribution it pays at the margin, 
I.e. 
From (2.12), Magee is able to show that 
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Therefore, the condition in which finns do not make political contribution in the 
non-cooperative equilibrium is when n > liB, i.e. when the number of firms is beyond 
a certain number and that number positively depends on the bargaining power of the 
industry relative to the government, (1 - B). This is because each firm's benefit from 
lobbying depends on Band n such that the lobby surplus (exploited from the general 
population and divided between the government and the industry lobby) shared by the 
industry as a whole depends on B and this share is divided equally between all firms in the 
industry (no matter they lobby cooperatively or non-cooperatively). An increase in either 
B or n reduces the lobby benefit accruing to each firm. In the non-cooperative equilibrium, 
when Band n are too high such that n > liB the profit each firm earns from the first 
unit of the political contribution will be less than the political contribution it pays at the 
margin and, therefore, discourages them from making a positive amount of contribution. 
In the symmetric Nash bargaining where B = ~ ~ => n > 2, the maximum nwnber of 
firms in the industry which allows them to lobby non-cooperatively is 1. Therefore, if 
the industry consists of more than one firm, the firms will not lobby non-cooperatively 
and an increase in the number of them always makes their cooperation more difficult. 
2.2.2 Summary 
Among others, the lobbying framework of Grossman and Helpman (1994) is successful 
in explaining the political process in which particular groups can translate their interests 
into the government policies. They view the trade policy as the outcome of the political 
lobbying. It is assumed that interest groups can influence the government's decision 
by offering campaign contributions contingent on the trade policies implemented by the 
government. Instead of being benevolent, the government is willing to trade off some 
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reduction in the general welfare in return for the campaign contribution. As a result, 
groups that can be organised will be able to obtain the trade policies which favour 
their interests at the expense of the public as a whole. However, the existence of the 
lobbies in the model is still exogenous. In fact, there exist some works such as Pecorino 
(1998), Mitra (1999) and Magee (2002) which investigate the lobby formation. Still, 
there remain some basic issues that they tend to ignore and some assumptions which 
seem to be too restrictive that they can easily lead us to draw incorrect conclusions. 
First, as pointed out by Reuben (2002), these previous works still do not reflect what 
really drives collective behaviour. Based on the Olson (1971) argument, Pecorino (1998) 
and Magee (2002) examine the difficulty in maintaining the collective action as a function 
of the number of firms in an industry not what makes them act collectively in the first 
place. Mitra (1999) merely mentions that each firm might be small relative to the fixed 
cost of lobbying which prevents them from the unilateral action. Second, they seem 
to restrict a lobby to be formed only within a well-defined group such as among firms 
within the same industry. Similar to Mitra (1999), chapter 5 of this thesis attempts to 
endogenise the formation of lobby by extending the lobbying framework of Grossman and 
Helpman (1994). However, we investigate the individual's decision to join a lobby prior 
to the stages of interaction between the government and the lobbies based on the Mayer 
(1984) model. In the Mayer's model, the individuals' single-peaked preferences toward 
the tariff level are different due to the difference in their factor endowments (endowments 
of goods in this thesis). Therefore, the individuals are not belong to any industry and 
hence are not restricted to join any particular lobby. Indeed, they are purely different in 
their preferences toward the trade policy and their decisions to participate in lobbying 
are purely strategic. Therefore, the individual's incentive to act collectively can also be 
examined in this framework. 
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Chapter 3 
Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation in 
the Multilateral Context 
The Inain contribution of this ('hapt ('1' is t Iw us(' of the mally-coullt ry', h\u-good t r a c h ~ ~
model, whi('h can 1)(' found in tlj(' Cust()lllS unionlit('rature, t() ill\'('stigat(' til(' i l l l p o r t a I H ' ( ~ ~
of tIl(' (world) Inarkd st ru('Lun' OIl tlj(' w('lfar(' effects of tariffs. This IIlOdd, where a 
good is ('x port (·d by lImn' t han one ('()lInt ry, allows lIS to examine t hI' w('lfare df('c! s of 
tariffs which vary with hmv t IH' goods an' di\'id('d initially' among til(' countries, Tlw 
t il('ory of optilllllIn tariffs and n·t aliat ion, usually in the t \\'( }--couIltr,v, t wc}--good C()lltext, 
s u g g ( ~ s t s s that til(' (,OIllltry wh()s(' ('Il<im\'lIH'llts of go()ds an' r<'iativ('l,v large tends t() Will 
;\ trad(' war. Still, til(' aIlaly'sis in this chap{('r shows that theI'(' is a great('r possibility 
for a (,OUllt ry to will even if the nnllltry's endoWIneIlts are relati\'dy slllall if the world 
markd of its ('X port a hl(' Ino\'('s closer to the Inonopolistic market, i,c, t lwn' arc lPss 
('Ollllt rips ('x porting th(' saIne good and/or the world endoWIneIlt ()f that good is divi<i('d 
I I H ) n ~ ~ disprop()rt ion at ('ly' aIllOIlg its ('xportt'l's. 
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3.1 Introduction 
A recent example of trade war is the US-EU steel trade dispute. Under Section 201 of 
the US trade law which provides for temporary restrictions on imports that have surged 
in such quantities as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to a domestic industry, 
the Bush Administration announced on 5 March 2002 the decision to impose tariffs of up 
to 30 per cent on its steel imports for 3 years as a remedy to its steel industry which has 
been reportedly affected by imports rising to more than 20 per cent of its conswnption. 
This invoked the response from the EU on 22 March 2002 which threatened to impose 
retaliatory tariffs on products such as motorcycles, textiles, and steel encompassing 360 
million US dollars worth of US exports to pressure the US to reverse its decision. l On 
the one hand, given the current efforts of the two economic powers to settle the dispute 
and the present multilateral environment characterised by the existence of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO), it may seem far-fetched that a full blown trade war would 
occur. On the other hand, there has been reportedly no breakthrough on the issue and 
no sign that the EU is willing to back away from its threat to impose the punitive tariffs. 
Therefore, studying of the trade war deserves attention. 
As both the US and the EU are the two largest trading partners in the world trade, 
they share 18.4 and 15.4 per cent in the world merchandise exports, and 23.5 and 18.2 per 
cent in the world merchandise imports, respectively,2 the implications of their disputes 
have gone much beyond the question of how they are affected if the trade war occurs. An 
interesting question is the implications of the disputes for the third countries especially 
those with less economic power, the developing countries. This chapter re-investigates 
the theory of optimum tariffs and retaliation in a multi-country setting which is capable 
of exanuning this question. 
In the standard two-country two-good trade model, Jolmson (1953) shows that the 
1 For more details, see Ahearn (2002) and Ahearn (2003). 
2World Trade Organisation, International Trade Statisitcs 2002. 
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country that has more elastic import demand tends to win the trade war. 3 Kennan and 
Riezman (1988) were the first to relate the country's market power to impose an import 
tariff to its size. They construct a two-country two-good trade model in which the Cobb-
Douglas preference and a world fixed endowment of each good are assumed (so that they 
measure the country's size by the level of its endowment). With the help of simulations, 
they show that the country whose endowment is larger, tends to win the trade war. In 
general, both papers show that both countries will lose when they are not too dissimilar. 
More recently, Syropoulos (2002) obtains the Kennan and lliezman (1988) results in a 
more general framework. 
In general, the theory of optimum tariffs and retaliation argues that the trade war 
arises from the countries' unilateral incentive to manipulate their terms of trade. The 
country that wins the trade war must be able to impose a larger tariff. The relative 
market power of a country to impose a tariff depends on its own price elasticity of 
import demand and that of the other country. The country whose price elasticity of 
import demand is higher will have greater market power to impose the larger tariff. 
The literature suggests that the country's price elasticity of import demand is positively 
related with the country's size. Therefore, it is argued that the country whose size is larger 
can win the trade war. The analysis in this chapter is based on the Kennan and lliezman 
(1988) model but there are more than two countries sharing and exchanging the world 
fixed endowments of two goods.4 In contrast to the result obtained in the standard two-
country two-good trade model, this chapter shows that, in the multi-country context, 
there is a greater possibility for a country to win a trade war even if the country's 
endowments are relatively small if the world market of its exportable moves closer to the 
monopolistic market, i.e. there are less countries exporting the same good and/or the 
world endowment of that good is divided more disproportionately among its exporters. 
3 A country's welfare must rise in the non-cooperative equilibrium relative to the free trade equilibrium 
for that country to win the trade war. 
"This many-country, two-good trade model is similar to the three-country, two-good model that has 
been used in the customs union literature, for example, Riezman (1979a) and Richardson (1994). 
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To give a sense of how the introduction of more countries affects the results, in section 
3.2, a two-country two-good model is constructed in which each country sets its import 
tariff non-cooperatively and simultaneously to maximise its national welfare. We re-
derive those results in the literature. However, in an extreme case where each country 
monopolises its exportable, we argue that the optimum tariffs (if they are to impose 
against each other) hence their welfare loss will be too high such that free trade can be 
the dominating strategy for both countries. 
More countries are added to participate in the tariff game in section 3.3. With more 
countries but still two goods, there exists more than one country exporting the same good. 
This setting provides the possibility that the countries' tariffs are strategic complements 
and hence the possibility that a relatively small-endowed country wins the trade war.5 
Conclusion is made in section 3.4. 
3.2 Two-country model 
The model is a pure exchange model between two countries, A and B, trading two 
goods x and y. Consumers in both countries have identical and homothetic preferences 
represented by the Cobb-Douglas utility function, 
where c ~ ~ and c ~ ~ are country i's consumption of x and y, i E {A, B}. 
Each country is initially endowed with both goods proportionately to the world en-
dowment. Assume that the world endowment of x is X and y is Y. Let Xi and yi are 
the country i's endowment of x and y. The endowment structure is 
~ S o m e e countries might even be able to benefit from other countries' tariffs without having to impose 
positive tariff and sacrificing their own trade volume. Syropoulos (2002) proposes t h ~ t t identifying .the 
exact circumstances under which this possibility might arise is important and theorehcally challengmg. 
This point will also be addressed in this section. 
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{3.1} 
o < {3x, {3y < 1. Assume that A has the comparative advantage in x and B has the 
comparative advantage in y. Given the identical homothetic preferences, it is implied that 
{3x + {3y > 1 must be satisfied for trade to be positive.6 Since {3j reflects the comparative 
advantage of the country exporting good j, {3x and {3y will be called the 'degree of 
specialisation' of A and B, respectively.7 The greater the {3 j is, the greater is the trade 
interdependence (the trade volume) between the two countries. 
Let p ~ ~ be the domestic price of good j in country i. Consumers' optimisation iInplies 
ci pi Y x 
-=- {3.2} 
Let qj be the world price of good j, choose the world price of x as numeraire hence 
qx = 1 and let qy = q. Assume that both countries impose ad-valorem tariff rate ri E 
(-1,00) on their imports.8 Therefore, (3.2) becomes 
6Consider A's import, MA = c: - yA. As can be verified by (3.5) and (3.7) below, under free trade, 
(XA+ yA) c: =! qq and q = ~ . . From (3.1), MA = ! [l3x + (1-131/)] y - (1 -l3y) y. Therefore for 
MA > 0, I3x + 131/ > 1 must be satisfied. 
7Note that I3x and 131/ also reflect the countries' sizes. However, as a country's size depends on both 
I3x and 13", this thesis chooses to discuss I3j in terms of the degree of specialisation so that the asymmetry 
between the two countries can be discussed simply in terms of the difference between I3x and 13". 
8The lower bound -1 is required for the domestic price of the importable goods to be positive. r' < 0 
indicates an import subsidy. 
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c: 1 
~ ~ q (I + rA) 
c: (1 + r B) (3.3) 
cB q x 
The equilibrium consumption in terms of the world relative price, q = !bt.., and both qz 
countries' tariffs, rA and rB, can be solved for using the budget constraints of both 
countries which require that their consumption expenditure must equal to their income. 
Formally, 
when evaluated at the world prices.9 
Utilising (3.3), (3.4) implies 
cA x sA (XA + qyA) 
cA 
( A) (XA + qyA) l-s y q 
cB x sB (XB + qyB) 
cB 
( B) (XB + qyB) l-s y q 
(3.4) 
(3.5) 
where sA = lr;A, sB = l + ~ B ' ' and ']"i = 1 + rio From (3.5), Si can be interpreted as 
the share of income country i spends on consumption of X. 
9This expression is equivalent to the budget constraint evaluated at domestic prices. When evaluating 
at domestic prices, A's budget constraint is c: + q (1 + rA) c: = X A + q (1 + TA) Y A + qrA ,\I A. Since 
c: = yA + MA, c: + qc: + qrA (yA + MA) = XA + q (I + rA) yA + qrAMA which is equivalent to 
c ~ ~ + qC: = X A + q Y A . 
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By substituting (3.5) into the utility function, country i's utility in terms of its tariff. 
the world relative price, and its endowments can be obtained. 
u i = ffi (Xi + qyi) 
(1 + Ti) vq (3.6) 
Since both countries are large such that their demands can influence the world relative 
price, therefore, q is a function of both countries' tariffs. The equilibrium q which clears 
all markets must satisfy the market clearing condition X A + X B = c: + C:. Substitute 
(3.5) into the market clearing condition and solve for q. 
[(1 - sA) X A + (1 - sB) XB] 
q = (sAyA + sByB) (3.7) 
Since the world relative price q represents the terms of trade of the country exporting 
y, an increase in q means an improvement in B's terms of trade while a deterioration in 
those of A. 
Assuming that A and B choose their tariffs non-cooperatively and simultaneously, 
country i's best response tariff to the other's tariff can be obtained by the maximisation 
of (3.6) with respect to T taking the other's tariff as given. The interior Nash equilibrium 
of the non-cooperative tariff game is derived in the next section. 
3.2.1 Interior Nash equilibrium 
From (3.6) and (3.7), the first order condition for country i's optimum tariff is 
(3.8) 
From (3.6) and (3.7), 
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(1 - ']'i) (Xi + qyi) 
2JTi(1 + Ti)2 vq 
(qyi _ Xi) JTi 
2vqq (1 + Ti) (3.9) 
and 
(SAyA + sByB)XA 
aq 1 +[(1 - sA) XA + (1 - sB) XB]yA 
{)TA (1 + TA)2 (sAyA + sByB)2 
1 (XA + qyA) 
(1 + TA)2 (sAyA + sByB) 
(sAyA + sByB)XB 
1 +[(1 - sA) x A + (1 - sB) XB]yB 
(1 + TB)2 (sAyA + sByB)2 
1 (XB + qyB) 
(1 + TB)2 (sAyA + sByB) (3.10) 
It can be shown that rx,: represents the negative direct effect of an import tariff 
on welfare as it reduces the volume of trade10 and 8 ~ i : f o o is the positive indirect effect 
of an import tariff through its effect on the terms of trade. 11 Therefore, the country 
i's optimum tariff is the tariff that equates the marginal gain from improvement in the 
terms of trade and the marginal loss from reduction in the volume of trade, given the 
10 An increase in the import tariff reduces the domestic consumption of importable good while increases 
the domestic consumption of exportable good , therefore, there are less imports and exports by the 
aui ~ _ T i ) ) (Xi+ yi) i 
country. From (3.9), 7fTT = 2fft(1+Ti)3 jf < 0 for T > 1. 
. A 
lIlt can be shown that a ~ ' ' Ii, is positive for positive volume of trade. Consider country A, ~ ~ = 
(qY2J;:A) ~ ~ < 0 for q < :;. It can be shown that q < :; must hold for A to import y. For A 
to trade, the domestic relative price of its importable must be cheaper under trade. i.e. qTA < : ~ ~ ~ ~
q < ~ ~ ~ ~ . . Therefore, q < : ~ ~ for non-negative import tariff TA ~ ~ 1. In addition, it is clear that 
a I exA+qyA) 
"lfiIx = - (1+TA)3 ( .. AyA+ .. DyD) < O. 
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other country's tariff. 
Substituting (3.9) and (3.10) back into (3.8) and solve for TA and T B , the two coun-
tries' best response tariff functions can be obtained.12 
f3y ( ~ + + 1) 
(1 - f3x ) [(1 - f3 y )TB + 1] (3.11) 
(3.12) 
The two best response tariff functions are represented in Figure 3-1. The negative 
slope of the best response tariff functions shows that both countries' tariffs are strategic 
substitutes.13 An increase in A's tariff undermines the terms of trade of B hence reducing 
the marginal gain of B's tariff and vice versa. Tt and TOB represent the optimum tariffs 
of A and B when the other country's tariff is zero. 14 This is the most preferred point 
by each country as they can obtain the highest utility from an import tariff, however, 
at the cost of the other. Each country's utility decreases along its best response tariff 
function as the other country's tariff rises and reaches the lowest when the other country's 
tariff equal to the trade prohibitive rate, Tpr, under which no trade occurs. As shown in 
Figure 3-1, the best response tariff of a country is zero when the other's tariff is trade 
12The derivations of the countries' best response tariff functions and the Nash equilibrium tariffs are 
provided in Appendix A.l. 
A /3 ((1-/31/)T B+l) ( tJ;)2 + ( ~ + 1 ) ( 1 - / 3 1 / ) ) 8TB 
13From (3.11) and (3.12), ~ ~ B B = - ! ~ ~ ( 1 - ~ z ) ) [ ( I - ~ 1 / ) T H + 1 1 2 2 < 0 and 8TA = 
1 /3 (I-/3z)TA +l) (:1)2 + ( ~ + I ) ( I - / 3 . r ) )
-7i:,f,r ( l - ~ 1 / ) ) [(I-OBz )TA+11 2 < O. 
B A /3 13 + 1 S"I I T.B 14Consider country A, setting T = 1 in (3.11) yields To = ( t - ~ z ) ) (l-Pll)+l . lIDl ar y, 0 = 
. l-1!.a_ /3 +1 V (1-/31/) ( 1 - ~ z ) + l l . 
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Figure 3-1: Best re ponse tariff fun tions and int ri r N· h quili rnun. 
pr hibitivc. 15 Th r 1 no trade for any tariff pair In the gr y ar a n th t p right 
'orn r of the diagram in Figure 3-1. 
Th int nor Nash equilibrium tariff (TfJ TfJ) an b olv d for by ub titnting 
(3.12) into (3.11). Solving for TA, A' int rior N h quilibrium tariff i 
(3.13) 
minimum tariff rat whi h liminat trad giv n th • 
A XA 'I IJ ) n 
ot ht r country's tariff qUt 1 t z r . p itive volum f trad if qT < y;r r - < yrr, 
i.('. t h d me ' ti r Intiv pri f n untry importabl und r p itiv trad mu -t b 1(. S t hall 
tIl( dOl1l('stic rclativ pric of that ollntry imp rtabl und r autarky. h tw in qualitil's impl ' 
'I ' ll \ II .\ \ 1 r ITH \ /I ) \ 1 T ITB :-. .\ I'll T i lTH 1C '/ r tit I )11 q}lFT )'IT\'T < =} < )."\ ;(11 =:} < (1- %}(1- 11) Lor rat ( 0 )1 
positi\'(' . Th r f I' , by the d 'finiti n f th prohil itiv tariff rat>, pr = ( )( )' whit h i III 
. 1- r )- II 
for both countri s. ol1sidtr cHlIltry . t , sui stitutiIlT Tpr f r TR in (3.11), tIl<' IHst rt pUll riff f 
is /,('!"l) (ind('( d, an) elwin s ()f _ \ 's tariff g i\ 11 Til = pr arc indiff( H'llt: tlwrt is no 1': d ). 
Substituting (3.13) back into B's best response tariff function (3.12) gives the interior 
Nash equilibrium tariff of B. 
(3.14) 
The equilibrium tariff pair (TA, TR) is similar to the Kennan and Riezman (1988) 
result and is represented by point N in Figure 3-1. Substituting {3.13} and {3.14} back 
into (3.7) yields 
It can be verified that 
where fi is the price elasticity of foreign demand for country i's export. 16 
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It can be seen that the world relative price is shifted to the advantage of the cOlmtry 
of which the Nash equilibrium tariff is larger. A country's Nash equilibrium tariff will be 
larger than the other's when the price elasticity of demand for its exportable is smaller. 
The price elasticity of demand for a country's exportable will be smaller than the other's 
when its degree of specialisation is larger, i.e. {3x > {3y ::::} fA < fB ::::} T ~ ~ > T ~ ~ => qN < 
qF = ~ . . This is analogous to the monopolist setting his/her price, the country that faces 
less elastic demand for its export will have greater market power to impose a tariff. The 
greater the degree to which it specialises in its export, the greater is the other country's 
dependence on import and hence its less elastic import demand. 
Define Ulv as the Nash equilibrium utility level of country i and U} as the utility level 
of country i under free trade. Substituting T ~ , , T ~ ~ for the tariffs and qN for the world 
relative price q in (3.6), the Nash equilibrium utility level are 
(3.15) 
The countries' utility levels under free trade can be derived by substituting 1 for the 
tariffs in the above expressions. Therefore, 
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1 
2 [{jx + (1 - (jy)] v'XY 
{3.16} 
For country i to win the trade war, ~ ~ must exceed 1. From {3.15} and {3.16}, 
{I + T ~ } }M [{jx + (1 - (jy)] 
2 [ T ~ ~ {I - {jx} + TH{jy] {3.17} 
Table A.l in the Appendix A.3 shows the values of ~ ~ and ~ ~ in {3.17} corresponding 
F F 
to the values of {jx, (jy E (0,1) which induce positive trade {{jx + {jy > I}. Figure 3-2 
summarises the simulation results. 
Since no trade occurs for low values of {jx and {jy, only the values of {jx,{jy E ( ~ , , 1) 
are shown in Figure 3-2 for ease of representation. The curves AA' and BB' are drawn 
to represent the combinations of {jx and {jy which make ~ ~ = 1 and ~ ~ = 1 respectively, 
F F 
i.e. they are the locus of {jx and {jy which make the countries indifferent between the 
Nash equilibrium and free trade. Figure 3-2 replicates the Kennan and Riezman (1988) 
results that A wins the trade war ( ~ ~ > 1) when the locus of {jx and {jy is within the 
F 
area to the lower-right of the curve AA' and B wins the trade war ( ~ ~ > 1) when the 
F 
locus of {jx and {jy is within the area to the upper-left of the curve BB'; otherwise, both 
are worse off in the Nash equilibrium as compared to free trade. 
It can be seen that for one country to win the trade war, its degree of specialisation 
must be sufficiently larger than the other's. This is because for a country's welfare to be 
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Figure 3-2: Degree of specialisation and the outcome of trade war. 
improved from the free trade level, an improvement in its terms of trade must be large 
enough to the extent which is more than just compensating the country's welfare loss 
from reduction in its trade volume. This requires the country's tariff to be sufficiently 
larger than the other country's tariff. As found earlier, a country's market power to 
impose an import tariff is positively related to its degree of specialisation. Although the 
discussions with regard to (3 j are made in terms of the degree of specialisation instead 
of the country size, the results in this section can also be stated in terms of the country 
size that the country which is sufficiently larger than the other will win the trade war. 
3.2.2 An extreme case 
The results discussed above replicate the results in the literature. However, an iuteresting 
case arises when the limit of the degree of specialisation is considered. From{3.13) and 
(3.14), a country's optimum tariff will be trade prohibitive when the country's degree 
of specialisation approaches one since in which case the country's market power n ~ a e h e s s
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its maximum, i.e. the price elasticity of foreign demand for its export is inelastic. I7 As 
a prohibitive tariff by one country eliminates all trade regardless of the other country's 
tariff while the countries always prefer some trade to autarky, whether the prohibitive 
tariff can be the equilibrium when a country monopolises its exportable is still ambiguous. 
Under autarky, the countries' consumption of each good is equal to their endowment. 
i.e. c ~ ~ = Xi and c ~ ~ = yi. Therefore, from the utility function U i = ( c ~ ) ) ~ ~ ( c ~ ) ) ~ ~ , 
(3.18) 
It can be verified that free trade is always preferred to autarky by both countries by 
ui 18 showing that 7ft" < 1. 
F 
Following Riezman (1982), assume that each country simultaneously chooses a strat-
egy between to impose and not to impose tariff; and if chooses to impose, the tariff 
must be the optimum tariff.19 When both countries monopolise their export abies , i.e. 
{3x = {3y = 1, the payoff matrix can be represented by Table 3.1. 
F and T represent the no tariff and optimum tariff strategy, respectively. When a 
country monopolises its exportable, its optimum tariff is the tariff rate that eliminates 
17 Consider A R -+ 1 =} fA = , , ; t J ; ~ ~ -+ 1. From footnote 15, the prohibitive tariff rate is 
• fJx 13,,- ( 1 - 1 3 ~ ) )
T.pr = 1 3 ~ ( v ) ) -+ 00 when either {3x or (3" approaches 1. ( 1 - 1 3 ~ ) ) 1-13" 
18From (3.16) and (3.18), ti = 2 I 3 z ~ ~ ~ ~ " ) ) < 1 =} 2J {3x {I - (3J1) - {3:z: - {I - (3,,,) < 0 :::} 
- $. - V {I - (3J1) < 0 which is true. It can be s h o ~ n n ~ h a t t u, <. 1 . h k e w l ~ . . . . k r u
B 
•• 
Riezman (1982) argues that allowing only two strategtes 15 not restnctlve as It seems. Thl5 IS because 
the strategy of imposing optimum tariff consists of many possible tariff rates given the other country's 
tariff. Indeed, the above results where both countries unilaterally impose their optimum tariffs when Pz 
and {3J1 are smaller than one still hold with this assumption. 
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Country A F 
Country B 
F T 
T ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
Table 3.1: Complete specialisation by both countries. 
Country A F 
Country B 
F T 
T ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
Table 3.2: Complete specialisation by A. 
all trade regardless of the other country's tariff. Therefore, the payoffs to both cowltries 
if either one of them chooses strategy T will be equal to the autarky level, i.e. the pair 
of payoffs in which case is (U}, Uf). Since U# > U} and Up > Uf, it is clear from 
Table 3.1 that the dominating strategy for both countries is to implement free trade. 
Each country chooses to implement free trade unilaterally in this case since, given any 
strategy chosen by the other country, they are always worse off than under free trade 
with the prohibitive tariff. The intuition behind this result is that even though when the 
countries gain their maximum market power when they monopolise their export abies , 
their trade interdependence is also at its maximum, i.e. each country's demand for one 
of the two goods has to be met only by imports from the other country. Therefore, they 
cannot afford to engage in a trade war which eliminates all trade.20 
Suppose that {3y < {3x = 1, i.e. only A monopolises its exportable. In which case, A's 
optimum tariff is still the prohibitive rate but B's optimum tariff will be less than trade 
prohibitive. Therefore, the payoff matrix can be represented by Table 3.2. 
20This 'balance of terror' would prompt the continuous efforts between the US and the EC to settle 
their trade disputes. For example, with respect to the steel trade dispute, the latest US decision to 
exempt 50 per cent of 2.3 billion US dollars of steel imported from the EU from its safeguard tariffs 
and the EU suspension of its retaliatory threat until a formal ruling on the dispute will be made by the 
WTO. 
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If the strategies chosen by A and B are F and T, respectively, the situation is analo-
gous to the situation when B imposes its optimum tariff without retaliation. This clearly 
implies U ~ ~ < U # and U ~ ~ > Up. Note that even though A is worse off than under the 
reciprocal free trade, it still prefers this situation to autarky ( U ~ ~ > U1) since there is 
still positive trade. Consequently, from Table 3.2, the unilateral free trade is still the 
dominating strategy for A and strategy T will be the weakly dominating strategy for 
B.21 However, it seems to be counter-intuitive if the country with greater market power 
A chooses not to engage in the trade war and be exploited by B's optimum tariff. The 
result will be different if there is a limit which is less than the prohibitive rate that a 
country can impose its tariff. Suppose that there is some minimum level of consumption 
of importable that A must maintain and that minimum level exceeds A's endowment of 
the importable. Consequently, there is a maximum level of tariff A can impose which is 
less than the prohibitive rate. Given f3 y < f3x = 1, A will impose this maximum tariff if 
it chooses strategy T. Since this maximum tariff does not eliminate all trade, it is the 
dominating strategy for A and the equilibrium is similar to the case when f3 y , f3x < 1 
where both countries impose tariffs. Whether A or B will win or both will lose the trade 
war depends on A's required minimum level of importable consuInption hence the max-
imum tariff it can impose. The larger the maximum tariff A can impose, the larger the 
possibility that it can win the trade war. 
3.3 Multi-country model 
The previous section has considered the tariff setting in the world of two countries. 
In this section, the model is extended to incorporate more countries to investigate the 
importance of the (world) market structure on the welfare effects of tariffs. 
The model is still a pure exchange model of two goods, x and y with the world en-
21 This result conincides with Syropoulos (2002) in which in the limit when one country is arbitrarily 
large relative to the other country, the country's non-cooperative payoff equals to the a ~ t a r k y y level. 
Therefore, Syropoulos questions the incentive of a large country to depart from free trade m such case. 
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dowments of X and Y. However, there are a number of n z > 1 countries sharing the 
endowments which were available to A in the previous section, namely aI, a2 . . '" a ~ . .
Similarly, there are a number of ny > 1 countries sharing the endowments which were 
available to B, namely bI, b2 , •.• , bnv. In summary, there are 2 + n z + fly countries in the 
country set {A, B, a!, a2 , ••. , aTlz , bI , b2 , •.. , bnv }. Therefore, there are two groups of coun-
tries: countries {A, a I, a2 , .•• , an:z:} which export good x and import good y and countries 
{ B, bI, b2 , .•. , bnll } which export good y and import good x. The tariffs are strategic sub-
stitutes between countries with different trade patterns and are strategic complements 
between countries with similar trade patterns. It is shown in this section that the out-
come of the trade war is determined by the world market structure of both goods, i.e. 
the numbers of their exporters and how the world endowments are divided initially. 
Identical and homothetic preferences represented by the Cobb-Douglas utility function 
is still assumed across all countries. Therefore, (3.5) hence (3.6) still hold for all countries, 
I.e. 
. T' £ all . t·· {A 1 2 n:z:} d i 1 where s" = (1+1") or x-exportIng coun nes, 'l E , a , a , ... , a ,an s = (1+1") 
for all y-exporting countries, i E {B, bI, b2 , •.• , bnv }, and 
i ffi (Xi + qyi) 
U = (I + Ti) vq 
for all i E {A,B,al,a2, ... ,anz,bI,b2, ... ,bnv} and EX i = X and Eyi = y. 
As in the previous section, the world relative price q can be derived from the Inarket 
clearing condition which is now 
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Substitute the above expression for c ~ ~ and solve for q, (3.7) now becomes 
[(1 - sA) X A + (1 - sB) X B + E ? ~ l l (1- sai)xai + E ~ l l (1- Sb')Xbi] 
q = (sAyA + sByB + E ? ~ l s a i y a i i + E ~ l S b i y b i ) ) (3.19) 
Assume that all countries choose their tariffs simultaneously and non-cooperatively, 
how the countries set their tariffs in this multi-country setting is discussed in the next 
section. 
3.3.1 Nash equilibrium tariffs 
The first order condition for each country optimum tariff is still the same as in (3.8) 
and ~ : : and { J ~ i i are still the same as in (3.9). 
From (3.19), 
8q 1 (Xi + qyi) 
{)Ti = - (1 + Ti)2 (sAyA + sByB + E : ~ l s a i y a i i + E ~ l S b ' y b ' ) )
for all x-exporting countries, and 
8q 1 (Xi + qyi) 
{)Ti = (1 + Ti)2 (sAyA + sByB + E ~ l s a i y a ' ' + E ~ l S b ' y b ' ) )
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(3.20) 
(3.21 ) 
for all y-exporting countries. 
Substitute (3.9), (3.20) and (3.21) into the first order condition and solve for 'P 
accordingly, the best response tariff functions of all countries can be obtained. The 
derivation shown in Appendix A.2 gives the best response tariff functions below. 
___ --....:...:X'--A ____ + 1 
(1 - sB)XB 
+ E ~ ~ l l (1 - sai)xai 
+ E ~ l l (1 - Sbi)Xbi 
__ ~ y _ B B__ :-- + 1 
sAyA 
~ ~__ --....:...:X_B ___ -:- + 1 
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(1 - sA)XA 
+ E : ~ l l (1 - sai)xai 
+ E ~ l l (1 - sbi)Xbi 
---Tai (TA, T B, {Tai }j#i' {Tbi}) = 
(1 - sA)XA 
+(1- SB)XB 
+ ~ j # i ( 1 1 - sa j )xa] 
+ ~ ~ 1 1 (1 - Sbi)Xbi 
yb i ' I , - . . - - - - = - - - - - ~ " " + 1 
sAyA 
+sByB 
(1- sA)XA 
+(1- sB)XB 
+ ~ ? ~ 1 1 (1 - sai)xai 
+ ~ j # i ( 1 1 - sb i )Xb i 
(3.22) 
where {Ta i } and {Tbi} represents the set of all tariffs of countries ai and bi ; and 
{Tai}j#i and {Tbi}j#i are {Ta i } - Ta i and {Tbi } - T bi , respectively. It can be shown 
that the tariffs of the countries with similar trade patterns are strategic complements 
while the tariffs of the countries with different trade patterns are strategic substitutes.22 
22 Consider the best response tariff function of A in (3.22), for example, Z ~ ~ ~
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This is because, from (3.20) and (3.21), the tariffs of the countries exporting the same 
goods affect the world relative price in the same way but there are different signs for the 
tariffs of the countries exporting different goods. 
To simplify the analysis, the endowment structure is assumed to be 
XA 8x f3xX yA = 8x (1 - f3y)y 
XB 8y (1 - f3x ) X yB = 8yf3yy 
xa
i (1 - 8x ) f3 X yai = (1 - 8x ) (1 - f3 )Y 
nx x n y 
x 
Vi 1,2, ... , nx 
X bi (1 n by) (1 - .ex) X ybi = (1 - 8y) f3 y 
n y y y 
Vi 1,2, ... ,ny (3.23) 
In addition to the degree of specialisation f3x and f3y which indicate the allocation 
of endowments hence the volume of trade between the countries with different trade 
patterns, new parameters, which indicate the allocation of endowments between countries 
with similar trade patterns (the world market structure of each good), are introduced 
into the model. 0 < 8x < 1 is the proportion of all endowments available to the countries 
exporting good x shared by country A while the rest (1 - 8x ) is shared equally among 
countries a l , a2 , ... , anz . Likewise, 0 < 8y < 1 is the proportion of all endowments available 
to the countries exporting good y shared by country B while the rest (1 - 8y ) is shared 
. bl b2 b I hi . 1 2 n . d t· al equally among countnes , , ... , fly. n t sway, countnes a ,a , ... , a z are 1 en lC 
as are countries bl , b2 , ..• , bn", and their superscripts will be omitted henceforth. When 
8x and 8y are large enough A and B will share larger endowments hence larger market 
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shares in their exportable markets than their counterparts which export the same goods. 
Therefore, we call country A and B as the 'dominating exporters' of their exportable 
markets and countries a and b as the 'small-size exporters' since they own less endowments 
hence less market shares than their dominating counterparts.23 Consequently, bx and by 
will be called 'the degree of market domination', an increase in bx (by) will be interpreted 
as the world market of good x (y) is more dominated by country A (B) so that it moves 
toward a monopolistic market. 
The number of small-size exporters nx and ny can be interpreted as representing the 
'market concentration' of good x and y, respectively. An increase in nx (ny) means more 
exporters of good x (y) in the world market, i.e. the market is less concentrated, which 
means the world market of good x (y) moves toward more competition. From (3.20), 
(3.21), and (3.23), it can readily be established that when nx and ny are very large, the 
small-size exporters are so small that they cannot influence the world prices and free 
trade is their optimal policy. There will be only two dominating exporters, A and B, 
whose market power to manipulate the world prices still remains. 24 
Substituting (3.23) into (3.22) yields 
23The term 'small-size' is used to avoid confusion with the term 'small' country which means the 
country that has no market power to influence the world prices. 
24 As n n --. 00 x a i ya i X b i and yb i approach zero hence ~ ~ and ...2!J....bt approach zero. From x, y , , , , aTo aT 
(3.22), the best response tariff for all countries ai and bi are always free trade. Another possibility for 
countries a i and bi to be 'small' is 8x , 8y --. 1. 
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\ 
6z f3;&. +1 
(1 - SB)by (1 - f3x) 
+(1 - sa) (1 - bx) f3x 
+(1 - sb) (1 - by) (1 - f3x) 
6z (I-f3Ji!) +1 
sBb f3 y y 
+sa (1 - bx) (1 - f3y) 
+sb (1 - by) f3 y 
6yf3Ji! 
-r--_2.::JL_-- + 1 
sAbx {1 - f3y) 
+sa (1 - bx ) (1 - f3y) 
+sb (1 - by) f3y 
r-__ - - = . i . 6 y ~ ( 1 1=.!:,f3:&1;&. ) ~ - - - + 1 
(1 - sA)bx f3 x 
+(1 - sa) (1 - bx ) f3x 
+(1 - sb) (1 - by) (1 - f3x) 
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T a = 
(1-6z )Pz 
nz 
(1 - sA)8x{3x 
+(1 - sB)8y (1 - (3x) 
+ ( n ~ ~ l ) ) (1 - sa ) (1 - 8x) {3x 
+(1 - sb) (1 - 8y) (1 - (3x) 
(1-6z )(1-Py ) 
nil; 
sA8x{1- (3y) 
+sB8y{3y 
+ ( n ~ ~ l ) ) sa (1 - 8x ) (1 - (3y) 
+Sb (1 - 8y) {3y 
-;:--____ nJl....y -----:- + 1 
sA8x{1 - (3y) 
+sB8y{3y 
+sa (1 - 8x) (1 - (3y) 
+ ( n y ~ l ) ) sb (1 - 8y) {3y 
+1 
+1 
-;:--_____ ----'ny'---_____ _=_ + 1 
(1 - sA)8x{3x 
+(1 - sB)8y (1 - (3x) 
+ (1 - sa ) (1 - 8 x) {3 x 
+ ( ~ ~ 1 ) ) (1 - sb) (1 - 8y) (1 - (3x) 
(3.24) 
Using the best response tariff functions in (3.24)25, a simulation analysis is conducted 
to investigate the effects of the model parameters on the non-cooperative equilibrium. 
Since the focus of our analysis is on how the world market structure of both goods 
25Note that the best response tariff functions for the small-size countries in (3.24) are not final since 
the terms sa and Sb still exist on the right hand sides to keep the expressions simple. 
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affects the Nash equilibrium while f3z and f3y indicate only the volwne of trade between 
countries, they are assumed to be equal and constant throughout the analysis to reduce 
the volume of complexity. The simulation results are obtained assuming f3
z 
= (3y = 0.7.26 
The effects of the degree of market domination (6z and 6y) and market concentration (n x 
and ny) on the Nash equilibrium are considered one at a time by keeping the other 
constant and symmetric between the x-exporting and the y-exporting countries. The 
simulation results are shown in Appendix A.3. The results with regard to the Nash 
equilibrium tariffs are discussed in detail below. 
Degree of market domination 
The effects of 6z and 6y on the Nash equilibrium tariffs are shown in Table A.2 and can 
be represented by Figure 3-3. 
The diagrams in Figure 3-3 are obtained arbitrarily assuming that nz = ny = 9. The 
relationship between the Nash equilibrium tariffs and the degree of market domination 
in the market of one good is drawn keeping the degree of market domination in the 
market of the other good fixed at 0.5. Since the degree of specialisation and the number 
of small-size exporters between the x-exporting and the y-exporting countries are kept 
equal, i.e. f3z = f3y and nz = ny, the two diagrams in Figure 3-3 mirror each other. 
Therefore, discussion of only the change in 6z is sufficient. When 6z is equal to 0, there 
is no country A hence its tariff is zero. As 6z increases from zero, Tt increases and 
TN decreases. TH and TJv increase with 6z over the interval in which Tt < TN 27 and 
26 Note that by introducing more countries exporting the same goods, the limit case in which a country's 
optimum tariff is trade prohibitve will never occur since no single country can monopolise its export. 
This can be seen from (3.24), for example, assuming that /3% = 1, the best response tariff of country A 
6 
will be [ ( i - _ 4 ) ~ - & i E ) J J +1 which is always finite, given that 6% < 1, i.e. there exists (1- v) +1 
(_B 6 11 1'11 +_0 (1-6.,)( 1 1'1/)+-"( 1-61/ )1'1/] 
other countries apart from A who are exporting x. 
27 i.e. until 6% = 0.1, the point where all countries exporting good x including A are identical. For 
6% ~ ~ 0.1, A has smaller endowment than each of country a hence the world market of good x is not 
dominated by A. 
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Figure 3-3: Degree of market domination and Nash equilibrium tariff, given nx = ny = 9. 
decrease thereafter. TN = 1 when 8x equals to 1 (there are no countries a).28 Tt ~ ~ T ~ ~
and TN ~ ~ Tt when 8x ~ ~ 8y • 
An increase in the degree of market domination in one market directly increases 
the tariff of the dominating exporter in that market since it obtains a greater market 
power due to its larger market share. On the contrary, this means the smaller market 
share hence the smaller tariffs of the small-size exporters in the same market. 29 Due 
to the strategic substitutability between tariffs of the countries that have different trade 
patterns; provided that the market is dominated by the dominating exporter, the strategic 
effect of the increase in the dominating exporter's tariff dominates the strategic effect of 
the decrease in the small-size exporters' tariffs so that the tariffs of those exporters in 
the other market are reduced. 
28Note that when both 6:£ and 6" equal to 1, the model reduces to the 2-country model as in the 
previous chapter. 
29Due to the strategic complementarity of their tariffs, the larger tariff of the dominating exporter at 
the same time strategically increases the tariffs of its small-size counterparts. However, the simulation 
results show that, with respect to an increase in 6j , the direct effect dominates the strategic effect. 
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Figure 3-4: Market concentration and Nash equilibrium tariff, given bx = by = 0.5. 
Market concentration 
The effects of nx and ny on the Nash equilibrium tariffs are shown in Table A.3 and can 
be represented by Figure 3-4. 
The diagrams in Figure 3-4 are obtained arbitrarily assuming that bx = by = 0.5. The 
relationship between the Nash equilibrium tariffs and the number of small-size exporters 
of one good is drawn keeping the number of small-size exporters of the other good fixed 
at 10. Since the degree of specialisation and the degree of market domination between 
the x-exporting countries and the y-exporting countries are kept equal, i.e. {3x = {3y and 
bx = by, the two diagrams in Figure 3-4 mirror each other. Therefore, only the change in 
nx will be discussed. From Figure 3-4, when nx is equal to 1, T: = TN since bx = 0.5 is 
assumed so that there are two identical x-exporting countries. It can be seen that T: and 
TN decrease while Tn and T ~ ~ increase with n x . When nx is very large, TN approaches 1 
as the small-size x-exporters become small. T: ~ ~ Tn and TN ~ ~ T ~ ~ when nx ~ ~ ny. 
Given a constant market size, an increase in the nwnber of small-size exporters in one 
Inarket dearly reduces the market share of each of them hence their smaller tariffs. An 
increase in nx leaves the market shares of the other countries unchanged. This implies 
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that only T ~ ~ are directly affected by an increase in nx which is reflected by the sharp 
decrease of T ~ ~ in the left diagram of Figure 3-4 while the others respond to the change 
in nx only gradually. Considering the best response tariff functions of the other countries 
apart from country a reveals that the effects of the increase in nx on those countries' 
tariffs are only through its effect on T ~ . .30 Since TN and T ~ ~ are strategic complements 
and T ~ ~ and TR, TJv are strategic substitutes, the decrease in TN strategically decreases 
the equilibrium tariff of A while increases the equilibrium tariff of B and b as shown in 
the left diagram. 
Proposition 1 summarises the above results which are necessary for the main argument 
of this chapter. 
Proposition 1 (i) Given that nx = ny, T ~ ~ ~ ~ TP and TN ~ ~ TJ\, when bx ~ ~ by. 
(ii) Given that bx = by, T ~ ~ ~ ~ TP and TN ~ ~ TJ\, when nx ~ ~ n y. 
Proposition 1 (i) states that given equal numbers of exporters in both markets, in the 
more dominated market, the dominating exporter imposes a larger tariff and the small-
size exporters impose smaller tariffs relative to the tariffs of the exporters of the same 
types in the other market. This is because the degree of market domination indicates 
the distribution of endowments among the exporters in a market. As compared to the 
exporters in the other market, a larger degree of market domination indicates the larger 
endowments for the dominating exporter but the smaller endowments for each of the 
small-size exporters which imply their market power to impose tariffs. 
Proposition 1 (ii) states that given equal degree of market domination in both nlar-
kets, the exporters in the more concentrated market impose larger tariffs. This is because, 
as compared to the exporters in the other market, the smaller number of small-size ex-
porters in a market indicates the larger endowments available to each of them. This 
implies the greater market power of each of them to impose larger tariffs. As discussed 
above, their larger tariffs strategically increase their dominating co-exporter's tariff. 
30lt can be seen in (3.24) that there is no n z in A '5, B's and b's best response tariff functions. 
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In general, Proposition 1 states that the exporters (at least the dominating exporter) 
in the less competitive market (larger degree of market domination and smaller number 
of exporters) tends to have the greater market power to impose larger tariffs. 
3.3.2 Welfare analysis 
For a country to win a trade war, the necessary condition is that the world relative price 
must be shifted to its advantage. Therefore, to examine how the market structure affects 
the countries' payoffs in the trade war, its effects on the equilibrium world relative price 
should be discussed. 
World relative price 
Recall that qN represents the Nash equilibrium world relative price and qF = ~ ~ represents 
the world relative price under free trade. Substitute (3.23) into (3.19), 
(1 - sA) 8x,8x 
+ (1 - SB) 8y(1 - ,8x) 
+(1 - sC)(l - 8x),8x 
qN +(1 - sD)(l - 8y)(1 - ,8x) (3.25) 
--
qF sA8x(1 - ,8y) 
+sB8y,8y 
+sc (1 - 8x)(1 - ,8y) 
+sD(l - 8y),8y 
~ ~ < 1 ( ~ ~ > 1) indicates an improvement in the terms of trade of the x-exporting 
qF qF 
(y-exporting) countries. The effects of a change in the degree of market domination and 
the number of small-size exporters can be examined by substituting the tariffs in Tables 
A.2 and A.3 into (3.25) correspondingly. The results obtained in Tables A.4 and A.5 in 
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Figure 3-5: Degree of market domination and Nash equilibrium world relative price, given 
nx = ny = 9. 
Appendix A.3 are represented by Figure 3-5 and Figure 3-6. 
It can be observed in Figure 3-5 that the Nash equilibrium world relative price in-
creases with 8x to a certain value and decreases thereafter while it decreases with 8y to 
a certain value and increases thereafter. In addition, !l!i.. > 1 when 8x < 8y and !l!i.. < 1 qF qF 
when 8x > 8y • Similarly, Figure 3-6 shows that the Nash equilibrium world relative price 
is increasing with nx while decreasing with ny, and !l!i.. > 1 when nx > ny and !l!i.. < 1 qF qF 
when nx < n y. These results imply that the Nash equilibrium world relative price will 
be in favour of the countries whose exportable market is less competitive as compared 
to the world market of the other good (larger degree of market domination and smaller 
number of exporters). This is because, by Proposition 1, the exporters (at least the 
dominating exporter) in the less competitive market tends to have the greater market 
power to iInpose larger tariffs.3! 
31 However, it can be seen in Figure 3-5 that a larger degree of market domination in a market tends to 
work against the interests of the exporters in that market when the degree of market domination is small. 
This is because over the interval of small values of 6j , the market is not dominated by its dominating 
exporter. Therefore, the strategic effect of the reduction in the small-size exporters' tariffs that raises 
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Figure 3-6: Market concentration and Nash equilibrium world relative price, given fJ x = 
8y = 0.5. 
However, for a country to win in equilibrium, the welfare gain from an improvement 
in the country's terms of trade must be large enough to overcome the welfare loss from 
reduction in its trade volume. As discussed above, there is a monotonic relationship 
between the countries' terms of trade and the degree of incompetitiveness in their ex-
portable markets. Therefore, it is readily implied that the degree of market domination 
and market concentration in the market of one good must be 'sufficiently large' relative 
to the degree of market domination and market concentration in the other market to 
make the dominating andj or the small-size exporters of that good win the trade war. In 
the symmetric case, Figure 3-5 and Figure 3-6 suggest that the Nash equilibrium world 
relative price is equal to the free trade level when 8x = 8y and nx = n y . In which case, all 
countries are bound to lose in equilibrium since neither of them are successful in shifting 
the world relative price to their advantage despite the welfare cost of tariffs that they 
impose. These points can be established more concretely when the countries' equilibrium 
the tariffs of the exporters in the other market dominates so that the equilibrium world relative price is 
shifted from their advantage. 
74 
J 
0.1 
~ y = 0 . 5 5
I 
- - - - - - - - ~ ~I 
I 
I 
I 
••••. \ I 
" ... ', I 
, .... , ' 
I "., .,/1 ".,/1 
I ••• •• ,.U N U F 
I ....... , • : .•..• ~ , : :
I ., iII'-} ., JJ 
U'N.'" U F 
"1 
0 . 5 ~ / / ~ A A 1 ~ x x 0.1 0.5 
I 
• 
cis l cI F 
1 ~ y y
Figure 3-7: Degree of market domination and Nash equilibrium utilitiy, given nx = ny = 
9. 
welfare is considered. 
Equilibrium welfare 
The payoff outcome can be examined by considering the ratio of the Nash equilibrium 
to free trade utility. From (3.6), 
Substituting results in Tables A.2 and A.3 for ~ ~ and results in Tables A.4 and A.5 
for qN correspondingly to the values of 8x , 8y, n x , and ny yields the values of the Nash 
equilibrium to free trade utility ratio in Tables A.6 and A.7 in Appendix A.3. Country i 
wins the trade war if .Vf > 1. 
F 
The results in A.6 and A.7 can be represented by Figure 3-7 and Figure 3-8. In Figure 
3-7 and Figure 3-8, the countries' Nash utilities increase with the degrees of market 
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Figure 3-8: Market concentration and Nash equilibrium utility, given hx = hy = 0.5. 
domination and decrease with the numbers of small-size exporters in their exportable 
markets. 32 In Figure 3-7, bx must be sufficiently greater than hy for ~ ~ and ~ ~ to be uF uF 
greater than 1 and similarly, by must be sufficiently greater than hx for ~ ~ and * to be uF uF 
greater than 1. In Figure 3-8, nx must be sufficiently less than ny for ~ ~ and ~ ~ to be uF uF 
greater than 1 and similarly, ny must be sufficiently less than nx for TriuUB and * to be 
F uF 
greater than 1. Therefore, Proposition 2 can be established below. 
Proposition 2 An exporter of one good can win the tmde war if the world market of 
that good is 'sufficiently' dominated and/or 'sufficiently' concentmted relative to the world 
market of the other good. 
Proposition 2 implies that there is a greater possibility for a country to win the 
32Note that since only the case where the world market of one good is dominated by a single country is 
in concern, the case in which the market of good x is not dominated by country A, 6% < 0.1 and the case 
in which the market of good y is not dominated by country B, 6y < 0.1, are omitted from Figure 3-7. 
In such cases, the countries' utilities decrease with the degrees of market domination since qN increases 
with 6z E (0,0.1) and decreases with 6" E (0,0.1). At 6:r; = 0.1 and 6" = 0.1, A and a are identical and 
B and b are identical for nz = n" = 9. This is reflected by the utility curves of A and a start from the 
same origin in the left diagram and the utility curves of B and b start from the same origin in the right 
diagram in Figure 3-7. See Figure 3-5 for details. 
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trade war, even if the country's endowments are relatively small, if the world market 
of its exportable moves closer to the monopolistic market, i.e. there are less countries 
exporting the same good and/or the world endowment of that good is divided more 
disproportionately among its exporters. This is understandable when we consider a 
monopolistic market in which the monopolist sets the price of its product to maximise 
profit of the whole industry. The price set by the monopolist gives the highest profit that 
the firm can obtain. However, when there is more than one firm competing in the market. 
those firms set their prices unilaterally to maximise their own profits instead of the 
industry profit as a whole. Therefore, they end up with a price hence their profits lower 
than what they would obtain otherwise. If the world market of one good is a monopolistic 
market which has only one exporter, that exporter setting a tariff is analogous to the 
monopolist setting the price. When there is more than one exporter, they unilaterally 
set their tariffs which are smaller than what are optimal for them as a whole. 33 The 
greater the extent to which a market differs from the monopolistic market, the greater 
is the difference between its exporters' unilateral tariffs and the collective optimal levels. 
Therefore, when the world market of one good moves closer to the monopolistic market, 
the exporters in that market are able to impose larger unilateral tariffs and hence a 
greater possibility for them to win the trade war. 
3.3.3 Discussions 
Furthermore, there are a few points that are worth discussing. 
More competition, less restrictive trade From the discussion of Proposition 2 
above, the ability of a country to impose a unilateral tariff seems to be positively related 
with the degree of incompetitiveness in the world market of its exportable. Therefore, 
it is logical to argue that the world trade will be less restrictive in the non-cooperative 
33Each exporter sets a smaller tariff in equilibrium when there ~ r e e more, of t ~ e m m s i ~ c e e (i) each o ~ ~
them is relatively smaller, and (ii) due to the strategic complementanty of theIr tanffs, theIr co-exporters 
tariffs are smaller. 
77 
equilibrium if there are more competitions in the world markets (smaller degrees of market 
domination and larger numbers of exporters). 34 This point can be illustrated clearly by 
considering the Nash equilibrium tariffs in the cells along the diagonal of Table A.3 where 
nx = n y. The Nash equilibrium tariffs of all countries decrease as nx = Tty increase. The 
standard two-country two-good model is a special case of the many-country two-good 
model in this section. It consists of two (world) markets and each of which has only one 
exporter so that we can expect a more restrictive trade in equilibrium as compared to 
the model consisting of more countries. 
The advantage of being small It can be seen from Figures 3-7 and 3-8 that the 
small-size exporters have greater tendency to win the trade war than their dominating 
counterparts as they require less degree of market domination and market concentration 
to win the trade war. For example, from the left diagrams in Figure 3-7 and 3-8, the 
minimum degree of market domination and the minimum degree of market concentration 
required by the small-size x-exporters to win the trade war is less than that required 
by the dominating exporter, i.e. ~ ~ < ~ ~ and ~ ~ > n:. This is because the small-
size exporters can obtain the same level of the equilibrium world relative price as their 
dominating counterparts while they impose smaller tariffs hence smaller loss from the 
reduction in their trade volume. 
Figure 3-7 shows that even when the small-size countries are 'small' as most of their 
exportable markets are dominated by their dominating counterparts, i.e. 6x or 6y ap-
proaches 1, they still be able to benefit from the global trade war. This result is in 
contrast with the previous literature which shows that the small countries always lose 
the trade war.35 This is because, in this model, even a 'small' small-size country set zero 
tariffJ6, it can still free ride its dominating counterpart's effort to manipulate the world 
34 Since a change in the degree of market domination and market concentration increases the tar-
iffs of some countrie while decreases the tariffs of other countries in equilibrium, the degree of trade 
restrictiveness could be measured by the average of the countries' Nash equilibrium tariffs. 
35For example, Mayer (1981), Kennan and Reizman (1988), etc. 
36When nz,n" ~ ~ 00 and/or 6%,6" -+ 1, XO, yo, X b , and yb approach zero. From (3.22), the best 
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relative price. 37 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter re-investigated the theory of optimum tariff and retaliation in the multi-
country setting. We started from constructing a tw<rcountry tw<rgood trade model as 
the benchmark in section 3.2. In the tW<rcountry setting, which country could win the 
trade war depended on which one was able to impose a tariff that was sufficiently larger 
than the other's to shift the world relative price to its advantage. Similar to the pricing 
behaviour of the monopoly firm in a market, the less elastic foreign demand faced by a 
country, the larger the market power of that country to impose a larger tariff. As the two 
countries shared the same pool of endowment, when the exporting country was endowed 
with more of its exportable, the importing country was endowed with less of the same 
good. This implied a greater degree the importing country had to rely on imports from 
the exporting country hence its less elastic demand. Consequently, it was established that 
the greater the degree of specialisation of a country, the greater the level of tariff that 
country could impose and the greater the possibility that country could win a trade war. 
These results replicated the results in the previous literature. However, it was shown in 
section 3.2.2 that, in the limit where both countries completely relied on trade (both of 
them monopolised their export abies ), the welfare loss from engaging in a trade war was 
too high such that they unilaterally implemented free trade. 
In the multi-country tw<rgood model in section 3.3, the trade war outcome did not 
depend on the tariffs of only two countries which were strategic substitutes. There was 
also a possibility that the countries' tariffs could be strategic complements since there was 
more than one country trading under the same trade pattern. With the help of simulation 
response tariffs for all countries a and b are always free trade. 
37The possibility that the 'small' countries would be able to free-ride on the tariffs of the 'large' 
countries with similar trade pattern as there may be positive terms of trade externalities between them 
is mentioned by Syropoulos (2002). 
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analysis, it was revealed that all countries' Nash equilibrium tariffs are positively related 
with their market shares which depended on how the world endowments are divided 
among the countries, the degree of market domination and market concentration in their 
respective markets in particular. The welfare analysis implied that anyone country could 
win the trade war if the world market of its exportable was 'sufficiently' dominated and/or 
'sufficiently' concentrated relative to the world market of the other good. This was due to 
the fact that the more exporters in the world market of one good, the smaller the tariffs 
those exporters would impose unilaterally relative to what are optimal for them as a 
whole. Since the outcome of the trade war depended on the relative size of the opposing 
tariffs to shift the world relative price from free trade, it was those exporters in the 
sufficiently dominated and sufficiently concentrated market which imposed sufficiently 
larger tariffs than the tariffs of the exporters in the other market that won the trade war. 
As opposed to the results in the literature, these finding lead us to conclude that, due 
to the positive tariff externalities between countries that have the same trade pattern, 
a country would be able to win a trade war when the world market of its exportable is 
relatively less competitive even if that country is small. 
The multi-country two-good trade model in this chapter can be extended to study 
the cooperative tariff setting. Analogous to the Cournot duopoly game where the non-
cooperative price is lower than what the firms can achieve if they can determine their 
production cooperatively, there is a possibility that the non-cooperative tariffs between 
countries that have the same trade pattern are too low that they exploit less than efficient 
terms of trade. Therefore, the trade agreements as the collusions between countries to 
further improve their terms of trade should be worth investigating. This type of trade 
agreement is studied in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
International Trade Agreements: 
Terms of Trade and Volume of 'frade 
Incentives 
This chapter extends the Inany-country tW( }-good trade Inodel in chapter 3 to illV('st igat(' 
the ncgotiation of trade agrC('lll('llt alnong a sllbsd of tIl<' c()untri('s. All important f('a-
lurc of tIl(' many-c()untry two-good trade nlOdel is that tariffs are stratq!;ic ('()lllpl('IlH'llts 
J)dW('('1l C()lllltri('s that hay!' tIl<' same trad(' patt('rn and an' strat('gic substitut('s oth-
('J"wis('. Th('re[()r<" two possible t rad(' agn'(,llH'llts can be in\'('st igat('<i: (i) an agrccIlwnt 
hd W('( '11 countries whos(' tariffs arc strategic cOInpleInents. and (ii) an a ,!..', rc( 'IJl( 'lit l)('t WP( 'II 
('()Illltri!'s whose tariffs are strategic substitutes. Since thest' trade agreelnents inlpl,\" dif-
f ( ' n ~ l l t t S( )IllT('S of gain for t IH' negotiating countries (gain frOIn an iInpruv(,lll('llt in t(,rIllS 
of trad(' for the fonner and gain frOIn an increase in trade \'()lmne for tlw lattt'r). t h i ~ ~
cha pt ('I' ('XCllnill!'S the ch()ic!' of a country by' comparing th(' wdfare ilIlplica t i()Il:-' uf t IH' 
tW() possibilities, It is fOllIld that Cl cOlllltry would prefer to ha\'(' a trade agn'('lllcllt with 
t h(' (,Ollllt ry w hos(' f'n<i()\\'IlH'llt S of goods an' rplat in'ly huge n 'gardlf'Ss ()f til!' st ratl'gic 
(,Olllpl<'lllellt arity or sllbs! itllt ability of t heir tariffs. 
4.1 Introduction 
It has been accepted, at least in neoclassical economics, that trade liberalisation can 
raise countries' welfare and the world welfare at large. The trade liberalisation has been 
conducted on the multilateral basis in which all countries participate in the negotiation, 
drafting, and adoption of the common trade rules. On the one hand, given diverse 
economic and political interests among countries, multilateral trade negotiation under 
the GATT had proved itself to be a slow process. It had gone through eight rounds 
of negotiation from 1947 to 1994 before the establishment of the WTO in 1995. On 
the other hand, the process had delivered significant results in liberalising world trade. 
Negotiated tariffs for industrial goods had been reduced close to zero, new sectors such 
as services and even the trouble field of agriculture were brought into the negotiations, 
etc. 
Given the increasing complexity of agendas incorporated into the negotiations such 
as environmental and intellectual property issues and more participants with even Inore 
diverse interests such as those transitional economies in Eastern Europe and the joining 
of China, the multilateral trade negotiation has now faced with new challenges. Some 
such as Steinberg (1997) and Rode (2003) advocate the cooperation between the US and 
the EU to deal with the challenges by pressuring all other countries to be in line with the 
multilateral trade liberalisation as they succeeded in closing the Uruguay Round. l P r ~ ~
posals have been made to foster the two economic powers closer tie such as a call for the 
negotiation of a Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA) and even deeper coop-
eration, ''the New Transatlantic Marketplace (NTM) that would progressively elilninate 
tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, and would presumably address deeper trade-related 
policies such as standards, subsidies, intellectual property protection, investInent mea-
sures, services, and competition policy" (Steinberg, 1997). However, neither of theIn has 
1 "By withdrawing from the GATT 1947 and joining the WTO,. the transatlantic powers f o r ~ ~ .the 
rest of the world to join the WTO or lose their Most-Favoured-Natlon access to Europe and the Umted 
States, which no GATT Contracting Party could afford." (Steinberg, 1997). 
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yet happened. 
A number of barriers to transatlantic trade policy cooperation have been suggested 
in the literature. Among others, Steinberg (1997) argues that the US or the EU itself 
might have other attractive alternatives to the cooperation with each other or even to the 
multilateral trade liberalisation. Many trade arrangements with the third countries have 
been made by both the US and the EU to secure their market access to those countries or 
even competitively to put their own producers on a better footing in those markets than 
the producers of the other. He argues further that the US and the EU appear in some 
respects to be rivalling each other to establish trade arrangements with third countries 
or regions. The excellent examples are the US's economic cooperation with Asia through 
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) which was perceived in Europe as an 
American alternative to Atlanticism (Rode, 2003) and the EU's counter arrangement 
with East Asian economies including China through the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) 
(Brennan, 2001). It is this point of argument which motivates this chapter to study why 
one country would prefer to coordinate its trade policy with one group of countries rather 
than others. 
It is argued that countries trade at the level less than efficient in the trade war equi-
librium since their unilateral tariffs are too high. The role of eliminating this inefficiency 
is a rationale for the trade agreement provided in the literature. Bagwell and Staiger 
(1999, 2002) show that the inefficiency in the trade war equilibrium arises solely from the 
countries' unilateral incentive to manipulate their terms of trade and the trade agree-
ment is the means by which this terms of trade incentive can be removed. It has been 
shown that the efficient trade agreement between any two countries is not unique. In 
fact, Mayer (1981) show that there exists a set of trade agreements which are Pareto 
efficient. The recent works on trade agreement, therefore, devotes to the study of trade 
negotiation to select a unique agreement among those efficient ones.2 In general, the gain 
2The static model of trade negotiation focuses on how the gain from the cooperation is to be divided 
among the negotiating countries using the Nash bargaining solution. In ~ ~ i t i o n , , in light of the f ~ t t
that the international trade agreement must be self-enforcing, the negotlatlon of trade agrE'('IIWnt 15 
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from trade agreement in this line of literature comes from an increase in the countries' 
trade volwne. However, as recognised in the customs union literature, such as Kennan 
and Riezman (1990) and Syropoulos (1999), another source of gain from trade agreement 
can be the collective market power of the member-countries to exploit their tenns of 
trade. It is argued that the countries that import the same good can internalise their 
(positive) tariff externality by setting their tariff jointly in a customs union. 
This chapter is based on the multi-country two-good trade model in chapter 3 in 
which the countries' tariffs can be strategic complements as well as strategic substitutes. 
Therefore, the trade agreement of which the negotiating countries collectively exploit their 
terms of trade can be studied as well as the trade agreement of which the negotiating 
countries agree to adjust their trade policies to increase their trade volume. We shall term 
the former as 'the terms of trade-driven trade agreement' and the latter as 'the volume 
of trade-driven trade agreement' henceforth. Since the two types of trade agreement 
imply different sources of gain and, especially, different negotiating parties, this chapter 
investigates the conditions in which a country might prefer one type of agreement to the 
other. 
The analysis is made by considering the two types of trade agreement separately. 
Then their welfare implications are compared from a perspective of a country. Section 
4.2 studies the trade agreement within a two-country two-good trade model to re-derive 
the results in the literature against which the results in the following sections can be 
compared. Section 4.3 develops the multi-country model in which the volume of trade-
driven and the terms of trade-driven trade agreement are studied in sections 4.3.1 and 
4.3.2, respectively. Section 4.3.3 compares the welfare gains over the non-cooperative 
equilibrium (studied in chapter 3) between the two possibilities. Conclusion is made in 
section 4.4. 
studied in the dynamic repeated game framework. The fact that the equilibrium trade agreement 
must be sustainable such that no member country has an incentive to defect restricts the set of the 
possible agreements. The sustainable trade agreements may not be fully efficient, ?owever: the r e s ~ l t e d d
equilibrium is more efficient than the non-cooperative one. Examples of works which consider the Issue 
of enforcement are Dixit (1987), Furusawa (1999) and Park (2000). 
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4.2 Two-country model 
As in chapter 3, there are country A and B trading good x and y under the world relative 
price q in which the world price of x is chosen as numeraire. Consumers' preferences are 
identical and are represented by the Cobb-Douglas utility function, Ui = ( c ~ ) ! ! ( c ~ ) ! ! for 
i E {A, B}. 
Both countries are initially endowed with both goods as follows. 
(4.1) 
where 0 < f3x, f3 y < 1. Recall that f3x and f3 y are the 'degree of specialisation' in good 
x and y respectively, and it is assumed that A is the exporter of x and B is the exporter 
of y. f3x + f3 y > 1 must be satisfied for trade to be positive. 
Both countries impose an ad-valorem tariff on their imports, rA, rB E (-1,00) for 
domestic prices to be positive. As was derived in chapter 3, country i's utility in terms 
of its endowments, tariff and the world relative price, and the world relative price as a 
function of the countries' tariffs and endowments are 
u i = y'Ti (Xi + qyi) 
(1 + Ti) .;q (4.2) 
[(1 - sA) x A + (1 - sB) XB] 
q = (sAyA + sByB) (4.3) 
. i A _ TA d B_1 
where T' = 1 + r ,s - l+TA' an s - l+TB· 
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4.2.1 Nash bargaining solution 
The symmetric Nash bargaining solution is employed to study the policy coordination 
between A and B using the Nash equilibrium as the threat point if the agreement cannot 
be reached. Even though the symmetric concept abstracts from any differences in the 
'bargaining ability' between the two players3 ; in the context of this model, the asymmetry 
between them (difference in the degrees of specialisation in the countries' export abIes ) is 
readily captured by the fact that the two countries face different threat points as they 
obtain different payoffs in the non-cooperative game.4 
Suppose that A and B have a chance to negotiate their trade policies, the agreement 
reached by the two countries is the tariff pair ( T ~ , ,Tg) which maximises the product of 
the countries' gains in utility over the non-cooperative outcome. This is given by 
where U ~ ~ and U R are the utility level each country receives in the non-cooperative 
equilibrium. 
It can be seen from (4.2) and (4.3) that a country's tariff both directly and indirectly 
(through the world relative price) affects the country's own utility but only indirectly 
affects its trading partner through the world relative price. Formally, 
3The bargaining ability of a country depends on many factors, such as the negotiation skills of 
the negotiators, political relations between countries, domestic political support and opposition, etc. 
Furusawa (1999) uses the governments' future discount rates to represent their difference in bargaining 
power to examine the issue of enforcement in a repeated game. 
4 Alternatively, one can use the model of alternating offers in which there is infinitesimal lag b e t w ~ n n
offers. In fact, the Nash bargaining solution is the solution to the limit case of the model of alternatmg 
offers as the lag between offers approaches zero. See Furusawa (1999) for example. 
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(8U
A 8UA 8q )dTA 8UA 8q B 
aTA + 8q aTA + aq aTB dT 
8UB 8q dTA (8UB 8UB 8q ) B 
8q aTA + aTB + aq aTB dT (4.4) 
The first order conditions for the above optimisation problem are, therefore, 
(4.5) 
(4.6) 
UA_U A 
where A = B ~ ~
U -UN 
Rearrange (4.5) and (4.6) and divide (4.5) by (4.6), the following expression can be 
obtained. 
(4.7) 
( OUB + oUB Oq) {JTB oq 7ff1l 
(4.7) defines the efficiency condition in which (4.5) and (4.6) are satisfied simulta-
neously. By (4.7), it is straightforward to show that the Nash equilibrimn tariffs are 
inefficient. Recall that the Nash equilibrimn tariffs must satisfy ' / % . ~ ~ + O¥qA :fA = 0 and 
~ : : + l J ~ q B B :is = 0 simultaneously. Since (4.7) will be violated to satisfy these two condi-
tions, as shown by Bagwell and Staiger (1999), the Nash equilibrimn tariffs are inefficient. 
The Nash equilibrium tariffs are inefficient since each country does not interna1ise the 
negative terms of trade externalities of its tariff when it chooses the tariff unilaterally. 
Therefore, both countries end up with higher tariffs and hence lower volmne of trade 
relative to the efficient level. 
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The trade agreement to eliminate this inefficiency can be determined by soh mg (-1.7), 
(4.5), and {4.6)simultaneously. The derivation is provided in Appendix B.l and only the 
key expressions are presented below. 
First, solve (4. 7) for TB, the efficient combinations of trade policies can be obtained. 
(4.8) 
Since TgTg > 1 when both Tg and T9 are greater than 1, the trade agreements 
which entail positive import tariffs by both countries will never be adopted in equilibrium 
since they are inefficient and both countries can still be made better off by altering the 
negotiating tariff pairs. The efficient trade agreement must either entail free trade by 
both countries or there must be an import tariff by one country and an import subsidy 
by the other. 5 
It can be seen that the efficient trade agreement is not unique as it can be any pair of 
tariffs that satisfy (4.8). To determine a unique equilibrium trade agreement (TS, T9), 
substituting (4.8) into (4.3), the cooperative world relative price can be represented by 
1 (XA+XB) 1 X 
qc = Tg (yA + yB) = Tg Y (4.9) 
Substituting (4.8) and (4.9) back into (4.5), it is found that 
(4.10) 
5This result is similar to Mayer (1981) since the governments' objectives in this model are simply to 
maximise national welfare. However, in Bagwell and Staiger (1999), it is possible that the efficient trade 
agreement might entail positive import tariffs by both countries if the g o v e ~ n m e n t s s of both c o u n t r i ~ ~
have political motive toward having positive tariffs, i.e. the governments might want to protect their 
import-competing industries etc. 
(4.10) suggests that the trade agreement reached by the two countries Jnust yield 
equal amount of gain to both of them regardless of their different threat points. This is 
because, by employing the symmetric Nash bargaining solution, it is assumed that both 
countries have the same bargaining ability. 6 
Substitute (4.8) and (4.9) into (4.2), 
ug (4.11 ) 
Substitute (4.11) back into (4.10), the expression for TS can be solved for. Then sub-
stituting TS back into (4.8) gives the expression for Tg. Therefore, the trade agreement 
(TS, Tg) reached by the two countries are 
( 4.12) 
From chapter 3, the non-cooperative tariffs and world relative price are T ~ ~ = J ( l ~ ~ z ) ' '
T/J = J ( l ~ " p . ) , , and qN = * ~ . . Substitute these facts into (4.2), 
6 Another point with respect to (4.10) is worth mentioning when (4.5) and (4.6) are reconsidered. 
As A = 1, the use of the symmetric Nash bargaining solution to study the trade policy coordination 
between countries is similar to the approach of maximising the linear sum of the two countries' utilities. 
However, the advantage of the former is that it gives a unique solution. Derivation along the latter 
approach merely suggests that the trade agreement can be any pair of tariffs that satisfy (4.8) while the 
former imposes another condition for uniqueness of the solution which is ( T ~ , ,Tg) must also maximise 
the product of the countries' gains over the non-cooperative outcome (U A - U ~ ) ) (U B - UR). 
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u ~ ~
( 4.13) 
From (4.12) and (4.13), it is clear that when the two countries are symmetric, /3
x 
= /3y 
( hi h · li TA TB A B W C Imp es N = N and UN = UN)' the agreement reached between them will be 
free trade, i.e. T ~ ~ = Tg = 1. 
However, in the situation in which one country has greater market power than the 
other7 , their threat points differ, U ~ ~ =F U ~ , , and free trade between them is definitely not 
the outcome.8 From (4.8), there must be an import tariff by one country and an import 
subsidy by the other. In the mean time, from (4.10), the tariff-subsidy combination must 
yield equal amount of gain over the non-cooperative outcome to both of them as they 
have equal bargaining ability. 
Numerical calculations of (4.12) and (4.13) for some hypothetical values of /3
x 
and 
/3y (shown in Table B.1 in Appendix B.4) suggest that the country with greater degree 
of specialisation in its exportable imposes an import tariff while the other imposes an 
import subsidy. Intuitively, instead of both countries non-cooperatively setting positive 
import tariffs, the country with less market power agrees to subsidise its imports in 
exchange for less aggressive import tariff by the other. In doing so, the country with 
less market power can obtain better terms of trade and both countries can gain from 
an increase in their trade volume, relative to the non-cooperative equilibrium. 9 These 
7The countries' market power is defined by their price elasticities of foreign demand for their exports 
as in chapter 3. The country with greater degree of specialisation in its exportable (f3 j) faces less elastic 
foreign demand for its export hence it has greater market power than the other. 
8Riezman (1982) shows that when the gains from moving to free trade are unevenly distributed. the 
attainment of free trade is more unlikely. 
9The two countries also have losses associating with the agreement relative to the non-cooperative 
equilibrium. They are losses in the tariff revenue and the cost of subsidisation for the country with less 
market power and the deterioration in terms of trade for the other. However, since the agreement is 
efficient, those gains always dominate the losses from implementing the tariff-subsidy combination. 
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results are similar to Mayer (1981) who shows that a trade agreement between a 'small' 
and a 'large' country must entail an import subsidy by the former and an iInport tariff 
by the latter. However, due to the more structural assumptions that we impose and 
the use of the Nash bargaining solution, we can derive a continuous set of equilibrium 
agreements corresponding to different configurations of the negotiating countries. The 
greater is the market power asymmetry, the larger the subsidy and the tariff agreed by 
the two countries.1o 
4.3 Multi-country model 
In this section, the model is still a pure exchange model of two goods, x and y with the 
world endowments of X and Y, however, they are shared by more countries. There are 
countries {A, a \ a 2 , ..• , a n:r;} exporting good x and countries {B, bi , b2 , .•. , bny} exporting 
good y. Recall that A and B are the dominating exporters, and {a l , a2 , ... , an;r} and 
{bI , b2 , ••. , bnll } are the small-size exporters. Assuming that the small-size exporters of 
the same good are identical, the distribution of the world endowment is 
XA 
- oxf3xX yA = ox(l - f3y)Y 
XB Oy (1 - f3x) X yB = Oyf3yy 
xa (1 - ox) f3 X 
nx x 
ya = (1 - ox) (1 - f3 )Y 
nx y 
X b (1 - Oy) (1 - f3x) X yb = (1 - Oy) f3 Y (4.14) 
ny n y y 
Recall that Ox and Oy and nx and ny are the 'degree of market domination' and the 
'degree of market concentration' in the world market of good x and y, respectively. 
10 However, as implied by (4.10), both countries gain equally relative to the non-cooperative equilib-
rium. The use of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution in which both countries have asymmetric 
bargaining ability may alter the distribution of gain to both countries. However, the qualitative results 
of this section will not change. 
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Identical and homothetic preferences represented by the Cobb-Douglas utility function 
is still assumed across all countries. Therefore, (4.2) still holds for all countries. It is 
restated in (4.15). 
u i = ..JTi (Xi + qyi) 
(1 + Ti) vq 
for all i E {A, a, B, b} and T- = 1 + ri. 
With more countries, the world relative price (4.3) becomes 
q = [(1 - sA) XA + (1 - SB) X B + nx(1- sa)xa + ny(1 _ sb)Xb] 
(sAyA + sByB + nxsaya + nysbyb) 
where Si Ti £ 11 {' (1+Ti) or a x-exporting countries, i E A, a}, and s' 
y-exporting countries, i E {B, b}. 
( 4.15) 
( 4.16) 
(1';7") for all 
Consider from the perspective of country A.ll In the previous section, the only trade 
agreement available to A is an agreement with B of which the source of gain is an increase 
in their trade volume. Another alternative available to A in this section is an agreement 
with its small-size co-exporters a of which the source of gain is their collective market 
power to manipulate their terms of trade against the y-exporting countries. Since these 
two types of agreement imply different source of gain and different source of negotiating 
partner to country A, this section examines the conditions in which country A prefers 
one type of agreement to the other. 
Therefore, the trade negotiations to be considered are the bargaining games between 
(i) A and B (the volume of trade-driven trade agreement) and (ii) A and a (the tenns 
11 Recall the discussion on the barriers to the US-EU cooperation as the motivation of this chapter. 
It is argued that they might have more preferable alternatives to the cooperation with each other as 
can be reflected by their recent emphasis on the trade arrangements in many regions rather than the 
cooperation with each other. Therefore, to examine a country's choice of negotiating partners, it is 
reasonable to consider from the perspective of a dominating country if the two dominating countries in 
this model are to be interpreted as representing the US and the EU. 
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of trade-driven trade agreement). It is assumed that the two bargaining games are 
independent of each other, i.e. the bargaining between country A and anyone country 
does not take into account the possibility that country A can also bargain with the other. 
Therefore, the threat points in all cases are the countries' non-cooperative utilities. I:? 
Since the purpose of this section is to compare the negotiating choices of country A, it 
is assumed that only country A is active in seeking a trade agreement and it can only 
be either (i) or (ii) at a time. Therefore, when country A cooperatively setting its tariff 
with anyone country, the other countries' tariffs will be set non-cooperatively. The two 
cases are considered separately and their comparisons are made at the end of this section. 
4.3.1 Volume of trade-driven trade agreement 
Suppose that there is a chance that A and B can coordinate their trade policies while, 
at the same time, the small-size exporters set their trade policies unilaterally. With 
symmetric Nash bargaining, the bargaining solution between A and B in the presence of 
small-size exporters is still the same as in section 4.2. Denote the cooperative tariffs as 
T { ~ + B ) ) and TtA+B)' the bargaining solution is 
Therefore, the first order conditions are the same as in (4.5) and (4.6), hence the 
efficient condition (4.7) which is implied by (4.5) and (4.6) still holds. Therefore, A's 
and B's Nash equilibrium tariffs are still inefficient in this multilateral context. Solving 
(4.7) for TB given that q is represented by (4.16), the efficient trade policy combinations 
between the two countries are defined by 
12 If the bargaining game between A and anyone country takes into account that A can negotiate 
another trade agreement with the other, the bargaining position of A in that bargaining game is improved 
as it alters the threat point to the advantage of A. However, as we compare only the wei fares of A across 
the two bargaining games and the bargaining position of A is improved symmetrically between them, 
removing the assumption that the two bargaining games are unrelated would not change the results. 
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(TA)2 (XAyB + XByA)2 
-4 [ (TA)2 (XB + W) (yA + Z) ] [ (XA + W) (yB + Z) ] 
-Z (XA + XB + W) - (TA)2 W (yA + yB + Z) 
T B = - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - r r ________ ~ ~ ~______ ~ ~__________ ~ ~__ 
2 [ (TA)2 (XB + W) (yA + Z) ] 
-Z (XA + X B + W) 
(4.17) 
where W = [nx (1 - sa) xa + ny (1 - sb) X b] and Z = (nxsaya + nysbyb).13 It can 
be seen that the efficiency locus between the two dominating exporters also depends on 
the small-size exporters' trade policies through their effects on the world relative price q. 
Algebraically, substituting (4.17) for TB in (4.5) and solving for TA, then substituting the 
result back into (4.17), the equilibrium agreement between the two countries in terms of 
the small-size exporters' tariffs can be obtained. In other words, the solutions T ~ ~ (To, T b ) 
and Tg (Ta, Tb) are their cooperative best response tariff functions to the small-size 
exporters' tariffs. Since the small-size exporters' tariffs are chosen non-cooperatively, 
their best response tariff functions are still the same as in chapter 3. The equilibrium 
tariffs of all countries can be obtained by solving all of these best response tariff functions 
simultaneously. Unfortunately, due to the complexity of the multi-country settings, the 
equilibrium tariffs can be solved only numerically by assuming some specific values of 
the model parameters. Therefore, the analysis of this section is based on the simulation 
results for some hypothetical values of those parameters. 
According to the derivation above, in addition to (4.17), the expressions for (4.5) and 
the small-size exporters' best response tariff functions are needed for the simulation to 
13The derivation of (4.17) is shown in Appendix B.2. It can be verified that when there are only 
country A and B, i.e. when the degrees of market domination 6% = 6y = 1 which makes H' = 0 and 
Z = 0, (4.17) is reduced to Tg = IITS as in (4.8). 
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be conducted. 
From (4.2) and (4.16), (4.5) is 
(l-TA) (XA+qyA) 
2v'TA(1+TA)2 .;q 
_ (qyA_XA) rrx 1 (XA+qyA) 
2.;qq (l+TA) (1+TA)2 (sAyA+sByF+Z) 
-A (qyB_XB) v'TB 1 (XA+qyA) 
2.;qq (l+TB) (1+TA)2 (sAyA+sBYB+Z) 
=0 
The expression can be simplified to 
(1 - sA) XA 
(1 - TA) (1 + TA) + (1 _ sB) XB _ (qyA - XA) TA 
A = __ ( ~ I _ + _ T _ B . . . : . ) - - - . . . = =______ --=----==-+_W __ -=--____ _ 
(qyB - xB)'VTB VTA (1 + TA) 
Recall that A = +-----=-=+, therefore, 
(1 - sA) xA 
(I-TA) (I+TA) +(I-sB)XB 
+W 
_ (qyA _ XA) TA 
( 4.18) 
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(4.18) defines A's cooperative best response tariff function to the small-size countries' 
tariffs in which q is represented by (4.16). U ~ ~ and UR are country A's and B's non 
cooperative utility levels. They are available in Tables A.6 and A.7 in Appendix A.3. 
Since the small-size exporters set their trade policies n o n - c o o p e r a t i v e l y ~ ~ the small-size 
exporters' best response tariff functions remain the same as in (3.24) in chapter 3. They 
are implicitly defined by14 
[(l-SA)XA+(l-SB)XB+(n:z:-l)(l-sa )xa+ny(l-sb)Xb] + 1 
ya 
[sAyA+sByB+(n:z:-l)saya+nysbyb] + 1 
( 4.19) 
The simulation is done by solving (4.17), (4.18), and (4.19) simultaneously for TA, 
T B , Ta, and Tb for some hypothetical values of {3x and {3y, bx and by, and nx and ny. U ~ ~
and uR in (4.18) are substituted correspondingly by the results in Tables A.6 and A.7 
in Appendix A.3. Assume that {3x = {3y = 0.7 throughout the rest of the analysis for the 
convenience of comparison with the non-cooperative results in chapter 3 ({3x = (3y = 0.7 is 
assumed there). The effects of the degrees of market domination (bx and by) and market 
concentration ( nx and ny) are considered separately by assuming the other being equal 
and constant. The results, to be represented by T { ~ + B ) ' ' T ( ~ + B ) ' ' T(A+B)' and T(bA+B ), are 
substituted back into (4.16) for the equilibrium world relative price q(A+B) and into (4.2) 
for the equilibrium utilities U(A+B)' As mentioned earlier, to evaluate the effects of the 
trade agreement, these results will be analysed relative to the non-cooperative results in 
chapter 3. The results are shown in Tables B.2 to B.7 in Appendix B.4. 
As in chapter 3, the effects of the degree of market domination are investigated 
14Note that SO (TO) and sb (Tb) are left on the right hand sides of the expressions for the convenience 
of presentation. If there are only one a and one b, the terms sa an.d sb on the right hand sides are 
eliminated and the expressions in (4.19) are their best response tariff functions. See their derivat ion in 
Appendix A.2. 
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by assuming nz = ny = 9 while the effects of the degree of market concentration are 
investigated by assuming 8z = 8y = 0.5. The results are shown in Tables B.2 and B.5 
for the equilibrium tariffs, Tables B.3 and B.6 for the equilibrium world relative price, 
and Tables B.4 and B.7 for the equilibrium utilities. The non-cooperative results are also 
presented for comparison. In Tables B.3 and B.6, the world relative prices are normalised 
by the free trade world relative price qF = ~ ~ to eliminate the term ~ , , therefore, the 
values shown indicate the percentage values relative to the free trade level. In Tables B.4 
and B.7, the equilibrium utilities are normalised by the corresponding non-cooperative 
utilities so that the values which exceed 1 indicate the welfare improvement from the 
non-cooperative equilibrium and the other way round for the values less than 1. 
Similar to the result in the two-country model, it can be observed from Tables B.2 and 
B.5 that free trade agreement between A and B is achieved only in the symmetric cases 
where 8z = 8y and nz = n y . Otherwise, the trade agreement must entail a lower import 
tariff (relative to the Nash equilibrium tariff) by the country that has greater market 
power (the country whose exportable market is more dominated and more concentrated) 
in exchange for an import subsidy by the other. 
From Tables B.4 and B.7, both A and B gain from the trade agreement over the 
non-cooperative outcomes in all cases since the non-cooperative tariffs are inefficient 
between them. However, despite their symmetric bargaining ability (reflected by the use 
of symmetric Nash bargaining solution), A and B do not always gain an equal amount in 
equilibrium as in the two-country model. This is because the efficient tariff combinations 
between them still depends on the small-size exporters' endowments and their trade 
policies (the terms W and Z in (4.17)) hence their utilities are not always perfectly 
substitutable in their bargaining (the efficient frontier in the utility space is not linear 
with the slope -1, therefore, the level curve (UA - U ~ ) ) (U B - UR) need not always be 
UB_UB . 
tangent with the efficient frontier at its slope - ~ ~ = -1, i.e. when both countnes UA-UN 
gain an equal amount). 
Consider the effects of the trade agreement on the small-size countries. Tables B.4 and 
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B.7 suggest that all small-size exporters will gain only in the symmetric cases. Otherwise, 
only the small-size exporters in the less competitive market will lose in the equilibrium. 
This is due to the strategic effects of the dominating countries' tariffs on the small-size 
exporters'. In the symmetric cases, free trade between the dominating countries under the 
agreement allows all the small-size countries to impose lower tariffs and obtain a higher 
utility level at the world relative price equal to the free trade level (see TablesB.2, B.3, B.5, 
and B.6). In the asymmetric cases, it can be observed that the world relative price will 
be shifted from the interests of the countries whose exportable market is less competitive 
(q(A+B) > qN when 8x > 8y and nx < ny; and q(A+B) < qN when 8x < 8y and nx > ny 
in Tables B.3 and B.6) due to the trade agreement. Even if Tables B.2 and B.5 suggest 
that the losing small-size countries impose smaller tariffs than in the non-cooperative 
equilibrium15 , the gain from their increase in trade volume cannot compensate such loss 
in their terms of trade relative to the non-cooperative outcomes. 
In general, the A + B trade agreement is aimed at increasing the trade volume by 
shifting the world relative price from the non-cooperative toward the free trade level. 
Therefore, the dominating country for which the world relative price is shifted from free 
trade in its favour in the non-cooperative equilibrium (the country whose market power is 
larger) has to lower its tariff to bring back the world relative price toward free trade. This 
change in the world relative price, therefore, affects the small-size exporters. The small-
size exporters whose exportable market is less competitive are clearly worse off since the 
trade agreement undermines the terms of trade they once enjoyed in the non-cooperative 
equilibrium (qF > q(A+B) > qN when 8x > 8y and nx < ny; and qF < q(A+B) < qN when 
8
x 
< 8y and nx > n1lin Tables B.3 and B.6). These results are summarised in Proposition 
3. 
Proposition 3 Relative to the non-coopemtive equilibrium, a tmde agreement between 
the dominating countries (i) makes all countries better off when both markets are sym-
15The small-size x-exporters will impose lower (higher) tariff and the small-size y-exporters will impose 
higher (lower) tariff than under the non-cooperative equilibrium when A has greater. (less) market power 
than B as the strategic effect of A's tariff will dominate (be dominated by) B's tanff. 
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metric (ii) makes all countries except the small-size countries whose exportable market 
is less competitive better off (makes the small-size countries whose exportable market is 
less competitive worse off). 
4.3.2 Terms of trade-driven trade agreement 
Now suppose that A can negotiate a number of nx bilateral trade agreements with each of 
country a, while leaving the y-exporting countries setting their trade policies unilaterally. 
Since countries A and a have the same motive to lower the world relative price q through 
their import tariffs, it can be expected that the collusion between them results in their 
higher tariffs relative to the non-cooperative tariffs to shift the world relative price to 
their advantage collectively.16 However, such gain definitely comes at the cost of the 
y-exporting countries. Since the purpose of this chapter is to compare the expected gains 
for a dominating country between its negotiating partner alternatives, we abstract from 
the possibility that the remaining countries can also collaborate their trade policies in 
retaliation. 17 
Denote the cooperative tariffs as T { ~ + a ) ) and TtA+a). Since countries a are identical, 
the generalised bargaining solution between country A and nx of countries a is 
16By a rough experiment not presented in this work, when country A can negotiate with a subset of 
countries a, those countries a who remain outside of the trade agreement and set their tariffs unilaterally 
obtain higher gain than those setting their trade policies under the trade agreement. This is because 
those remain outside of the agreement still enjoy an improvement in the terms of trade from the collusive 
effort of those in the trade agreement at a lower tariff rate they impose unilaterally. It is found that the 
gain for those in the trade agreement including country A increases when more countries a are joining. 
Since all countries a are identical, there is no justification that a subset of them will act differently 
by staying out of the agreement and free ride the collusive effort. Therefore, all countries a will be 
negotiating with country A in this section. 
17If retaliatory trade agreement between y-exporters is allowed, the world consists of two export cartels. 
Each export cartel imposes tariff against each other, therefore, the tariff setting game is analogous to 
the tariff war between two countries in chapter 3. See Krugman (1991) and Bond and Syropoulos (1996) 
which consider the world consisting of trading blocs imposing optimum tariffs against each other. 
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From (4.15) and (4.16), the first order conditions for the above solution are 
(4.2O) 
and 
( 4.21) 
UA_UA 
where J.L = N • 
ua-u'N 
It can be seen that the number of small-size countries nx can be eliminated from the 
first order conditions. 18 
(4.20) and (4.21) imply the efficiency condition between all x-exporting countries 
which is 
(4.22) 
Consider the efficiency between all x-exporting countries. It can be seen from (4.22) 
that the x-exporting countries' tariffs are inefficient and they can gain from cooperation. 
However, the countries impose the Nash equilibrium tariffs lower than the efficient level 
in this case. 19 
181£ A negotiate a plurilateral trade agreement with all of countries a at once, the bargaining solution 
will be ( T { ~ + o ) ' ' TlA+O ») = argmax(T'\TCl) (UA - uA) (Ua - UN)"'" where nz now indicates the collec-
tive bargaining power of the small-size countries. Therefore, it is presumable that A would be better off 
with the n z of bilateral agreements than with the plurilateral agreement. So we consider the former in 
this section. 
19It can be shown that when countries a are small, the x-exporting countries' Nash equilibrium tariffs 
are already efficient so that they cannot gain from a trade agreement. The RHS in ( .... 22) converges 
to zero if countries a are small, i.e. 8 ~ q A A 810 = O. Therefore, (4.22) is satisfied even if A sets its 
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Solving (4.22) for TA the efficiency locus between the dominating and the small-size 
exporters of good x, given the tariffs of y-exporting countries, can be obtained. The 
derivation shown in Appendix B.3 gives 
-Ta (XAya + xayA) 
where E = [(1 - sB) XB + (nx - 1) (1 - sa) x a + ny (1 - sb) X b] 
and F = [sByB + (nx - 1) saya + nysbyb]. 
(4.23) 
(4.23) and (4.21) must be solved simultaneously with country B's and b's non-
cooperative best response tariff functions to determine the trade agreement between 
countries A and a and the general equilibrium as a whole. Simulations over the same 
hypothetical values of the model parameters as in the previous section are conducted to 
analyse the negotiation between countries A and a. 
In addition to (4.23), the expressions for (4.21) and the y-exporting countries' best 
response tariff functions are needed for the simulation to be conducted. From (4.15) and 
(4.16), (4.21) is 
tariff unilaterally ( ~ ~ ~ ~ + a ~ : : al!JA = 0). This finding also applies to the efficiency between the Nash 
equilibrium tariff of A and the Nash equilibrium tariff of 'small' country b (zero) that have different 
trade patterns. Therefore, it contradicts the Mayer (1981) result that a small country can still gain from 
a trade agreement with a large country. 
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J¥:-Ta) (xa+qya) 
2 Ta(1+Ta)2 .jQ 
_ (qya_xa) ffi 1 (xa+qya) 
21!q A (l+Ta) (1+Ta)2 (sAyA+sBYB++nzsaya+nysbyb) 
_1 (qy -x ).;r;r 1 (xa+qya) 
=0 
Jl 2.jQq (l+TA) {1+Ta)2 (sAyA+sByB++nzsaya+nysbyb) 
Simplify the expression. 
_ (qyA _ XA) JTA ffa (1 + Ta) 
J.L - (1 + TA) - - - - - - - ; : - - - ~ ~ ~ - - - = - - - - - - - -
.;r;r (XA+qyA) 
(l+TA) .jQ 
- U ~ ~
& (xa+qya) 
(l+Ta) .jQ 
_ua 
N 
(1 - Ta) (1 + Ta) 
< 
(1- sA) X A 
+(l-sB)XB 
+nx (1 - sa) xa 
+ny (1 - sb) X b 
... 
+nx (1 - sa) X a 
+ny (1 - sb) X b 
_ (qya _ xa)Ta 
> 
(4.24) 
(4.24) defines the small-size country a's cooperative best response tariff function to y-
exporting country tariffs, given q represented by (4.16). U ~ ~ and UN are country A's and 
a's non-cooperative utility levels. They are available in Tables A.6 and A.7 in Appendix 
A.3. 
From (3.24) in chapter 3, the y-exporting countries' unilateral best response tariff 
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functions are 
TB (sAyA+nZsaya+nysbyb) + I 
x B 
yB 
(4.25) 
The simulation is done by solving (4.23), (4.24), and (4.25) simultaneously for TA, 
T B , Ta, and Tb over some hypothetical values of f3x and f3y, bx and by, and nx and ny. 
U ~ ~ and UN in (4.24) are substituted correspondingly by the results in Tables A.6 and 
A.7 in Appendix A.3. Similar to the previous section, the degrees of specialisation (f3x 
and f3y) are chosen to be f3x = f3y = 0.7 throughout the analysis. The effects of the 
degrees of market domination (bx and by) and market concentration ( nx and ny) are 
considered separately by assuming the other being equal and constant. The results, to 
be represented by T { ~ + a ) ' ' T ( ~ + a ) ' ' T{A+a) , and TtA+a) , are substituted back into (4.16) 
for the equilibrium world relative price q(A+a) and into (4.2) for the equilibrium utilities 
U(A+a). The results are shown in Tables B.8 to B.13 in Appendix B.4. 
In all cases except when countries a are 'small' (when nx ---+ 00 in Tables B.II to B.13), 
the trade agreement between the x-exporters pushes up their tariffs which strategically 
reduces y-exporters' tariffs. The result is that the world relative price q is shifted from 
the non-cooperative level to the advantage of the x-exporters (Tables B.9 and B.12). 
Therefore, the x-exporters are better off, however, at the cost of the y-exporters relative 
to the non-cooperative equilibrium (Table B.10 and B.13). This is because when the 
x-exporters internalise the effects of their trade policies, they choose their tariff rates not 
only to maximise their own welfare but the weighted sum of all the x-exporting countries' 
welfare as a whole. This requires a tariff rate higher than the unilateral one. Facing the 
higher tariff from the x-exporting countries to which the y-exporting countries' tariffs are 
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strategic substitutes, relative to their non-cooperative equilibrium tariffs (without the x-
exporters' trade agreement), the y-exporting countries have to lower their tariffs along 
their unilateral best response functions. Consequently, the world relative price is shifted 
to the advantage of the x-exporting countries and to the disadvantage of the y-exporting 
countries. 
Given the symmetric settings between x-exporters and y-exporters, similar results 
will be obtained when tariff coordination between y-exporting countries is considered. 
Therefore, the results can be generalised in Proposition 4. 
Proposition 4 Relative to the non-cooperative equilibrium, a tmde agreement between 
countries that export the same good makes all countries exporting that good better off but 
countries that export the other good worse off. 
Proposition 4 is straightforward. As recognised in the customs union literature, the 
coordination of external tariff policies by CU members enables them to internalise the 
positive terms of trade externalities they generate for each other when they import similar 
products from the rest of the world. Syropoulos (1999) argues that since the CU members 
also liberalise their internal trade, there must be a 'trade liberalising' force that tempers 
this market power. Therefore, the effect of the CU's common external tariff on the rest 
of the world is still ambiguous. However, we obtain a clear cut result that the trade 
policy coordination between countries that import the same good always harms the rest 
of the world, as stated in Proposition 4, since, in our model, the negotiating countries 
import and export the same goods so that there is virtually no trade between them to 
be liberalised, consequently, the trade policy coordination generates only the 'externality 
internalising' force that enhances their collective market power in world trade. 
4.3.3 Comparison of results 
This section makes the main argument of this chapter: why would a country prefer to 
negotiate a trade agreement with one country rather than others? We investigate the 
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conditions in which the terms of trade-driven agreement will be preferred to t he volume 
of trade-driven agreement by A by comparing the country A's payoffs between t he two 
agreements. 
The payoffs to country A from the two types of trade agreement are presented in 
Tables B.4, B.7, B.lO, and B.13. All of them are normalised by the non-cooperative 
utility and are readily comparable.20 In general, the criterion to determine which of the 
two agreements is preferred by country A in a specific circumstance is which of the two 
agreements gives higher utility to country A. Given the normalisation of the results, 
the criterion will be which of the two agreements makes country A better off to the 
larger extent relative to the non-cooperative outcome, i.e. country A will prefer a trade 
uA uA 
agreement with country a rather than the one with country B when ( ~ 1 4 ) ) > ( ~ ~ B ) ) and 
N N 
vice versa. Comparing the results between Tables B.4 and B.lO gives the results in Table 
B.14j and between Tables B.7 and B.13 gives the results in Table B.I5. The letter in 
each cell indicates the country whom country A prefers its trade agreement with. 
Table B.14 suggests that, given equal degree of market concentration in both markets, 
the A + a trade agreement will be preferred to the A + B trade agreement when country A 
dominates not too much of the world x-market, i.e. when bx is sufficiently low for which 
the threshold value decreases with by. Table B.15 suggests that, given equal degree of 
market domination in both markets, the A + a trade agreement will be preferred to the 
A + B trade agreement when the world market of good x is highly concentrated, i.e. nx 
is sufficiently low. Given the degree of market domination bx = by = 0.5 in B.15, the 
suggested maximum number of small-size x-exporter is nx = 1 which implies that country 
A and a are identical, i.e. they share the world endowments equally (bx = (1 - bx ) = 0.5). 
In addition it should be noted that the results are invariant with the degree of market , 
concentration in the world market of good y (ny). These results are summarised in 
Proposition 5. 
20In fact they are readily comparable even without the normalisation since the comparison across the 
two cases i ~ ~ made between the same country and the same values of model parameters. However. if we 
have to compare the unnormalised ones, another table showing them is needed which is unnl"Ce5Sary. 
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Proposition 5 Given the degree of market domination in the y-market by, ~ ~ and 11; 
are the degrees of market domination and market concentmtion in the x -market which 
make country A indifferent between the A + a and the A + B tmde agreement. The former 
will be preferred to the latter by country A when 8x < bx and nx < rt;. 
To help explain Proposition 5, it should be noted from sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 that 
there are different sources of gain for country A between the A + a and the A + B 
trade agreement. Relative to non-cooperative equilibrium, under the former, country A 
sacrifices its trade volume for a better terms of trade by an increase in its tariff while, 
under the latter, country A sacrifices its terms of trade for a larger trade volume by 
a decrease in its tariff. Therefore, in any circumstances, for country A to prefer the 
A + a to the A + B trade agreement, the net gain in its terms of trade from the former 
must outweigh the net gain in its trade volume from the latter. This means that, in 
addition to A's tariff, the tariffs imposed by the small-size countries a under the A + a 
agreement must also be large enough. Each small-size country a will be able to impose 
the large enough tariff when it possesses a large enough endowments (which is positively 
related with their market power); and for the small-size country a to posses such a large 
enough endowments, the x-market must be sufficiently low dominated by country A and 
sufficiently high concentrated.21 In general, the terms of trade-driven trade agreement 
between the exporters of one good will be more likely when the structure within the world 
market of that good allows the small-size exporters to have sufficient market power to 
attract its dominating exporter. Otherwise, the volume of trade-driven agreement with 
the other dominating country will be preferable. It can be concluded that the choice of a 
country to negotiate a trade agreement does not depend on the strategic complementarity 
or substitutability of its negotiating partners but their levels of endowments that generate 
sufficiently large gain (no matter it is the gain in terms of trade or in volume of trade) 
21 Therefore n the maximum number of the small-size x-exporters to make A + a trade agreement 
preferable, c o ~ l d x b e e greater than 1 if the degree of market domination by the dominating countries is 
lower than that assumed in Table B.I5. 
106 
relative to the non-cooperative equilibrium. 22 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter extended the multi-country two-good trade model in chapter 3 to consider 
the possibility that a subset of the countries could coordinate their trade policies. A 
trade agreement within the two-country model was first examined so that the results in 
the multi-country one can be compared. It was shown that the Nash equilibrium tariffs 
are inefficient and there was a rationale for a trade agreement. Under symmetric Nash 
bargaining, the two countries agreed to implement free trade when they were symmetric, 
otherwise, they adopted a tariff-subsidy combination scheme in which the country with 
greater market power reduced its tariff in exchange for an import subsidy by the other 
country. 
In the multi-country model, there were more alternatives available to a country to 
negotiate its trade policy. One was the volume of trade-driven trade agreement nego-
tiated between countries with different trade patterns and the other was the terms of 
trade-driven trade agreement negotiated between countries with similar trade pattern. 
The volume of trade-driven agreement between the two dominating countries made all 
countries better off relative to the non-cooperative equilibrium when the market struc-
tures in x and y markets were symmetric. Otherwise, the small-size countries who had 
enjoyed the non-cooperative terms of trade would be worse off. The terms of trade-driven 
agreement between the dominating and the small-size exporters of one good, by virtue 
of their collective market power, raised their tariffs to improve their terms of trade and 
made themselves better off at the cost of the exporters of the other good. 
Since the two types of trade agreement implied different sources of gain and different 
negotiating partners, this chapter examined the conditions in which one was preferred 
to the other by a country. By comparing the welfare implications between the two 
22Therefore, the results are invariant with n ll since a change in n ll affects neither the endowments of 
B nor a. 
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types of agreement from the perspective of a country, it was found that the choice of a 
country to negotiate a trade agreement did not depend on the strategic complementarity 
or substitutability of its negotiating partners' tariffs but their levels of endowments that 
generated sufficiently large gain (no matter it was the gain in terms of trade or in volUllle 
of trade) relative to the non-cooperative equilibrium. 
Since the study of tariffs in this chapter as well as that in chapter 3 is based solely 
on the terms of trade incentive of a large country to impose a positive import tariff, 
more dimensions can be added to the model if the political economy aspect of tariff is 
considered. The country's preference between the two types of trade agreement suggested 
in this chapter would be changed if private sectors with diverse interests in the trade 
volume and the terms of trade are allowed to influence the governments' decision. Relative 
to the governments' trade policies in absence of the political motive, the governments 
have to reformulate them to strike a new balance between the terms of trade and the 
political motive. The political economy aspect is, therefore, an interesting candidate for 
an extension of the model. 
In the next chapter the political economy of trade policy is considered. However, 
we confine to the trade policy formation in a small country in which the terms of trade 
argument is dropped to examine the issue of domestic lobby formation. 
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Chapter 5 
An Endogenous Lobby Formation 
Model 
This chapter presents a political ( ~ C ( ) I l ( ) I l l . v v rnodel of tariff in a small open (\(,()Il(}llly. It is 
a s s I l I I l ( ~ d d that the government's trad(\ policy is a result of lohhying ad iviti('s and Il<'IH'(' tIl<' 
i n f h w I l c ( ~ ~ driven contribution approach of GrossIllall and Helpman ( 1 9 9 ~ 1 ) ) is ('IIlp[(}y(\d. 
While previolls works on lobbying awl international trade p()li(',v tend t() L\k(\ the (\x-
i S t . ( ~ I l C ( ~ ~ of a lobby as given, this dwph\r goes further by attempting t() ('lld()g('Ilis(\ tIl<' 
lobby formation. It is shown explicitly that individuals would Il()t lobl),v individually 
WIl<'Il t he total population and/or the fixed C()st of lobbying an' t ()() large. All incent iv(' 
which !Pads the individuals to form a lobby is the ability of the group to n\strain their 
otherwise offsetting lobbying efforts. An interesting result is that. in equilibrimn, SOlllC 
individuals Illight choose to join the lobbies that lobby against their interests to moderat<, 
t I\(\ir efforts rat her than to join the lobbies that lobby in their favour, This n'sult rais(\s 
;\ qlwstioll whether the standard industry-lobby in the lit(\rature rnight ('xagg<'rat (' t 11<' 
actllal lobb,ving activit it's. 
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5.1 Introduction 
Grossman and Helpman (2(01) note that "political action committees (PACs), which are 
organisations that have registered with the US government under the reporting require-
ments of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 so as to be able to contribute legally 
to political candidates, numbered 3,835 at the end of 1999. This represents a dramatic 
increase from the 608 PACs that had registered by the end of 1974 ... The overall impres-
sion that these figures give is that the number of SIGs (special interest groups) active in 
national politics in the United States is by no means small, and probably continues to 
grow." 
One of the theories that deal with the lobbying activities is the influence driven con-
tribution model of Grossman and Helpman (1994) in which interest groups can influence 
the government's policies by offering contributions contingent on the trade policies iIn-
plemented by the government. It is assumed that the government is willing to trade off 
some reduction in the general welfare in return for a the contribution. As a result, groups 
that can be organised are able to obtain the trade policies in favour of their interests at 
the expense of the public as a whole. While the model can explain the political process 
in which particular groups can translate their interests into the government policies, the 
existence of the lobbies is still exogenous. This chapter, therefore, attempts to endogenise 
the lobby formation. 
In fact, there have been a few papers investigating the lobby formation. Mitra (1999) 
shows that the benefit from lobbying to each industry lobby is decreasing with the number 
of them and hence not all industries can be organised in the long run. By assuming 
that there exist fixed costs of lobbying which are heterogeneous across industries, the 
industries which can be organised are those whose fixed costs of lobbying not exceeding 
the lobbying benefit to their industries. 
In general, Olson (1971) points out the free rider problem in group formation. He 
argues that since the good provided by a collective action tends to be a public good, it is 
in an individual's interest not to contribute to the cost of providing the good which still 
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be provided by the contributions of the others. Therefore, groups consisting of so large 
number of members that their members' actions are imperceptible may find it difficult to 
act collectively. Groups that can be organised tend to be the groups with small number 
of members. 
Following Olson (1971), Pecorino (1998) analyses the ability of firms in an industry to 
overcome the free rider problem in a repeated tariff lobbying game where their cooperation 
in lobbying is maintained through the use of trigger strategy. The difficulty of maintaining 
cooperation is measured by the critical value of the discount parameter below which the 
cooperation cannot be maintained. He finds that the critical level does not rise to the 
cooperation prohibitive level (one) as the number of firms approaches infinity so he argues 
that there is no presumption that the cooperation must break down as the number of 
firms increases without bound. Magee (2002), also in a repeated game framework, finds 
a more clear cut result that an increase in the number of firms necessarily worsens the 
free-rider problem. 
However, it should be noted that these works implicitly assume that the firms lobby 
the government only through forming a lobby and each lobby will be organised only 
among the firms within the same industry. Based on the model of a small open economy 
consisting of individuals whose endowments of goods hence trade policy preferences are 
different, this chapter examines the individuals' decision to influence the government in 
a more general framework in which they are allowed to lobby individually and join any 
lobby. Section 5.2 provides the basic setting of the model. Section 5.3 formally shows 
that individual would not lobby individually when the total population and/or the fixed 
cost of lobbying are too large. Section 5.4 considers the lobby formation and Section 5.5 
concludes. 
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5.2 Basic settings 
Consider a small open country consisting of N individuals endowed with and consuming 
two goods, x and y. Preferences toward consumption of the two goods are identical across 
all individuals and represented by a quasi-linear utility function. 
(5.1) 
where ui , c ~ ~ and c ~ ~ are individual i's utility level, consumption of good x and good y 
respectively; and a > 0 is a constant.! 
Lagrangean optimisation implies equal consumption of good y for all individuals, 
presuming each individual's income is high enough, 
. P 
c'" = a - ...Jt.. 
y Px 
(5.2) 
Px and py are goods x and y domestic prices. Assume that the economy is a net 
importer of good y whose world price is q and the government imposes an ad valorem 
tariff or subsidy rate 7 on the imports. Choose Px = 1 as numeraire, (5.2) becomes 
c ~ ~ = a - q (I + 7) = a - qT (5.3) 
where T = 1 +7. It can be seen that, given the utility function assumed, consumption 
of good y is affected by the import tariff/subsidy uniformly across all individuals. 
The rest of the income is spent on consumption of good x, therefore, individual i's 
expenditure on good x is his/her income, mi, less expenditure on the consumption of 
1 This quasi-linear utility function is adopted from Laussel and Riezman (2001). Its advantage is that 
it generates a linear expenditure function which eases subsequent derivations. 
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good y represented by (5.3). 
c ~ ~ = mi - qT (Q - qT) (5.4) 
Individual i's income depends on his/her endowment of both goods, Xi and yi, and 
the tariff revenue transfer from the government, ri. 
i . .. 
m = x ~ ~ + q T y ~ ~ + r' 
Assume that the economy aggregate endowment of good x and y are X and Y, each 
individual shares equal amount of good x but uneven amount of good y such that 
X 
N 
N 
yi > 0; Lyi = Y 
i=l 
Assume that the government tariff revenue is redistributed equally among all individ-
uals in the economy.2 Therefore, 
ri = q (T - 1) ( N c ~ ~ - Y) 
N 
q (T - 1) [N (Q - qT) - Y] 
N 
From (5.3), individuals consume good y equally, the aggregate consmnption of good 
y is, therefore, individual consumption of good y times the number of population, Net. 
Substituting these facts into (5.4), individual i's consumption of good x is 
2 As opposed to Mayer (1984) who assumes that the tariff revenue is redistributed according to 
individuals' factor income, this assumption better reflects the fact that the government's revenues are 
usually spent on providing public goods which any individual can consume. 
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i ({X + qY) ) (. 
ex = N - aq + q f)" + q) T {5.5} 
where fi = yi - 1. Oi ~ ~ 0 means individual i's endowment of good y is larger, equal 
and lower than average and, therefore, E ~ l l Oi = O. Substituting (5.3) and (5.5) back 
into (5.1), individual i's utility is 
It can be seen that individual utility is a function of tariff and individual ownership 
of good y. By (5.6), it can be shown that individuals have different preferences toward 
the government's tariff policy. Differentiate (5.6) with respect to T. 
8ui . 
aT = q [ot + q (I - T) ] {5.7} 
Setting ~ ~ = 0, individual i's optimal tariff rate is implied, 
{5.8} 
It can be seen that the individual optimal tariff rate depends on individual ownership 
of good y. rr ~ ~ 1 when Oi ~ ~ 0, i.e. an individual prefers an import tariff, free trade, or an 
import subsidy when his/her endowment of good y is larger, equal or less than average. 
The further the deviation from the average, the higher is his/her optimal tariff/subsidy 
rate. 
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5.3 Lobbying individually 
This section studies tariff policy formation within the framework of Grossman and Help-
man (1994) and individuals' decision to lobby when they set their contribution schedules 
and offer to the government individually. The main objective of this section is to examine 
why the individuals would prefer to lobby the government through groups rather than 
to lobby on their individual efforts. The main argument is that the individuals consider 
themselves too small relative to the lobbying costs to make the individual efforts. This 
point is often argued by the previous works, such as Mitra (1999), and it is to be shown 
explicitly in this section. 
In the first stage of the game, each individual decides whether to lobby or not to 
lobby and announces a contribution schedule to the government, given the contribution 
schedules of the others, if he/she decides to lobby. It is assumed for the time being 
that the individual can announce a contribution schedule without any fixed cost.3 The 
contribution schedule specifies how much contribution the individual will be making 
against every possible tariff rate chosen by the government. In the second stage, given 
the contribution schedules, the government chooses and implements a tariff rate and 
collects the contributions. 
5.3.1 Policy formation 
Let u i (ri, T) represents individual i's utility. If N is the set of all population, define 
L C N as a set of all individuals who decide to lobby. Every i E L chooses a contribution 
schedule (function), Si (T), which maximises his/her net utility, i.e. 
3Before an individual can convey his/her desire to the government, some costs might be incurred 
and those costs are viewed as sunk investment by many authors, inter alia, Mitra (1999). Mitra (1999) 
argues that the costs may consist of the costs of establishing links ~ i t h h politicians, communication, etc. 
In case of a lobby group which is to be considered in the next section, the fixed costs may be the costs 
of forming an organisation, hiring professional lobbyists, building a communications network among 
members, designing a scheme of punishments for defaulting members, etc. 
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~ a x x U i (fi, T) - i (T) 
8'(T) 
Given the contribution schedules, in the second stage, the government's objective is 
to maximise the weighted sum of the aggregate contribution and the general welfare, i.e. 
mF L i (T) + aU (T) 
iEL 
where U (T) = LiEN u i ((i, T) is the aggregate utility and a > 0 represents the 
government's concern over its political survival which depends on the general welfare at 
large. 
Let Tp be the government's political optimal tariff defined by 
Tp = arg max L Si (T) + aU (T) 
iEL 
(5.9) 
and Tp-i be the government's optimal policy were individual i not participating in 
lobby, defined by Tp-i = argmaxLjEL_i sj (T) + aU (T), where L-i = L - {i}. Without 
imposing any additional assumption on the contribution function, a contribution function 
chosen by every individual can take many forms as long as two conditions below are 
satisfied. The first is 
i (Tp) + L sj (Tp) + aU (Tp) > L si (T;i) + aU (Tp-i) 
jEL_i jEL_i 
for all i E L. This condition states that to induce the government to implement Tp , 
the contribution made by every individual i E L must make the government at least as 
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well off as implementing its optimal policy were he/she not participating in lobby. Since 
the individuals have no desire to pay the government more than necessary to induce it 
to implement Tp , the condition is, therefore, met with equality. Rearranging gives 
By the definition of Tp- i , si (Tp) is, therefore, non negative. 
The second condition is that, in equilibrium, the contribution made by every individ-
ual must not exceed his/her gain from participation in lobby, i.e. 
(5.11 ) 
for all i E L, otherwise there would be some individuals in the set L who find it 
beneficial not to lobby. Substitute (5.10) into (5.11), 
lUi (0" Tp) - si (Tp)] + [s' (Tp) + i ~ i i si (Tp) + aU (Tp)] 
> [ui ((i, T;i) - Si (Tp-i)] + [Si (T_i) + L si (T;i) + aU (Tv-i)] 
jEL- 1 
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which implies that for every i E L, the political optimal tariff Tp must also maximise 
the joint welfare of that individual and the government, given the contribution schedules 
offered by j E L-i' i.e. 
Tp = argmax [ui ((]i, T) - Si (T)] + [L Si (T) + aU (T)] (5.12) 
iEL 
for all i E L.4 
Assume further that the contribution function offered by every individual is differen-
tiable at least around Tp. (5.9) and (5.12) imply that there are two first order conditions 
that must be satisfied simultaneously by Tp. 
as i au 
L-+a-=O 
iEL aT aT 
(5.13) 
--- + -+a- = [au
i 
asi] [L asi au] 0 
aT aT iEL aT aT (5.14) 
Therefore, it is implied that 
-=-
aT aT 
which means that every i E L will set his/her contribution schedule such that the 
marginal change in the contribution for a small change in the government tariff matches 
the effect of tariff change on his/her utility, at least around Tp. SUbstituting this fact 
back into the government's first order condition (5.13), it is clear that within the lobbying 
4This is Proposition 1 (c) of Grossman and Helpman (1994). 
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framework of Grossman and Helpman (1994), the political optimal tariff is a tariff which 
maximises the weighted sum of the utilities of every i ELand the aggregate utility. 
aui au L-+a-=o 
'Lor or 
'lE 
(5.15) 
Given set L, the political optimal trade policy Tp can be derived by solving {5.15} for 
T. From (5.7), the first order condition is 
L q [(i + q (1 - T)] + aN q2 (1 - T) = 0 
iEL 
Eliminate the common q and expand. 
L(i + NL q(1- T) + aNq(1- T) = 0 
iEL 
where N L is the number of individuals in L. Solving for T. 
(5.16) 
where B L E ~ ~~ ~ (Ji. It can be seen that the political optimal tariff policy will be 
an import tariff, free trade or an import subsidy, i.e. Tp ~ ~ 1, when the average lobby 
ownership is larger, equal or less than the population average, i.e. (j L ~ ~ o. Would the 
trade policy be tariff/subsidy, the extent to which it deviates from free trade positively 
relates to the deviation of BL from the mean (zero)5 and the weight the government 
5 8fe = 1 (N N,. N) > O. The political optimal tariff is shifted away from free trade in favour of the 
8 L q L+O 
individual whose ownership is 8L since, from (5.15). his/her utility is effectively given an extra weight in 
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attaches to all individual i E L as a whole relative to the total population N L 6 (NL+aN)' 
Both OL and NL are detennined in the first stage of the game when every individual 
decides whether to lobby or not. 
5.3.2 Individual decision 
To determine the set L, individual decisions in the first stage of the game must be 
considered. It will now be shown that, without fixed cost of lobbying, all individuals 
will decide to lobby in equilibrium. The analysis is done by showing that given any set 
L = LO (can be empty), individuals not in LO always find it beneficial to be included into 
the set; and once everyone is in the set, i.e. L = N, no one finds it beneficial to leave. 
From (5.15), given any set L = LO, the political optimal tariff for the government T; 
is defined by 
T; = argmax Lui (Oi, T) + aU (T) (5.17) 
iELO 
Similarly, if an individual i ¢ LO were to lobby, the political optimal tariff for the 
government T: i is defined by 
T: i = argmax ui (ri, T) + Lui (Oi, T) + aU (T) (5.18) 
iELO 
the government's objective function in return for the c o n ~ i b u t i o n s s made by all individual i E L .. More 
specifically, the utility of the individual with ownership fh is given the weight of (NL + a) whtle the 
others' utilities are given a common weight of a. _ 
63Tp =1 oN 8L>O«O)and alp =_1 NN(t 'J 8L<O(>O),iffh>O«O). Thepolitica1 
N,. q (NL+oN)'J a q (NL+oN) . 
optimal tariff/subsidy rate will be greater when N L is larger and/or the weight the government put on 
the aggregate welfare, a, is smaller. Intuitively, the term ( N : : ~ N ) ) in (5.16) ~ ~ be thought of as the 
relative weight the government put on the individuals who lobby as ~ ~ whole agamst ~ ~ e e g e n e r ~ ~ welfar.e, 
. l'n N It either NL increases and/or a decreases, Will make the pobttcal optimal tanff 
an Increase (N/.+oN)' 
deviate more from free trade. 
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From (5.11), an individual i f/: LO will participate in lobbying if 
(5.19) 
From (5.10), the contribution Si (T:i) made by the individual i must be just large 
enough to induce the government to switch from implementing T; to T:i. 
(5.20) 
Since the contribution function can take many forms as long as (5.19) and (5.20) 
are satisfied, an additional assumption is needed to be able to select a contribution 
function among those forms. That assumption is the 'truthfulness' of the contribution 
function. A contribution function which is truthful is the contribution function which 
reflects the true willingness of the individual to pay for every possible tariff rate chosen 
by the government. Since the lobbying game is viewed as a menu-auction problem, an 
individual's true willingness to pay is reflected by the maximum amount he/she wishes 
to pay for a given tariff rate chosen by the government. Such maximum amount that 
an individual will wish to pay is the amount which leave him/her some base level of 
net utility. For clarity, denote individual i's base level of net utility by bi , the maximum 
amount of contribution that individual i wants to pay for a given tariff rate is u i ((i, T) -
bi .7 The truthful contribution function, therefore, takes the form Si (T) = u' (()i, T) - bi 
for every possible tariff rate chosen by the government.8 
7It would be clearer to think of the base level of net utility, bi , as the minimum amount of money a 
bidder wants to have left in his/her pocket after the auction. In this work, bi is chosen by each individual 
to be as high as possible such that his/her contribution made to the government is not too small to be 
able to influence the government's decision. See Grossman and Helpman {1994} for details. 
8If any T makes u' ((J', T) $ bi , the maximum amount individual i wishes to pay for that tariff is 
121 
Following Grossman and Helpman (1994), assume that every individual plays the 
truthful strategy by always announcing the truthful contribution schedule to the govern-
ment. Since every individual plays a truthful strategy, (5.20) becomes 
s' (r:) = r L (ui (£P, T;) - /J) + aU ( ~ ) ] ]
LELo 
- r L (ui (£P, T,ti) - /J) + aU (T;i)] 
LELo 
Substitute this fact back into (5.19) and rearrange. 
u
i (ri, Tp+i) + L u j ((}j, T/i) + aU (Tp+i) 
jELO 
> u i ((}i, T;) + L u j (oj, T;) + aU (r;) 
jELO 
which is always true by the definition of T/i in (5.18) regardless of the individual 
ownership Oi. Even if individual i's participation in the given set LO does not change the 
political optimal tariff, i.e. T: i = T;, he/she can always pay zero contribution according 
to his/her contribution schedule which had been announced prior to the government's 
decision making.9 Therefore, without fixed cost of lobbying, every individual i ¢ LO will 
always find it beneficial to participate in lobby. 
zero. 
9From (5.21), when T: i T;, 
[EjELo u j ((Ji, T:i) + aU (T:i)] = O. 
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Once every individual is in set L, i.e. L = N, the political optimal tariff T; is defined 
by 
T; = argmax u i (li, T) + L u j (oj, T) + aU (T) (5.22) 
jEN_i 
where N-i = N - {i}. If an individual i leaves set L, i.e. decides not to lobby, the 
political optimal tariff Tp-i is defined by 
Tp-i = arg max L uj (oj, T) + aU (T) 
jEN_i 
The individual i will find it beneficial not to lobby if 
The truthful contribution schedule made by individual i to support T; is 
Substitute (5.25) back into (5.24) and rearrange. 
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(5.23) 
(5.24) 
(5.26) 
which is a contradiction by the definition of r; in (5.22). Therefore, no one finds it 
beneficial to leave the set L = N and it can be concluded that everyone will decide to 
lobby individually in equilibrium. This is due to the truthful strategy played by every 
individual. Whatever the political tariff outcome, every individual pays only the amount 
that they are willing to pay to support that outcome. As illustrated in footnote 10, an 
individual pays zero contribution if his/her participation in lobbying does not alter the 
political tariff. Therefore, the net benefit from lobbying for every individual is always 
non negative. 
Fr (5 16) T* - 1 + LiEL f]i - 1 LiEN Oi - 1 L - N C I . om . , p - q(NL+aN) - + q(l+a)N - ,once - . onsequent y, It 
is obvious that individuals are worse off than with no lobbying since they have to pay 
contributions to the government for the free trade policy which would always be chosen by 
the government even without the contributions. lO This prisoner's dilemma occurs since 
every individual has a unilateral incentive to lobby. Therefore, their lobbying efforts 
neutralise each other in equilibrium and their political contributions are only to prevent 
the trade policy from being shifted away from their interests. 
Recall that these conclusions are subject to the assumption that there is no fixed cost 
of lobbying. As discussed earlier, there may exist some fixed costs of lobbying in reality 
which may consist of the costs of establishing links with politicians, communication, etc. 
Therefore, this assumption is relaxed in the next section. 
5.3.3 Lobbying with fixed cost 
Suppose that all individuals face a homogenous fixed cost of lobbying F > O. The 
condition for an individual i not to lobby in equilibrium in (5.26) becomes 
tOBy the definition ofT; in (5.22), it is implied that EjEN_. ~ ~ ~ + a ~ ~ = - $ ~ ~ at T = T;. Therefore, 
(5.25) is equivalent to - *fIT=T. (Tp-i - T;) which is, from (5.6), -q (Oi + q (1 - T;)) (T;i - T;). 
Since T* = 1 it is clear that the l ~ g e r r the deviation of individual i's ownership from the mean (zero), 
the lar;er c o ~ t r i b u t i o n n he/she has to make while individuals whose ownership is equal to the mean makes 
zero contribution in equilibrium. 
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The expression on the LHS is non negative by the definition of T; in (5.22). (5.27) 
simply states that an individual i will not lobby in equilibrium if the net benefit (net 
of political contribution but gross of the fixed cost) from lobbying he/she can expect 
unilaterally is less than the fixed cost. 
Using linear approximation, the net benefit from lobbying on the LHS in (5.27) be-
comes 
(aui "au j au) (T* _ T- i ) < F aT + ~ ~ or +aor P P -jEN_i T=T;' 
. Out" Ouj" Ou' - {)U d T* - 1 Slnce {)T + wjEN_, {)T = wiEN {)T - {)T an p - , 
(1 + a) au;:) T=T;' (1- T;') < F 
From (5.7), 
E (}i _fJi fJ' 
From (5.16), T;i, defined by (5.23), is Tp-i = 1 + q [ ( 1 ~ ) N - l ] ] = 1 - q[(l+a)N-l]' 
( i) = (1 + a) N ((/i) 2 < F N B (/ - [(1 + a) N _ 1]2 -
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{5.28} 
NB(8') 
NB'(8') 
o 
Figure 5-1: Lobbying individually with fixed cost. 
It is clear that NB (Oi) is strictly convex in Oi as ONB(Oi) = 2(1+a)NO i < 0 if Oi < 0 
2 . 09' [(1+a)N-l]2 > > 
o NB(O') 2{l+a)N . 
and (OOi)2 = [(1+a)N-lj2 > O. Therefore, NB (0') can be represented in Figure 5-1. 
Omin and Omax are the minimum and maximum ownerships in the economy, respec-
tively. It can be seen that the closer an individual's policy preference is to free trade, 
the smaller is the net benefit from lobbying that individual can expect unilaterally. 11 
Therefore, given a positive fixed cost, there will be some individuals who do not find it 
beneficial to lobby individually. They are those whose ownerships are within the interval 
(01, ( 2 ) in Figure 5-1. The equilibrium trade policy is now not necessarily free trade 
as in the previous section because not every individual participates in lobbying. From 
(5.16), the political equilibrium trade policy depends on the average ownership and on 
the welfare of individuals participating in lobbying which depends on the distribution 
of ownership at the two tails of the distribution. The political equilibrium trade policy 
will be an import subsidy, free trade, or an import tariff when the ownerships on the left 
11 This is because when all individuals are lobbying, the optimal political tariff is free trade and hence 
the greater the deviation of an individual's ownership is from the population average, the greater is the 
net welfare loss of that individual were he/she not to lobby. 
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tail of the distribution are more, equally, or less populated relative to those on t he right 
tail.12 
The purpose of this section is to identify the cases where no individual can afford 
to lobby individually. From Figure 5-1, no one will lobby if the fixed cost is too large. 
In addition from (5.28) Q2NB(Oi) = _2(1+a)[(1+a)N+l)(}i hi h . t (1 ) th 
, 'OO'oN [(1+a)N-lj3 W C IS grea er ess an zero 
if (}i < 0 ((}i > 0). This means that the slope of N B ((}i) in Figure 5-1 is increasing 
(decreasing) with N for (}i < 0 ((}i > 0) which implies that N B ((}i) will be flatter if the 
total population N is larger and no one will lobby individually if the total population is 
sufficiently large. This is depicted by the function N B' ((}i) in Figure 5-1. The number 
of total population N' which underlying N B' ((}i) is larger than the number of total 
population N which underlying N B ((}i). This result is understandable when Tp-i = 
1 - q[(l+:;N-lj is considered. It can be seen that Tp-i will be closer to T; = 1 as N 
becoming larger. This is because as an individual becomes smaller relative to the larger 
total population, his/her political contribution influence on the government's trade policy 
becomes smaller. From (5.27), if N is arbitrarily large, Tp-i converges to T; and the net 
benefit any individual can expect from lobbying converges to zero and hence no individual 
will find it beneficial to lobby.13 These results can be summarised in Proposition 6. H 
Proposition 6 No one lobbies individually in equilibrium if the total population and/or 
the fixed cost of lobbying are too larye. 
Proposition 6 provides support for Mitra (1999)'s claim that individuals do not lobby 
individually since they consider themselves too small to communicate their offers or 
12This result coincides with the majority voting model of Mayer (1984) in which the political equilib-
rium trade policy are those preferred by the majority. 
131n terms of Figure 5-1, N B (fi) will lie thoroughly on the horizontal axis in which case. 
14Needless to say, the effect of the government concern on the aggregate welfare, a, on the individual 
decision to lobby is similar to the effect of N. It is obvious that as the government has greater concern on 
the aggregate welfare relative to the political contribution, an individual's influence on t h ~ ~ government 
and hence the net benefit he/she can expect from lobbying will be smaller. This can be Illustrated by 
8 l N ~ ( 8 i ) ) = _ 2NI{l+a)N+;IOi which is greater (less) than zero if Oi < 0 (Oi > 0), similar to the effect of 
888a !(l+a)N-l) . . 'h. . . 
N. However, Mitra (1999) finds that the lobbymg benefit could mcrease Wit a smce an increase In a 
reduces the number of organised industries. 
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persuade the government to formulate economic policy one way or the other since the 
transactions costs for these to be done at the level of the individual may be very high. 
This section can be considered as providing a formal proof of the claim. We proceed to 
the case where the individuals influence the government through forming lobbies in the 
next section. 
5.4 Lobby formation 
As opposed to the previous works which usually assume that a lobby is formed only 
within a well-defined group, such as identical firms within the same industry, this section 
concerns the lobby formation in which individuals are free to join any lobby. Before we 
proceed, it should be noted that the results of this section show that an individual might 
choose to join the lobby that lobbies against his/her interest to moderate its effort rather 
than the lobby that lobbies in his/her favour. Therefore, in equilibrium, a lobby group 
might consist of members whose policy preferences are diverse, e.g. an individual who 
prefers an import tariff might be a member of the same lobby as the individual who prefers 
an import subsidy. Given the complete information on the individuals' policy preferences, 
one may wonder why the lobby does not reject the entrance of some members knowing 
that they want to mitigate its objective. Note that the main assumption in the lobbying 
framework is that a lobby can make the government be aware of its policy preference by 
the use of money. Given that the lobby normally has to face with fierce competition in 
the political arena but has to rely on the donations from its members,15 it is reasonable 
that the lobby might be willing to trade off its policy stance for a higher donation like 
the government which values contributions while concerning the general welfare. This 
two-level politics is able to generate such an outcome that seems to support what is often 
150ne might even argue that lobbies certainly have interests aside from influencing policy, such as 
profits for the lobby entrepreneurs (Salisbury, 1990). 
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cited as "politics makes strange bedfellows" .16 Therefore, the passive role of the lobbies 
is assumed in this section. 
The political game consists of three stages. In the first stage, individuals decide 
whether to form and join the lobbies. In the second stage, each organised lobby non 
co-operatively chooses a contribution function which maximises the aggregate utility of 
its members and announces to the government. In the last stage, given the contribution 
schedules announced by the lobbies, the government chooses and implements a tariff rate 
to maximise the weighted sum of the contribution and the general welfare, and then 
collects the contribution from the lobbies accordingly. Each lobby's contribution will 
be shared equally among its members. To keep the complexities of t he model at the 
minimum, it is assumed in this section that there is no fixed cost of lobbying. 
5.4.1 Policy formation 
If lobbying is the effort to shift the one dimensional trade policy away from free trade, 
it is presumable that there are two opposing forces pulling the trade policy toward an 
import tariff or an import subsidy. This section concerns the equilibrium in which there 
exist two opposing lobbies, one lobbying for an import tariff and the other lobbying 
for an import subsidy, represented by L t and L s , respectively. Given the other lobby's 
contribution schedule, each lobby maximises the net aggregate welfare of its members. 
(5.29) 
where Sk (T) is lobby Lk's contribution schedule, Lk E {Lt, Ls}. 
16Being aware of the fact that interest groups often enter into coalitions .so as to reduce the cost of 
issue advocacy, Almeida (2003) argues that the opposing interest groups mIght have a common s ~ ~ r t t
term interest to work together. An example in the US is the Cigarette Tax for H e a l ~ h h C a r ~ ~ coahtlon 
which campaigns for a raise in the cigarette tax. It has brought together t h ~ e e e pubhc-relatlons ~ r m s s
who often find themselves dueling against one another: Chernoff Newman SlIver Gregory, :\IcAllSter 
Communications and Richard Quinn & Associates. 
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If the lobbies announce truthful contribution schedules, the government is effectively 
maximising the weighted sum of the lobbies' aggregate utilities and the economy aggre-
gate utility. 
mF L uJ (OJ, T) + L uJ (OJ, T) + aU (T) (5.3O) 
JELt JELa 
This is because the objective of the government is to choose Tp such that St (Tp) + 
SB (Tp) + aU (Tp) > St (T) + S8 (T) + aU (T). The truthful contribution made by 
lobby Lk for any T chosen by the government must leave the lobby a base level of 
aggregate utility, Bk • Therefore, lobby k's truthful contribution function must satisfy 
LJELk uJ (OJ, T) - Sk (T) = Bk => Sk (T) = LjELk uj (OJ, T) - Bk for all possible T 
chosen by the government. Therefore, the government optimisation condition is 
(LJELt uJ (OJ, Tp) - B t ) 
+ (LJELa uJ (OJ, Tp) - Bs) 
+aU (Tp) 
which implies that 
LJELt uJ (OJ, Tp) 
+ LJELa uJ (OJ, Tp) 
+aU (Tp) 
(LJELt uj (OJ, T) - B t ) 
> +(LjELauj(OJ,T)-BB) 
+aU (T) 
LJELt uj (OJ, T) 
> + LJELa uJ (oj, T) 
+aU (T) 
From (5.30), the first order condition for the government's optimisation problem is 
(5.31) 
From (5.7), (5.31) is 
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L q [oj + q (1 - T)] + L q [oj + q (1 - T)] + aN q2 (1 - T) = 0 
jELt jELt 
Solving for T, the political optimal tariff can be represented by 
(5.32) 
E· ()j 
Ok = J ~ k k where Nk is the number of lobby Lk'S members. Similar to the previous 
section, the government's political optimal tariff is the policy compromise between its 
policy preference and those of the lobbies. It will be an import tariff, free trade, or 
an import subsidy, Tp ~ ~ 1, when the average ownership of the lobbies is larger, equal 
or less than the population average, NtOt + NsO s ~ ~ o. It can be seen that when the 
lobbies' objectives are to maximise the aggregate welfare of their members, individuals 
are indifferent between the two lobbies in terms of the gross benefit from lobbying since 
they always gain extra weight in the government's objective function regardless of which 
lobby they join. As is to be shown in the next section, the only difference between joining 
the two lobbies is the lobbies' contributions that the individuals will have to share. 
5.4.2 Lobby contribution 
By implementing Tp , the government collects contributions from the lobbies according 
to their pre-announced contribution schedules. Consider lobby Lt. The government's 
political optimal tariff were lobby Lt not lobbying is Tp- t , defined by 
Tp- t = argmax L u j (Oi, T) + aU (Tp) 
jEL. 
From (5.32), 
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T- t = 1 + NiJs 
p q(Ns + aN) (5.33) 
Denote the contribution that lobby L t must make to support Tp by St (Tp). Since lobby 
L t has no incentive to pay more than the amount that just compensates the government's 
welfare were it not lobbying, from (5.30), 
U sing linear approximation, 
From (5.7), 
[ 
L:iELs (}i (1 T.)] (T- t - T. ) St (Tp) = q (Ns + aN) (Ns + aN) + q - p p p 
T t Recall th t () LjEL. (Ji Substitute (5.32) for Tp and (5.33) for ;. a S = N. . 
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where B_ t = ( N ~ + ~ N ) ) is the ownership of the individual whose most preferred policy 
is Tp-t. Lobby La's contribution to support Tp can be derived likewise. Therefore, the 
contribution each member of each lobby has to pay for Tp is 
8t (Tp) 
Nt 
8 s (Tp) 
Ns (5.34) 
Similarly, B- s = ( N ~ ~ ~ t N ) ) is the ownership of the individual whose most preferred 
policy is the political optimal tariff were lobby Ls not participating in lobbying. It is 
clear that the contribution each lobby has to pay for Tp is larger when there is larger 
deviation between its policy preference and the policy preferences of the government 
and its opponent. This is intuitive since the greater the difference between the policy 
preference of a lobby and the policy preferences of the government and its opponent, the 
greater is the effort of the lobby is required to shift the outcome in its favour. 
It can be seen that the political optimal tariff in (5.32) and the contribution each 
lobby member has to pay in (5.34) depend on the lobbies' identities (the average own-
ership among their members) and sizes (the numbers of their members). They are pre-
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determined by the individuals' decision to join the lobbies in the first stage of the game. 
5.4.3 Individual decision 
In the first stage of the game, the individuals choose between staying out of the lobbies 
and joining the tariff or subsidy lobby. Among the three choices, given the choices of the 
other individuals, every individual chooses the strategy that gives him/her the highest 
net utility in equilibrium. The objective of this section is to identify the possible forms 
of coalitions when the individuals choose their lobbies endogenously. 
Denote L; and L: as the equilibrium sets of the tariff and subsidy lobbies, respectively, 
by which the political equilibrium tariff T; is implied.17 From (5.32), 
T* = 1 + NtO; + N;O: 
P q (Nt + N; + aN) (5.35) 
The equilibrium in the first stage of the game must be such that no one finds it 
beneficial to change his/her course of action. This means that the two following conditions 
must be satisfied in equilibrium. 
Condition 1 At T;, every individual i E L; (i E L:) must not find it beneficial to 
leave L; (L:) and stay out of the lobbies. 
Condition 2 At T;, every individual i E L; (i E L:) must not find it beneficial to 
switch to L: (L;). 
Condition 1 is the necessary condition for an individual i to be a member of a lobby in 
equilibrium. It ensures that each lobby consists of the members who prefer participating 
in rather than staying out of the lobbies. Condition 2 is the condition in which that 
17From (5.30), T; is defined by T; = argmax EjEL; uj ((Ji,T) + EjEL: uj (lP,T) +aU(T). 
The superscript (*) will be used to indicate the equilibrium values of all the variables henceforth. 
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individual i prefers staying in that lobby rather than the other. 18 Therefore. to identify 
the equilibrium sets of the tariff and the subsidy lobbies, the set of individuals who do 
not violate these conditions must be identified. These conditions are considered in turn. 
Condition 1 
Consider i E L;. At T;, every individual i E L; must not find it beneficial to leave 
L; and stay out of the lobbies. This condition can be represented by 
(5.36) 
for all i E L;. 
T ~ - i i is the political optimal tariff were i E L; not to participate in lobbying. From 
(5.30), it is defined by T ~ - i i = arg max [LjELi uj (oj, T) - ui (Oi, T) ] + LjEL: uj (oJ, T) + 
aU (T). From (5.32), 
T t - i = 1 (NtO; - Oi) + N;O: 
P + q [( Nt - 1) + N; + aN] (5.37) 
Therefore, ui (Oi, T ~ - i ) ) is the net utility individual i E L; would obtain were he/she 
to leave the lobby while [ui ((Ji, r;) - si i? )] is the net utility of the individual i E L; 
in the equilibrium. Therefore, (5.36) states that, in equilibrium, all individual i E L; 
must have non positive gain to leave L; and stay out of lobbying. 
•• • ( ) t" S;(T;). (536) (536) Rearrange, use linear apprmQmatlon, and substitute 5.34 lor N
e
• In . , . 
becomes 
18 Another condition that, at T*, every individual i ~ ~ {L;, L:} must not find it beneficial to join either 
L * or L * is not necessary since i ~ ~ is already implied by the satisfaction of Condition 1 and Condition 2. t 8' 
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8u
i (T!.-i _ T*) + Nt (N: + aN) (* * 2 
aT P P (N* + N* N}2 O_t - 0t) < 0 T=T; t 8 + a 
O*-t = ( : ; ~ ~ ) ) is the ownership of the individual whose most preferred policy is the 
political optimal tariff were L; not lobbying at T;, i.e. Tp-t.. From (5.7), 
q [Oi + q (1 - T*)] (T t - i _ T*) + Nt (N: + aN) (0* _ 0*)2 < 0 
p P P (Nt + N; + aN}2 -t t - . 
Substitute (5.35) for T; and (5.37) for r;-i. 
( . .........)2 
_ 0" - 0 + Nt (N: + aN) (0* _ 0*)2 < 0 
[(Nt - I) + N; + aN] (Nt + N; + aN}2 -t t - (5.38) 
7! = ( Z f ~ t ; ! 1 : ; l ) ) is the ownership of the individual whose most preferred policy is 1';. 
Given that 0: < 0 < 0;,19 it is shown in Appendix C.1 that (5.38) will be violated if 
(5.39) 
Nt (N: + aN) [( Nt - 1) + N; + aN] 0 
J..L - > 
t - (Nt + N; + aN}2 (5.40) 
Since O*-t = ( : : i ~ N ) ) is the weighted average between 0: and 0, (O*-t - 0;) < 0 by the 
assumption that 0: < 0 < 0;. Therefore, [0 + /P. ( O ~ , , - 0;)] < 0 < [0 - /P. ( O ~ . . - 0;) ] . 
19Since it is assumed that L; is lobbying for an import tariff and L: is lobbying for an import subsidy. 
9; < 0 < 9; is the natural assumption. 
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{5.39} is the set of individuals who violate Condition 1 and hence they cannot be a 
member of the tariff lobby in equilibrium, i.e. they cannot be in L;. It can be seen that 
the individual who could be a member of the tariff lobby in equilibrium must have the 
.-.. 
ownership sufficiently far from 0 , the ownership of the individual whose most preferred 
policy is T; .20 This is understandable when (5.38) is considered. The first term in (5.38) 
is the welfare loss of an individual i E L; from his/her utility not being given an extra 
weight in the government's objective function while the second term is the welfare gain in 
terms of the political contribution he/she can forgo were he/she to leave L;. It can be seen 
that the welfare gain is constant with respect to Oi. Therefore, when comparing across 
-. 
individuals, the individuals whose ownerships are closer to 0 will face smaller welfare 
loss from leaving L;. If the individual whose ownership is [0 + ..jii; ( O ~ t t - 0;)] < Oi < 
[9* - JJI; ( O ~ t t - On] was in L;, he/she would face sufficiently small welfare loss to have 
a positive net benefit to leave L;. Hence being in L; is apparently not his/her optiInal 
strategy.21 
The set of individuals who violate Condition 1 were they in L:can be obtained likewise. 
They are the individuals whose ownerships are 
(5.41 ) 
_ N: {Nt + aN} [Nt + (N: - I) + aN] > 0 
J.Ls - {Nt + N: + aN)2 (5.42) 
20 As Condition 2 must also be satisfied, satisfaction of Condition 1 is necessary but not sufficient for 
an individual to be a member of the tariff lobby in equilibrium. 
21 Fr (5.38) it is clear that the individual whose ownership is 8* have the maximum gain from l e a v i n : ~ ; ; ( w e r ~ ~ he/she in Ln comparing to the other individuals, since he/she faces zero welfare loss 
from doing so. 
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where [0 - $. ( o ~ . . -0:)] < 0 < [0 + $. ( O ~ . . -0:)] .22 
Condition 2 
Consider individual i E L;. At T;, every individual i E L; must not find it beneficial 
to switch to L:. This condition can be represented by 
[ui (li Tt-i,s+i) _ Ss (rr;-i,S+i)] _ [ui (fi T*) _ S; (T;)] < 0 , P N* + 1 ' P N* 
S t 
for all i E L;. 
T;-i,S+i is the political optimal tariff were individual i E L; to switch to L:. From 
(5.30), it is defined by T;-i,S+i = argmax [LiELi ui (Oi, T) - ui (Oi, T)] 
+ [LiEL: ui (Oi, T) + ui (Oi, T)] + aU (T) which is clearly identical to T;. This is 
because, when the lobbies maximise the aggregate utilities of their members, the indi-
viduals' utilities are always given an extra weight in the government's objective function 
regardless of which lobby they join. Therefore, switching lobby does not alter the gross 
utility of an individual. At T;, an individual i E L; can gain from switching to L: only 
if he/she can expect to pay a lower contribution. The above condition reduces to 
S: (T;) 
N* t 
S S ( ~ - i , S + i ) )
- . . . . . : . . . . . . : : . . . . - . - ~ ~ < 0 
N* + 1 S 
for all i E L;. This means that all individual i E L; must not be able to expect to 
pay a lower contribution by switching to L:. From (5.34), the above condition is 
220· = NiB, is the weighted average between 0; and 0, therefore, (0:'. - 0;) > 0 by the a s s u m ~ ~
-5 (N;+aN) 
tion that 8; < 0 < 0;. 
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<0 (5.43) 
Rearrange the second term. 
Nt (N: + aN) ((r _ 0*)2 _ 1 (" _ i)2 
(Nt + N: + aN)2 -t t (N: + 1) [(Nt _ 1) + aN] Ot 0 < 0 (5.44) 
o = 7! + N: (Nt + aN) (0* _ 0*) 
t (Nt + N: + aN) -s s (5.45) 
" Ot is the ownership of the individual who, if switches from L; to L; at T;, will alter 
the average ownership of L: to be equal to the new O-s which, from (5.34), means that, 
ceteris paribus, the new contribution made by the new subsidy lobby L; + {i} equals to 
zero. 23 Note that Ot > 7! since (O*-s - 0:) > O. 
It is shown in Appendix C.2 that (5.44) will be violated if 
(5.46) 
A _ _ N.!:.,...t ~ ( N . . . 2 . : . . . . . ; , + _ a _ N . . . : . . ) ~ ( (N......::::.-+----:..l )...!;,.;[ ( : . . . . . N ~ t t:---1.;,...) + _ a N ~ ] ]
t - (Nt + N: +aN)2 (5.47) 
23See the second term in (5.43), if an individual i E L; switches to L: at r; t the new average 
N ·B· Bi ..... N·B·+B i • " - H (Ji (J h al h· h ownership of L. is (k:'+o and the new (J-IJ IS N,.-l +aN' = t, t ese two are equ W Ie means 
zero contribution paid by the new subsidy lobby L: + til· 
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Since ( O ~ t t - 0;) < 0, rot + A (O*-t - 0;)] < [Ot - A (O*-t - 0;)]. 
From (5.44), it can be seen that the first term, which represents the contribution 
cost paid by i E L; at T;, is constant with respect to (i. Therefore, the gains from 
switching from L; to L: are different across individuals with respect to the extent to 
which the individuals can affect the average ownership of L:, i.e. 0:, and hence its political 
contribution. As discussed above, the individual whose ownership is Ot can expect to pay 
zero contribution were he/she in L; and switched to L: at T;. Therefore, the individuals 
..-
whose ownerships are close to Ot will be more likely to violate (5.44) as compared to 
the others since they can expect to pay a lower contribution24 were they in L; and 
switched to L:. This is stated by (5.46) in which the boundaries of the set of ownerships 
which violate (5.44) deviate symmetrically around Ot, i.e. [Ot + A (O*-t - 0;)] < et < 
~ t t - A ( O ~ t t - on ] . 
The individuals whose ownerships are ~ t t + A (O*-t - 0;)] < Oi < ret - A (o*-t - on], 
therefore, cannot be in L; since they would have an incentive to switch to L: were they 
in L; at T;. 
The set of individuals who violate Condition 2 were they in L: can be obtained likewise. 
They are the individuals whose ownerships are 
(5.48) 
N; (Nt + aN) (Nt + 1) [(N; - 1) + aN] 
As = (Nt + N: + aN)2 
(5.49) 
24The closer an individual i's ownership is to 9t (either ei is larger or smaller than ge), the smaller is 
the contribution the individual i can expect from switching from L; to L;. 
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-- ......... N* (N* + aN) Os = 0 + t s (0* _ 0*) (Nt + N: + aN) -t t (5.50) 
Since ( O ~ s s - 0:) > 0, [Os - vTs ( O ~ s s - 0:)] < Os < [Os + vTs ( O ~ s s - 0:)]. 
(5.39) and (5.46) are the sets of individuals who cannot be the members of the tariff 
lobby in equilibrium, however, it is not necessary that all the rest of the individuals will 
be the tariff lobby's members. Likewise, all the rest of the individuals from those in 
(5.41) and (5.48) need not be the subsidy lobby's members. Therefore, to determine how 
the individuals group themselves in equilibrium (5.39), (5.41), (5.46), and (5.48) have to 
be compared. They are summarised in Summary 1 as the point of reference. 
Summary 1 
(i) The equilibrium tariff lobby L; does not consist of the individuals whose oumer-
ships are 
Condition 1: [0 + yJi; ( O ~ t t - On] < Oi < [0 - yJi; ( O ~ t t - 0;) J 
Condition 2: ~ t t + ~ ~ ( O ~ t t - 0;) J < Oi < [Ot - A ( O ~ t t - 0;) J 
(ii) The equilibrium subsidy lobby L: does not consist of the individuals whose oum-
erships are 
Condition 1: 
Condition 2: 
Since the critical values in Summary 1 still depend on the numbers of the lobbies' 
members which depend on the distribution of ownership in the economy, their comparison 
is not possible without knowing the distribution function. 
Suppose that the distribution of ownership is symmetric around the population mean 
B = o. Therefore, it is presumable that the equilibrium will be synunetric such that 
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the two lobbies' efforts neutralise each other. Specifically, with symmetric distribution. 
Nt = N: and the political equilibrium tariff is free trade, T; = 1. From (5.35), it is 
---. 
implied that {} = 0 and hence {}: = -{};. 
Therefore, the results in Summary 1 can be simplified and be compared in tenns of 
the variables associated with only one lobby that chosen to be the tariff lobby. From 
(5.40), (5.42), (5.47) and (5.49), the symmetric equilibrium implies that I's = I't and 
As = At· The symmetric equilibrium also implies that {}*-s = -{}*-t and hence, from (5.45) 
....... ....... 
and (5.50), {}s = -{}t. Therefore, the results in Summary 1 can be simplified to 
Condition 1 #t ({}*-t - (};) < {}i < - #t ({}*-t - 0;) 
Condition 2 [0, + VA. ( O ~ , , - 0;) 1 < 0' < ~ , , - VA. ( O ~ , , - 0;) 1 
Condition 1 #t ({}*-t - 0;) < Oi < - #t (O*-t - (};) 
Condition 2 - [0, - VA. ( O ~ , , - 0;) 1 <9' < - [0, + VA. ( O ~ , , - 0;) 1 
(5.51) 
It can be seen that, under the symmetric distribution, only three critical values need 
to be considered. 
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01 #t (O*-t - On 
O2 [Ot - A (O*-t - on ] 
03 [ ~ + + A (O*-t - 0;)] (5.52) 
It is shown in Appendix C.3 that they are in the following order. 
Figure 5-2 (a), in which [Omin,Omax] is the set of all possible ownerships, SUlnnlarises 
these relationships and the conditions stated in (5.51). 
It can be seen that the set of those who violate Condition 1 and 2 for i E L; are those 
whose ownership Oi E (01, ( 2 ), Therefore, the possible tariff lobby's members in equilib-
rium should be those individuals whose ownerships are Oi E [Omin, 01] and Oi E [02 ,Omax]' 
Similarly, the possible equilibrium subsidy lobby should consist of those individuals whose 
ownerships are Oi E [Omin, -02] and Oi E [-O I ,Omax]' In fact, there are two possible forms 
of symmetric coalitions suggested by Figure 5-2 (a). One is represented by Figure 5-2 
(b) and the other by Figure 5-2 (c). It can be seen that both forms of coalitions do not 
violate Condition 1 and Condition 2 for i E L; and i E L:. However, the form of coali-
tions in Figure 5-2 (b) implies that the lobbies' average ownerships are 0; < 0 < 0: in 
equilibrium which is in contradiction with the assumption that 0: < 0 < 0;. Therefore, 
it can be concluded that the possible form of coalitions in equilibrium when individuals 
choose their lobbies endogenously is as suggested by Figure 5-2 (c). 
It can be seen that those who stay out of the lobbies in equilibrium are those whose 
policy preferences close to the political equilibrium tariff T;. This is straight forward 
since the equilibrium trade policy is close to their preferences so that they would obtain 
too small change in the tariff and hence too small improvenlent in their wdfare; to 
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cover the lobbies' contribution costs they had to share were they to join the lobbies 
for their utilities to be given an extra weight in the government's decision. Note that 
this is different from the case if they lobby individually. As discussed earlier, when 
the individuals lobby individually, they offer the government their truthful contribution 
schedules so that they pay the amounts of contribution according to their true willingness 
to pay given the tariff outcome. They can even pay zero contribution if the tariff turns 
out to be their most preferred tariff so that every individual always obtains non negative 
net benefit from lobbying in absence of the fixed cost. In contrast, when the individuals 
are restricted to lobby only through the lobbies in this section, they have to pay the 
contribution according to the true willingness to pay of the individuals whose ownerships 
are the average ownerships among the members of the lobbies they join.25 Therefore, 
the amount of contribution per head can be too high for the individuals whose policy 
preferences are close to the equilibrium tariff to be able to join. 
In addition, it can be seen that each lobby consists of the members whose policy 
preferences are diverse. When group formation is not restricted to be only among a 
well-defined group as in all previous works, an individual may choose to join the lobby 
that lobbying against his/her interest to moderate the lobby's effort instead of joining 
the lobby that lobbying in his/her interest. Consider an individual whose ownership is 
-(}2 < (}i < (}1 in Figure 5-2 (c). If he/she left L; and stayed out of the lobbies, the 
political equilibrium tariff would move away from his/her interest. Even if the individual 
might gain from the contribution he/she could forgo, the above derivation ensures that the 
loss from the policy change dominates. Alternatively, if the same individual switched from 
L. to L· even if the switching did not alter the political equilibrium tariff (see (5.32)), 
t s' 
he/she would have to pay a higher contribution with the subsidy lobby.26 Therefore, 
25Note also that from Figure 5-2 (c), the individual whose ownership is the average among the 
members of a lobby' need not be one of the members as the set of the lobby's members i ~ ~ n ~ t t .continuous, 
26The switching has two effects on the contribution of the subsidy l o b ~ y y that ~ h e , l ~ d l v l d u a l l would 
expect to pay were he/she to switch to, It lowers the contribution of L,' S l ~ c e e the md,lVldual m a k ~ ~ the 
average ownership of L, closer to zero. However, it also raises the contnbutlon of L" s m ~ ~ the leavmg of 
the individual makes the average ownership of L t farther from zero, The above derivation ensures that 
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being a member of the tariff lobby in equilibrium is his/her optimal strategy. It can 
be concluded that the political equilibrium trade policy tends not to be extreme not 
only due to the opposing forces between the lobbies but also due to the fact that each 
lobby's effort is moderated by its own members. This result raises a question whether 
the standard industry lobby approach might exaggerate the lobbying activities. 
Comparing the welfare implications between this two-lobby equilibrium and the individual-
lobby equilibrium in section 5.3, a point is worth discussing. It was shown in section 5.3 
that all individuals lobby individually in equilibrium in the absence of the fixed cost to 
support free trade. Since there is also free trade in the symmetric two-lobby equilibrium, 
the welfare comparison can be done in terms of the contributions that the individuals have 
to pay. It is obvious that those whose fi close to zero are better off in the two-lobby equi-
librium since they do not have to pay any contribution. For those at the two extremes, it 
is apparent that they are also better off in the two-lobby equilibrium since they can pay 
smaller contributions. This is because, when the individuals lobby through groups, they 
do not have to pay according to their own deviations from the mean but according to the 
average deviations of their respective lobbies which are smaller. Therefore, the lobbies 
that emerge in this model can be considered as the means through which the individuals 
can restrain their otherwise offsetting contributions thus providing an incentive for the 
individuals to lobby collectively. 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the individuals' decision to participate in lobbying prior to the 
stages of interaction between the government and the lobbies studied by Grossman and 
Helpman (1994). It was found that no one lobbied individually if the total population 
and/or the fixed costs were too large since the individuals would find themselves too small 
to influence the government's decision. When the lobby formation was concerned. It was 
the latter effect dominates. 
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found that when the individuals were not restricted to join a particular lobby as in the 
previous works, some individuals might want to join the lobbies which lobbied against 
their interests to moderate their efforts rather than joining the ones which lobbied in 
their favour. Welfare comparison between the two equilibriums suggested that a lobby 
could be the means through which the individuals could restrain their otherwise offsetting 
contributions thus providing them an incentive to lobby collectively. 
It can be seen that the model in this chapter shares the same basic sett ings as the 
models in the previous chapters on trade disputes and trade agreements. As pointed out 
by Putnam (1988) and is generally recognised in the literature, there are the entangle-
ments between domestic and international politics. Therefore, an interesting extension 
of this model is to combine it with the framework in the previous chapters to study the 
effect of domestic politics on the international front. This will constitute a more com-
prehensive framework to analyse the international tariff policy whether it is in conflicts 
or coordinations. More generally, the framework developed in this chapter can also be 
applied to the determination of the government's policies other than tariff. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
This thesis is a collection of theoretical works on trade wars, trade agreements, and the 
political economy of trade policies. A multi-country, two-good model t hat shares the 
same trade patterns with a trade model in the customs union literature was elnployed 
in chapters 3 and 4. We examined the importance of the world market structure on 
the outcome of a trade war and the choice of a country to negotiate a trade agreement 
when the alternatives which imply different sources of gain were available. Chapter 5 
concerned the lobby formation which was exogenous in the previous literature. 
In chapter 3, it was shown that there was a greater possibility for a country to win even 
if the country's endowments were relatively small if the world market of its exportable 
moved closer to the monopolistic market, i.e. there were less countries exporting the same 
good and/or the world endowment of that good was divided more disproportionately 
among its exporters, while the previous literature suggested that only the cowltry whose 
endowments of goods were relatively large could win a trade war. 
In chapter 4, as there were two types of trade agreement which implied different 
sources of gain and different negotiating partners, the conditions in which one was pre-
ferred to the other by a country were exalluned. By comparing the welfa.re implications 
between the two types of agreement from the perspective of a COWltry, it was found that 
the choice of a country to negotiate a trade agreement did not depend on the strategic 
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complementarity or substitutability of its negotiating partners' tariffs but their levels of 
endowments that generated sufficiently large gain (no matter it was the gain in tenns of 
trade or in volume of trade) relative to the non-cooperative equilibrium. 
In the last chapter, it was found that no one lobbied individually if the total population 
and/ or the fixed costs were too large since the individuals would find themselves too small 
to influence the government's decision. When the lobby formation was concerned. It was 
found that when the individuals were not restricted to join a particular lobby as in the 
previous works, some individuals might want to join the lobbies which lobbied against 
their interests to moderate their efforts rather than joining the ones which lobbied in 
their favour. Welfare comparison between the two equilibriums suggested that a lobby 
could be the means through which the individuals could restrain their otherwise offsetting 
contributions thus providing them an incentive to lobby collectively. 
As the last chapter is closely linked with the framework in the first two chaptt'rs, a 
possible and interesting extension of this thesis is to combine the two frameworks together 
to obtain a more comprehensive framework for the trade policy analysis. 
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Appendix A 
Chapter 3 
A.1 Derivation of the Nash equilibrium tariffs ill tlle 
two-country model. 
Substituting (3.9) and (3.10) back into ( 3 , ~ ) ) and soh'(' for r' alld 1'11, tIl!' two c ( ) l l l l t r i ( ~ ' '
best response tariff fUllctioIls call 1)(' ohtaill<'<i, COll:-;idn' .\. 
(1 orA) (SA l<JyA) 
2 ~ ( 1 + r A ) 2 2 ..;rj 
Take out the COIIlIIlon t(,rIll:-; and sub:-;titllt(' (:L7l for q 1Il till' dt'IlOIllin;11111 ()f tIlt' 
s(\c<md t(\rIll. 
l Ts,'(\ t , l l t ~ ~ f;H't that s·1 --cc J"\ \ aIld sllhstitllt(' ( : ~ , 7 ) ) fill (}. .. (IT [' ) , 
~ ~ 1 .,1 LXI • ( 1 _, /1 :.x B ~ ~
( .' .( y'( '.' n ) n ) 
Rearrange. 
[ SA X A] [( A' A ] (SAyA + sByB) = TAsAyA 1 - s ).\ +TA(1 - TA)(1 - sB)XB +(1 _ sB)XB 
(sA)2XAyA 
+TA(1- TA)sAyA(1- sB)XB 
+SAXAsByB 
+TA(1- TA)sB(I- SB)XByB 
Using the fact that sA = (lr;A) and (1 - sA) = ( l + ~ A ) ' ' the first term on the left and 
the first term on the right are equal thus cancel each other out. Rearrange. 
[ 
sAXAsByB ] [ T AsAYA(1 _ sB)XB ] 
+TA(1 - TA)sB(1 - SB)XByB _TA(1- TA)sAyA(l _ sB)XB 
sA XAsByB + TA(1 - TA)sB(1 - SB)XByB = (TA)2sAYA(1 _ sB)XB 
Multiply through by -!X. 
XAsByB + -!xTA (1 - TA)sB(1 - SB)XByB = (TA)2yA(1 _ sB)XB 
XAsByB + [1 - (TA)2]sB(1 - sB)XByB = (TA)2yA(1 _ sB)XB 
Solve for TA, A's best response tariff function can be obtained. 
sByB [XA + (1- SB)XB] 
(1 - SB)XB (yA + sByB) 
Substituting for SB and (3.1) for Xi and yi and rearranging yields 
{3y ( ~ + 1 ) )
(1 - {3:1J [(1 - {3y)TB + 1] 
Working similarly, 8's best response tariff function can also be obtained. 
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(3.11 ) 
/3x ( ~ + 1 ) )
(1 - /3y) [(1 - /3x)TA + 1] (3.12) 
The interior Nash equilibrium tariffs (TA TB) can bled £ b bs· . 
_ __ ' N' N , e so v or y su tltUtlng 
TB(TA) into TA(TB). 
/3 (1-{3y) [{l-l3z)TAHj :I: {3 /3 +1 (TA)2 = /3y :I: ( ~ + l ) )
(1-/3:1:) 13 
(1-/3) ~ ~ (¥i+l) 
y (1-111/' [(1-{3:1:)TA+ 1j +1 
(TA)2 = /3" V'''-/3:1:-(I--/3-y)y'[(I-/3:1:)TA+IJ+ ( ~ + l ) ) [(l-/3:1:}TA+IJ 
(1-/3:1:) (3 y/3:1:(1-/31/) ( ~ + I ) + y ' [ ( I - / 3 : 1 : ) T A + I J J ( ~ + 1 ) )
(TA)2(1 _ /3x) { /3x(1- / 3 y ) ( ~ ~ + 1) } = 
+ [(1 - /3x)TA + 1] ( ~ ~ + 1) 
/3 { J /3x(1- f3 y) [(1 - f3x)TA + 1] } 
y +J[(1 - /3x )TA + 1] ( ~ ~ + 1) 
(TA)2(1 - / 3 x ) ( ~ ~ + 1) f3x(1 - f3y) 
+(TA)2(1 - /3x) [(1 - /3x)TA + 1 ] ( ~ ~ + 1) 
-/3y[(l - /3x)TA + 1] f3x(1- f3y) 
-/3y [(1 - /3x)TA + 1 ] ( ~ ~ + 1) 
=0 
[ 
J ~ / 3 x - ( l - / 3 - y ) ) (TA)2(1 - f 3 x ) ( ~ ~ + 1) - f3y[(l - /3x)TA + 1)] ] = 0 
+ [(1 - /3x)TA + 1 ] ( ~ ~ + 1) [(TA)2(1 - /3x) - /3y] 
[ 
/3x(1- /3y) [(TA)2(1- f3x) - /3y] ] 
+ [(1 - (3z)TA + 1 ] ( ~ ~ + 1) [(TA)2(1 - (3z) - f3.1 = 0 
[(TA)2(1 _ /3x) _ /3y] { /3x(l - /3
y) } = 0 
+ [(1 - /3x)TA + 1 ] ( ~ ~ + 1) 
The values of TA which make the second parenthesis equal to zero are all negative. 
Since TA has to be positive for the domestic price of A's importable to be positive, the 
A's interior Nash equilibrium tariff is 
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(3.13) 
which makes the first parenthesis equal to zero. Substituting T ~ ~ back into B's best 
--
response tariff function TB(TA) gives the interior Nash equilibrium tariff of B. 
{3.14} 
A.2 Derivation of the best response tariff functions 
in the multi-country model. 
Consider country A. Substitute (3.9), (3.20) and (3.21) into the first order condition. 
Take out the common terms and substitute (3.19) for q in the denominator of the 
second term. 
I , 
~ n y y b'yb' 
A +LJi=1 S .,fTA 1 0 (1JTTA) - (q Y A - X A) . . . . . . . . - ~ - - - - - - ' - - - - : ; ; (1+ TA) - , - - - - - - - - : ~ - _ _ _ _ _ r r = (1 - sA) X A sAyA 
+ (1 - sB) XB +sByB 
+ ~ : ~ 1 1 (1 - sa')xa' 
+ ~ ~ 1 1 (1- Sb')Xb' 
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~ ~ ~ a'ya' 
+LJi=l S 
~ n y y b'yb' 
+L..i=l S 
(1- sA) X A 
+ (1- sB) XB 
+ ~ ~ 1 1 (1 - sai)xai 
+ ~ ~ l l (1 - sbi)Xbi 
Use the fact that (1 - sA) = ( l + ~ A ) ' ' and rearrange. 
(l-sB)XB 
(l_TA)(l+TA) + E ~ l l (1 - sai)xai 
XA + E ~ l l (1 - Sbi)Xb i 
TAyA + - - - - - = - - ' = ~ . - - - - - - - = = = = q TAyA 
Use the fact that sA = (lr;A) , and substitute (3.19) for q. 
Rearrange. 
(l-sB)XB 
(l_TA) + E ~ ~ l l (1 - sai)xai 
(1- sB) XB 
+TA(1 - TA) + E ~ l l (1 _ sai)xai 
+ E ~ l l (1 - Sbi)Xb i 
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(1 - sA) X A 
+(I-sB)XB 
+ E ? ~ l l (1 - sai)xai 
+ E ~ l l (1 - sbi)Xb' 
\ 
(1- sA) XA 
+ (1- sB) XB 
+ E ~ l l (1 - SOi)XOi 
+ E ~ l l (1 - sbi)Xbi 
(SA)2XAyA 
(1- SB) XB 
+TA(1- TA)sAyA + E ? ~ l ( 1 1 SOi)XOi 
+ E ~ l l (1 - sbi )Xbi 
sByB 
(l-sB)XB 
+TA(l - TA) + E ~ l l (1 _ SOi)XOi 
+ E ~ l ( l l - Sbi)Xbi + E ~ l S b ' y b ' '
T AsA(l - sA)XAyA 
(1 - sB) X B 
+TAsAyA + E ~ l l (1 _ SOi)XOi 
+ E ~ l ( 1 1 sbi)Xbi 
Using the fact that sA = (lr;A) and (1 - SA) = ( l + ~ A ) ' ' the first term on the left and 
the first term on the right are equal thus cancel each other out. Rearrange. 
~ n v v biybi 
+L..Ii=l s 
(l-sB)XB 
+TA(1 - TA) + E ? ~ l l (1 - SOi)XOi 
+E7;:1 (1 - Sb l )Xbi 
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Rearrange. 
(1- sB) X B 
TAsAyA +E::1(1 _ sat)xat 
+ E ~ l l (1 - sbi)Xbi 
(1- sB) XB 
-TA(1 - TA)sAyA +E::1 (1- sai)xai 
+ E ~ l l (1- Sbi)Xbi 
SAXA + E ~ ~ 1 s a i y a i i
+ E ~ 1 I I biybi 1=1 S 
(l-sB)XB 
+TA(1- TA) + E ~ ~ l l (1- Sai)xai 
+E7!1 (1- Sbi)Xbi 
+ E ~ 1 s a i y a i i
+ E ~ ~ Sbiyb' 1=1 
(l-sB)XB 
= (TA)2sAyA + E ~ ~ 1 ( 1 1 _ Sai)xai 
+E7!1 (1- Sbi)Xbi 
Multiply through by -:x. 
+-:xTA (1 - TA) +E::l (1 - sai)xai + E ~ 1 1 saiyai 
nv bi ) bi ~ n l l l bi yb' +Ei=1 (1 - s X +L..i=1 s 
(1 - sB) X B 
= (TA)2yA + E ~ 1 ( 1 1 sai)xai 
+ E ~ l ( l l - Sbi)Xbi 
156 
(l-sB)XB 
+(1 + TA)(1 - TA) + E ~ l l (1 _ sai)xai 
+ E ~ l l (1 - sbi)Xbi 
(l-sB)XB 
_(TA)2yA + E ~ l l (1 _ sai)xai 
+ E ~ l l (1 - sbi)Xbi 
=0 
+ E ~ ~ b'yb' l=l S 
Solving for TA, country A's best response tariff function can be obtained. 
TA(TB, {Tai}, { ~ i } ) ) = 
-=--__ --=X:....:...A ___ ~ ~ + 1 
(1 - sB)XB 
+ E ~ l l (1 - Sai )xa' 
+ E ~ ! l l (1 - Sbi )Xbi 
---:--_---=-y_A __ ~ ~ + 1 
sByB 
The other countries' best response tariff functions in (3.22) can be obtained likewise. 
A.3 Simulation results 
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The numbers in each cell a r e ( U ~ / u t , , U ~ / U ! ) . .
{3x \ (31J 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
0.2 . 961 ~ ; ~ ~
1.003 j 
0.3 .988 15 .91401 
1. 0017 1. OIOS 
0.4 .99505 .96879 .an 1 
1. 0005 1. ()().I 5 1.018 
0.5 .99787 .98656 .95174 .851 I:) 
.99942 1 1. 0055 1. 022;-
0.6 .99942 .99488 .97982 .94022 .83606 
.99787 .99488 .99468 1.001 1. 0213 
0.7 1. 000 5 1 .99468 .9n98 .93623 
.830n 
.99505 .98656 .97982 .9n98 .98456 1.0076 
0.8 1. 0017 1. 004 5 1. 005 5 
1. 001 .98456 .94281 .83814 
.98815 .96879 .95174 .94022 .93623 .94281 .96838 
0.9 1. 003 7 1. 0108 1. 018 1. 022 7 
1. 0213 1. 0076 .96838 .86602 
.96183 .91401 .8nl .85145 .83606 .83092 .83814 .86602 
Table A.l: Degree of specialisation and Nash equilibrium welfare. 
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The numbers in each cell are T ~ , , T ~ , ,TN' TN), given f3z = f3x = 0.7 and nz - n ll - 9. hz \ hy 0 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1 
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
0 1.0 1.041 1.1298 1. 2353 1. 3731 1. 5771 1.729 1. 0459 1.046 1. 0455 1.044 1. 0412 1. 0363 1. 032 5 
1. 0459 1. 041 1. 0322 1. 0239 1. 0155 1. 0058 1.0 
1.041 1. 0411 1. 0407 1. 0394 1. 0368 1. 0325 1. 0291 
0.1 1.0 1. 0411 1.1301 1. 2359 1. 3741 1. 5786 1. 7308 1.041 1. 0411 1. 0407 1. 0394 1. 0368 1. 0325 1. 0291 
1.046 1. 0411 1. 0323 1.024 1. 0155 1. 0059 1.0 
1.1298 1. 1301 1.1288 1. 1244 1. 1162 1. 102 1 1. 0913 
0.3 1.0 1. 0407 1.1288 1. 2334 1. 37 1. 572 5 1. 7234 1. 0322 1. 0323 1.032 1. 0309 1.029 1. 0256 1. 0229 
1. 0455 1. 0407 1. 032 1. 0238 1. 0154 1. 0058 1.0 
1. 2353 1. 2359 1. 2334 1. 2253 1. 2103 1. 184 7 1. 1652 
0.5 1.0 1. 0394 1.1244 1. 2253 1. 3573 1. 5534 1.7 1. 0239 1.024 1. 0238 1.023 1. 0216 1. 019 1 1. 0172 
1.044 1. 0394 1. 0309 1.023 1. 0149 1. 0056 1.0 
1. 3731 1. 3741 1. 37 1. 3573 1. 3337 1. 2935 1. 2632 
1.0 1. 0368 1.1162 1. 2103 1. 3337 1. 5179 1. 656-l 0.7 1. 015 5 1. 015 5 1. 0154 1. 0149 1. 014 1. 012 5 1. 0113 
1. 0412 1. 0368 1.029 1. 0216 1. 014 1. 0053 1.0 
1. 5771 1. 5786 1. 5725 1. 5534 1. 5179 1. 4578 1. 4128 
1.0 1. 0325 1. 1021 1. 1847 1. 293 5 1. 4578 1. 5827 0.9 1. 0058 1. 0059 1. 0058 1. 0056 1. 0053 1. 004 8 1. 0044 
1. 0363 1. 0325 1. 0256 1. 0191 1. 0125 1. 0048 1.0 
1.729 1. 7308 1. 7234 1.7 1. 6564 1. 5827 1. 5275 
1.0 1. 0291 1. 0913 1.1652 1. 2632 1. 412 8 1. 5275 1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
1.0325 1. 0291 1. 0229 1. 0172 1. 0113 1. 0044 1.0 
Table A.2: Degree of market domination and Nash equilibrium tariff 
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The numbers in each cell are (TA TIJ TO. Tb
r
) 
• N, N, ,\. N • 
gIven /3x = /3u = 0.7 and 8 - 8 - 0 5 
nx \ ny 
x y .• 
1 5 7 10 100 
-+ ex:: 1. 230 1 1.245 1. 2459 1. 2467 1. 2482 1. 2484 
1 1. 230 1 1. 211 7 1. 2105 1. 2097 1. 2079 1. 2070;-1. 230 1 1.245 1. 2459 1. 2467 1. 2482 1. 2484 1. 230 1 1. 0394 1. 0278 1. 0193 1. 0019 1.0 1. 211 7 1. 2258 1. 2267 1. 2274 1. 2289 1.229 
5 1.245 1. 2258 1. 2246 1. 2237 1. 2218 1. 2216 1. 0394 1. 0418 1.042 1. 0421 1. 0424 1. 042-1 1.245 1. 0418 1. 0296 1. 0205 1.002 1.0 
1. 2105 1. 2246 1. 2255 1. 2262 1. 2276 1. 2278 
7 1. 2459 1. 2267 1. 2255 1. 2246 1. 2227 1. 2225 
1. 0278 1. 0296 1. 0297 1. 0298 1. 0299 1. 03 
1. 2459 1.042 1. 0297 1. 0206 1.002 1.0 
1. 2097 1. 2237 1. 2246 1. 2253 1. 2267 1. 2269 
10 1. 2467 1. 2274 1. 2262 1. 2253 1. 2234 1. 2232 
1. 0193 1. 0205 1. 0206 1. 0207 1. 0208 1. 0208 
1. 2467 1. 0421 1. 0298 1. 0207 1.002 1.0 
1. 2079 1. 2218 1. 2227 1. 2234 1. 2248 1.225 
100 1. 2482 1. 2289 1. 2276 1. 2267 1. 2248 1. 2246 
1. 0019 1.002 1.002 1.002 1.002 1. 002 
1. 2482 1. 0424 1. 0299 1. 0208 1.002 1.0 
1. 2077 1. 2216 1. 2225 1. 2232 1. 224 6 1. 2247 
1. 2484 1.229 1. 2278 1. 2269 1.225 1. 2247 ~ o o o
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
1. 2484 1. 0424 1. 03 1. 0208 1.002 1.0 
Table A.3: Market concentration and Nash equilibriwn tariff. 
The number in each cell is ~ , , given /3x = {3y = 0.7 and n z = ny = 9. 
8x \ 8y 0 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1 
0 1.0 .99762 1. 0072 1. 0384 1. 0994 1. 213 1. 3071 
0.1 1. 0024 1.0 1. 0096 1. 0408 1.102 1. 2158 1. 31 
0.3 .99281 .99044 1.0 1. 0309 1. 0915 1. 204 5 1. 2981 
0.5 .96307 .96077 .97004 1.0 1.059 1. 169 1 1. 2609 
0.7 .90958 .90743 .91613 .94433 1.0 1. 1046 1. 1925 
0.9 .82443 .82252 .83024 .85537 .90527 1.0 1. 0804 
1 .76507 .76335 .77033 .7931 .83857 .92559 1.0 
Table A.4: Degree of market domination and Nash equilibriwn world relativt' prin·. 
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The number in each cell is ~ , , given (3x = (3y = 0.7 and bz = 6y = 0.5. 
nx \ ny 1 5 7 10 100 -+:X; 
1 1.0 .94802 .94469 .94223 .93714 .93658 
5 1. 0548 1.0 .99648 .99388 .9885 .98791 
7 1. 0585 1. 003 5 1.0 .99739 .99199 .9914 
10 1. 0613 1. 0062 1. 0026 1.0 .99459 .994 
100 1. 0671 1. 0116 1. 0081 1. 0054 1.0 .9994 
~ o o o 1. 0677 1. 012 2 1. 0087 1.006 1. 0006 1.0 
Table A.5: Market concentration and Nash equilibrium world relative price. 
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Th b' ( U ~ ~ u!! U4 U ~ - ) )
e num ers In each cell are u ~ , , U!' Yft' uf ,given {3z = {3y = 0.7 and nz = ny = 9. 
bz \ by 0 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 .99932 .99959 1. 0021 1. 0074 1. 0168 1. 024 1 
.99975 1. 0002 .99832 .99242 .98196 .9658-1 .9551-t 
.99975 .99932 1. 0013 1. 0076 1. 020 1 1.0433 0 
.99932 .9998 .99789 .99201 .98158 .96551 .95486 
0.1 0 .9998 1. 0001 1. 002 6 1. 0079 1. 0173 1. 024 5 
.99932 .9998 .99789 .99201 .98158 .96551 .95486 
1. 0002 .9998 1. 0018 1. 0081, 1. 0206 1. 0439 0 
.99959 1. 000 1 .99817 .99233 .98195 .96593 .95528 
0.3 0 .99789 .99817 1. 0007 1.006 1. 0155 1. 0227 1. 0013 1. 0018 .99988 .99392 .98333 .96699 .95613 
.99832 .99789 .99988 1. 0061 1. 0185 1. 0416 0 
1. 0021 1. 0026 1. 0007 .99486 .98447 .9683 .957 ·16 
0.5 0 .99201 .99233 .99486 1. 0002 1. 0097 1.0172 1. 0076 1. 0081 1. 0061 .99994 .9889 .97173 .96023 
.99242 .99201 .99392 .99994 1. 0118 1. 034 3 0 
1. 0074 1. 0079 1.006 1. 0002 .98973 .97326 .96205 
0.7 0 .98158 .98195 
.98447 .98973 .99932 1. 0069 
1. 020 1 1. 0206 1. 0185 1. 011 8 .99998 .98131 .96861 
.98196 .98158 .98333 .9889 .99998 1. 0211 0 
1. 0168 1. 0173 1. 015 5 1. 0097 .99932 .9825 .97075 
0 .96551 .96593 .9683 .97326 .9825 .99002 0.9 1. 0433 1. 0439 1. 0416 1. 034 3 1. 0211 1.0 .98528 
.96584 .96551 .96699 .971 73 .98131 1.0 0 
1. 0241 1. 0245 1. 0227 1. 0172 1. 0069 .99002 .97798 
0 .95486 .95528 .95746 .96205 .97075 .97798 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
.95514 .95486 .95613 .96023 .96861 .98528 0 
Table A.6: Degree of market domination and Nash equilibrium welfare. 
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The nwnbers in each cell are (m ~ ~ !!lL f:f) u 'u 'VB, L' ' 
• F F F 'F 
nx \ ny 
gIven {3x = {3y = 0.7 and bx = by = 0.5. 
1 5 7 10 100 -+ x 
.99466 1.005 1. 0057 l. 0062 1. 0073 1. 007 -l 
1 .99466 .98513 .98453 .98408 .98315 .98305 
.99466 1.005 l. 0057 l. 0062 1. 0073 1. oo7-l 
.99466 .98949 .98893 .98849 .98754 1.0 
.98513 .99484 .99551 .996 .99703 .99714 
5 1.005 .99484 .99419 .99371 .99272 .99261 
.98949 .99979 l. 0005 1. 001 1. 0021 1. 002 ~ ~
1.005 .99979 .99919 .99873 .9977 1.0 
.98453 .99419 .99485 .99535 .99637 .99649 
7 1. 0057 .99551 .99485 .99437 .99338 .99327 
.98893 .99919 .99989 l. 0004 1. 0015 1. 0016 
1. 0057 1. 0005 .99989 .99943 .998 -1 1.0 
.98408 .99371 .99437 .99486 .99589 .996 
10 1. 0062 .996 .99535 .99486 .99386 .99376 
.98849 .99873 .99943 .99995 1. 001 1. 0012 
1. 0062 1. 001 1. 0004 .99995 .99892 1.0 
.98315 .99272 .99338 .99386 .99488 .99499 
1. 0073 .99703 .99637 .99589 .99488 .99477 100 
.98754 .9977 .9984 .99892 1.0 1.0001 
1. 0073 1. 0021 1. 0015 1. 001 1.0 1.0 
.98305 .99261 .99327 .99376 .99477 .99488 
1. 0074 .99714 .99649 .996 .99499 .99488 
-+ 00 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
1. 0074 1. 002 2 1. 0016 1. 0012 1. 000 1 1.0 
Table A.7: Market concentration and Nash equilibrium welfare. 
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Appendix B 
Chapter 4 
B.l Nash bargaining solution in the two-colllltry 1l10(iel 
The ()pt ilIlisati()Il problem is 
Tlwn{oI'<\ t 1w first ord('r COllditions ar<' 
(I A (l,0) 
\\' I WI'<' /\ = (I' B l'.t . 
au'\ i)["\ oq (){ . B Dq (- + --.-, ) . ~ ~ A-.--. . -, = () orA aq OJ·\ ()(I ()j.\ 
The first order conditioIls i l l l p l ~ ' '
(4.7) 
Rearranging gives 
From (4.2) and (4.3), the above expression is 
(l-TA) (XA+qyA) (l-TB ) (XB+qyB) 
2VTA(1+TA)2 ..;q 2VTB(1+TB)2 yq 
(l-TA) (XA+qyA) (qyB_XB) VTB 1 (XB+qyB) 
+ 2JTA(1+TA)2..;q 2yqq (l+TB) (1+TB)2 ( s ) y A + S B Y ~ ) ) = 0 
(l-TB) (XB+qyB) (qyA_XA).JTA 1 ~ X A + q Y A ) )
- 2VTB(1+TB)2..;q 2..;qq (l+TA) (1+TA)2 (s yA+sByB) 
Take out the common terms and substitute for q remaining in the denominators of 
the second and third term. 
T T 
..,fTli I-TA qyB_XB = 0 
+ TA(l+TB)[(l-sA)XA+(l-sB)XBj 
..JTA I-TB qyA_XA 
=0 
Substitute for q and rearrange. 
[ 
(1-TB) (1+TB)XA ] [TA (l+TB)}""] 
_ (1 _ TA) (1 + TA) (TB)2 + (1 + To") yB 
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_ [ (I+TB)XA ] [ TA(l-TB) (l+TB)}'.-\ ] 
+TB (1 + TA) X B _TB (1 - TA) (1 + TA) yB 
[ 
(1 + TA) (1 + TB) XAyB (1 - TATB) ] 
- (1 + TA) (1 + TB) TATB XByA (1 _ TATB) = 0 
Eliminate the common term (1 + TA) (1 + TB) and factor out. 
Therefore, there are two conditions which solve the above expression, TB = liT'" 
and TATB = ~ ~ ~ ; ; = ( 1 - ~ ) ( 1 ~ { 3 1 1 ) . . It was shown in chapter 3 that the latter condition 
eliminates all trade between the two countries. The former is, therefore, the solution. 
( . l . ~ ~) 
Substitute (4.8) into (4.3), the equilibrium world relative price is 
From (4.2) and (4.3), (4.5) is 
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Simplify and rearrange. 
=0 
(l+TB) (l-aA)X +(l- .. B)XBJ 
(1 - TA) (1 + TA) [(1 - sA) X A + (1 - SB) XB] 
_ (qyA _ XA) TA 
Substitute (4.8) for TB and (4.9) for q. 
Therefore, 
(1 - Tt) (1 + T ~ ) ) ( l ; ~ ( ~ ) )
-Tg ~ ; ; (1 - ,By) Y - fi x .\ 
A UB UA UB Uc - C = N - N 
From (4.11) in the text, the above expression is 
167 
( 4.10) 
Solve for Tg, then by (4.8), Tg can be obtained. 
( 4.12) 
B.2 Efficiency locus between A and B in the multi-
country model 
Since the optimisation problem is still the same as in the t w ~ c o u n t r y y model, solving for 
the efficiency locus between A and B in the multi-country model can be started from 
(4.7). Given the world relative price q represented by (4.16). (4.7) becomes 
(l-TA) (XA+qyA) (I-TB) (XB+qyB) 
2JTA I+TA)2 ..jq 2JTB(I+TB)2 .;q 
(l-TA) XA+qyA (qyB_xB)..fTE I (XB+qyB) = 0 
+ 2JTA(I+TA)2..jq 2..jqq (1+TB) (I+TB)2 ( .. ltylt+ .. ByB+Z) 
(l-TB) (XB+qyB) (qyA_XA).../'fA I XA+qyA 
- 2JTB(I+TB)2..jq 2..jqq (I+TIt) (I+TA)2 ( .. y +a Y +z 
where Z = (nxsaya + nysbyb). 
Take out the common terms and substitute for q remaining in the denominators of 
the second and third term. 
=0 
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where W = [nz (1 - sa) X a + ny (I - sb) Xb]. 
(I - TA) (1 + TA) (1 _ TB) (I + TB) [ (I - sA) XA ] 
+ (I - sB) X B + \" 
+TB (1 - TA) (I + TA) (qyB _ XB) 
_TA (1- TB) (I + TB) (qyA _ XA) 
(I-TB) (I+TB)XA 
- (I - TA) (I + TA) (TB)2 X B 
+(I-TA) (I+TA) (I-TB) (I+TB)W 
Substitute (4.16) for q and rearrange. 
(I - TB) (I + TB) XA TA (1 + TB) }'A 
- (I - TA) (I + TA) (TB)2 + (1 + TA) yB 
=0 
+ (I - TA) (1 + TA) (I - TB) (I + TB) W + (1 + TA) (1 + TB) Z 
= [(I+TB)XA+TB(I+TA)XB] [ TA(I-TB)(I+TB)}':\ ] 
+ (1 + TA) (I + TB) W _TB (1 - TA) (1 + TA) }'/I 
(I + TA) (1 + TB) XAyB (1 - TATB) 
_TATB (1 + TA) (1 + TB) XByA (1 - TATB) 
_ (TA)2 (1 + TA) (I - TB) (1 + TB)2 vAn' 
+ (I - TA) (1 + TA) 2 (1 + TB) Y B W = 0 
+ (1 + TA) (I - TB) (1 + TB)2 XAZ 
_ (1 - TA) (I + TA)2 (TB)2 (1 + TB) XB Z 
+ (1 - TA) (I + TA)2 (1- TB) (1 + TB)2 WZ 
Eliminate the common term (I + TA) (1 + T B ), expand and rearrange, 
(TA)2 (TB)2 (XB + W) (yA + Z) 
_ (TB)2 Z (XA + X B + W) 
_TATB (XAyB + XByA) = 0 
+ (XA + W) (yB + Z) 
_ (TA)2 W (y--\ + yB + Z) 
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Solve for TB. The solution defines the efficient combination of country A and B trade 
policies given the small-size countries' tariffs (contained in W and Z). However. there 
exist two solutions to the above expression. Recall that the efficiency locus is defined by 
TB = 11TA in the two-country model. Therefore, to determine which solution defines 
the efficiency locus in this multi-country model, that solution must reduce to TB = l / T . ~ ~
if there are only country A and B, Le. 8z = 8y = 1 =} W = 0 and Z = o. The effici('lIcy 
locus is defined by 
(Tc1) 2 (XAyB + XByA)2 
-4 [ (Tc1) 2 (XB + W) (yA + Z)] [ (XA + H') (yB + Z) J 
-Z (XA + XB + W) - ( T ~ ) 2 1 V V (yA + }-n + Z) T B = - - L - ~ - - - - - - 2 ~ [ ~ ( - T c 1 - ) - 2 ( - X - B - + ~ W - ) - ( Y - A - + - Z - ) ' J - - - - - - - - - - - -
-Z (XA +XB + W) 
(4.17) 
B.3 Efficiency locus between A and a in the multi-
country model 
From (4.15) and (4.16), the efficiency condition (4.22) in the text can be simplified to 
=0 
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Take out the common terms and substitute (4 16) £ ... . or q remaullng ill the denollunators 
of the second and third term. 
(1 - sA) X A 
(1 _ TA) (1 + TA) (1 _ 1"') (1 + 1"') + (1 - sB) XB 
+nx (1 - sa) xa 
+ny (1 - sb) X b 
_Ta (1 - TA) (1 + TA) (qya - xa) 
_TA (1 - Ta) (1 + Ta) (qyA - XA) 
(1 - Ta) (1 + Ta) X A 
+ (1 - TA) (1 + TA) xa 
+ (1 - TA) (1 + TA) (1 - ra) (1 + Ta) E 
[ 
TA (1 - Ta) (1 + Ta) yA ] 
= q +Ta (1- TA) (1 + TA) ya 
=0 
=0 
where E = [(1 - SB) X B + (nx - 1) (1 - sa) xa + ny (1 - sb) X b]. Substitute (4.16) 
for q and rearrange. 
(1 - Ta) (1 + T a) X A TA (1 + ra) yA 
+ (1 _ TA) (1 + TA) xa + ra (1 + TA) ya 
+ (1 _ TA) (1 + TA) (1 - Ta) (1 + Ta) E + (1 + TA) (1 + ra) F 
= [(I+Ta)XA+(l+TA)xa] [ T A(l-Ta)(l+T')y,,\ ) 
+ (1 + TA) (1 + Ta) E +Ta (1 - TA) (1 + TA) ya 
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Ta (1 + TA) (1 + Ta) xAya (TA _ Ta) 
_TA (1 + TA) (1 + Ta) XayA (TA - ra) 
- (TA)2 (1 + TA) (1 - Ta) (1 + ra)2 yA E 
- (Ta)2 (1 - TA) (1 + TA)2 (1 + ra) yaE = 0 
+ (1 + TA) (1 - Ta) (1 + Ta)2 XAF 
+ (1 - TA) (1 + TA)2 (1 + ra) XaF 
+ (1 - TA) (1 + TA)2 (1 - Ta) (1 + ra)2 EF 
Eliminate the common term (1 + TA) (1 + Ta), expand and rearrange. 
(TA)2 (Ta)2 E (yA + ya + F) 
- (TA)2 (xa + E) (yA + F) 
_(Ta)2(XA+E) (ya+F) =0 
+TATa (XAya + XayA) 
+F (XA + xa + E) 
Solve for TA. The solution defines the efficient combination of country A's and a's 
trade policies given the y-exporting countries' tariffs. However, there exist two solutions 
to the above function. From the discussion in footnote 19 in the text, the solution which 
defines the efficient combination of TA and Ta should reduce to the non-cooperative best 
response tariff function of A (see (3.22) in chapter 3) when a is small. It is found that 
the solution which defines the efficient combination of TA and ra is 
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{3x \ {311 0.2 
The numbers in each cell are (rg, rgJ. 
0.20.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
0.2 .8J6.a 
1. 1956 
0.3 .91876 • -;--;-1. ~ i ~ 1 1
1. ll.· .... ~ ' ' I 297 
0.4 .95921 .882067 · i.aJ06 
1. 042 5 1. IlJ 1.3-158 
0.5 .98735 .94735 ~ 7 ~ ~ U · ili 51 
1. 012 8 1. 0556 l. 1466 1 3559 
0.6 1. 012 8 1.0 .95976 S ~ · 1 5 3 3 -;--,1166 
.98735 1.0 1.0419 1. 1305 I.lJ22 
0.7 1.0425 1.0556 1. 0419 1.0 .92233 is:) Ii 
.95921 .94735 .95976 1.0 1. 08-12 1. :!i] 6 
0.8 1. 0884 1.133 1. 1466 1. 1305 1. 084 2 1.0 .85321 
.91876 .882067 .87214 .88453 .92233 1.0 1. 1 I:! 
0.9 1.1956 1.297 1. 3458 1. 355 9 1. 3322 1. 27:1 ti 1.1 i2 1.0 
.8364 .77099 .74306 .73751 .75066 .785 Ii .85321 1.0 
Table B.l: Equilibrium trade agreement in the two-country model. 
(4.23) 
B.4 Simulation results 
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The numbers in each cell are ~ 1 + B } ' ' 1 ( ~ + B } ' ' 1(A+B} , Tl'A_BI) on the left 
and ( T ~ , ,TN' TN, Tt) on the right, 
given f3x = f3u = 0.7 and nx = ny = 9. 
Ox \ Oy 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 
1.0 1.0411 .95599 1.0407 .92222 1. 039 4 
.89183 1. 0368 .86-&27 1. 032 5 
0.1 1.0 1. 0411 1. 0664 1.1301 1. 1511 1. 2359 1. 2636 1. 3741 1.129 "2 1 5186 
1. 0411 1. 0411 1. 0408 1. 0407 1. 0398 1.0394 1. 0377 1. 0368 1 OJ.I 1 OJ.?') 
1. 0411 1. 0411 1.032 1.0323 1.0235 1.024 1. 015 1.0155 1. 005 ,') 1.0059 
1. 0664 1.1301 1.0 1.1288 .9524 1. 1244 .90337 1. 1162 .86066 1. 1021 
0.3 .95599 1. 040 7 1.0 1.1288 1.0762 1. 2334 1. 154 5 1. 37 1. " 2 ~ 5 5 ~ ~ 1:,7"1. 5 
1.032 1. 032 3 1. 0317 1.032 1.03ll 1.0309 1. 0296 1.029 1. 0211 1. 0256 
1. 0408 1. 040 7 1. 031 7 1.032 1.0230 1. 0238 1. 014 6 1. 015-1 1. 005 3 1.0058 
1.1511 1. 2359 1.0762 1. 2334 1.0 1. 2253 .9468 1. 210 3 , ~ s s .. ) ~ " 2 2 I 11'117 
0.5 .92222 1. 0394 .9524 1. 1244 1.0 1. 2253 1.0763 1. 3573 1. 181 "2 1. 55J.1 
1. 023 5 1.024 1.0230 1. 0238 1. 0225 1.023 1.0220 1. 0216 1. Ol9S 1. Ol!l I 
1. 0398 1. 0394 1.0311 1. 0309 1.0225 1.023 1.0140 1. 014 9 1. 005 I 1. 005 6 
1. 2636 1. 374 1 1. 1545 1. 37 1.0763 1. 3573 1.0 1. 333 7 .929;)1 1. 2935 
0.7 .89183 1. 0368 .90337 1. ll6 2 .9468 1. 210 3 1.0 1. 333 7 1. 089:; 1 . ~ > l 7 9 9
1. 015 1. 015 5 1. 014 6 1.015·' 1.0140 1. 014 9 1. 0134 1. 014 1.0124 1 01:.?:, 
1. 0377 1. 0368 1. 0296 1.029 1.0220 1. 0216 1. 013 4 1. 014 1. 00-1 8 1.0053 
1. 4292 1. 5786 1. 2858 1. 572 5 1. 181 2 1. 5534 1. 0895 1.5179 1.0 1 ·1578 
0.9 .86427 1. 032 5 .86066 1. 1021 .88582 1. 1847 .92951 1. 293 5 1.0 1.4578 
1. 005 5 1. 005 9 1. 0053 1. 0058 1. 0051 1. 0056 1. oo.a 8 1. 0053 1. oo.a 5 1. 0048 
1.034 1. 032 5 1. 0271 1. 025 6 1. 019 8 1.0191 1. 012 4 10125 IlX).I5 I. (Xl48 
Table B.2: Degree of market domination and equilibritun tariff. 
The numbers shown in each cell are ( q ( ~ ; B ) , , ~ ) )
given f3x = f3u = 0.7 and nx = Tly = 9. 
Ox \ Oy 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 
1.0 1.005 1.0281 1.0771 1.1701 0.1 1.0 1. 0096 1. 0408 1.102 1. 2158 
.9951 1.0 1.021 1.0597 1.1373 
0.3 
.99044 1.0 1. 0309 1. 0915 1. 204 5 
.9727 .9795 1.0 1.0368 1.1068 
0.5 
.96077 .97004 1.0 1.059 1.1691 
.9284 .9437 .9645 1.0 1.0647 
0.7 
.90743 .91613 .94433 1.0 1. 104 6 
.8546 .8793 .9035 .9392 1.0 
0.9 
.82252 .83024 .85537 .90527 1.0 
Table B.3: Degree of market domination and equilibriwn world relative price. 
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( U A UB U a ~ , ,The numbers shown in each cell are (A+B) ('-\+B) (A+8) U(A+8») 
UA , u ~ ~ , ua • u' . N .'W ."1 N 
8x \ 8y 
given /3x = /311 = 0.7 and nx = ny - 9. 
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 
1. 0002 1. 0009 1. 001 7 1. 0027 1. 0037 
0.1 1. 0002 1. 0004 1. 0006 1. 0008 1. 001 1.0 1. 0009 1. 0024 1. 0042 1. 0062 
1.0 .99907 .99747 .99501 .991 
1. 0004 1. 0018 1.0033 1. 0057 1. 0079 
0.3 1. 0009 1. 0018 1.0029 1. 003-l 1. 0042 
.99907 1.000002 1.0018 1. 0055 1. 0096 
1. 0009 1.000002 .9981 .99364 .98678 
1. 0006 1.0029 1. 0051 1.0082 1. 0113 
0.5 1. 001 7 1.0033 1. 0051 1.0066 1. 0082 
.99747 .9981 1.000002 1.0040 1. 0095 
1. 0024 1.0018 1.000002 .9956 .98769 
1. 0008 1. 0034 1.0066 1. 0104 1. 014 4 
0.7 1. 0027 
1. 0057 1.0082 1. 0104 1. 0128 
.99501 .99364 .9956 1.000002 1. 0067 
1. 0042 1. 0055 1.0040 1.000002 .99206 
1. 001 1. 0042 1. 0082 1. 0128 1. 0178 
1. 0037 1. 0079 1. 0113 1. 0144 1. 0178 0.9 
.991 .98678 .98769 .99206 1.0000003 
1. 0062 1. 0096 1. 009 5 1. 0067 1.0000003 
Table B.4: Degree of market domination and equilibrium welfare. 
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The numbers shown in each cell are (Tt T.B p T!' I) A+B)' (A+B)' ( . 4 ~ B l ' ' ( A ~ B ) )
on the left and ( T ~ , , TR, TN, 'It) on the right, 
given (3z = f3v = 0.7 and D7; = Dy = 0.5. 
nz \ ny 1 5 7 10 --+ X 
1.0 1. 230 1 1. 012 7 1.245 1. 013 5 1. 2459 1. 014 1 1. 246, I 0156 1. 2 1 ~ . a a
1 1.0 1. 2301 .9882 1. 211 7 .9875 1. 210 5 .9870 1.2097 ~ ~ ~ , j j ~ ~ 1.!l1-;"; 
1. 224 7 1. 230 1 1. 2384 1.245 1. 2393 1. 245 9 1. 24 1. 246 7 1.241 5 1. 2-1"'·' 
1. 224 7 1. 230 1 1. 038 7 1. 0394 1. 027 3 1. 0278 1.019 1. 019 3 1.0 1.0 
.9882 1. 211 7 1.0 1. 2258 1. 000 7 1. 226 7 1. 0013 1. 2:,?, 4 1002 -;" 1.229 
5 1. 012 7 1.245 1.0 1. 2258 .9992 1. 2246 .9986 1. 223 7 ~ l ~ l ; ; 3 12216 
1. 038 7 1. 039 4 1.0409 1. 0418 1. 0411 1.042 1. 0412 1. 0421 I 041 I 1. 042 .. 
1. 2384 1.245 1. 0409 1. 0418 1. 0289 1. 0296 1. 020 1 1.020 5 1 II 1.0 
.9875 1. 210 5 .9992 1. 224 6 1.0 1. 2255 1. 000 5 1. 2262 tom 1. 22, ~ ~
7 1. 013 5 
1. 245 9 1.0007 1. 226 7 1.0 1. 2255 .9994 1. 2'2 1 6 .9980 1. 222 5 
1. 027 3 1. 027 8 1. 0289 1. 0296 1.029 1. 029 7 1. 0291 1. 0298 l . n ' 2 ~ ~ 1. 03 
1. 239 3 1. 245 9 1. 0411 1. 042 1.029 1. 029 7 1. 0201 1. 0206 1.0 1 II 
.9870 1. 209 7 .9986 1. 2237 .9994 12246 1.0 1.2'2:) :l 1.0013 1. 2·.?ti 9 
1. 0141 1. 246 7 1. 0013 1. 227-1 1. 0005 1. 226 2 l.n 1. 225 3 .99S6 1. 2232 
10 1. 0201 1. 0206 1. 020 2 1. 0207 1. 0203 10208 1. 019 1. 019 3 1. 0201 1. 0205 
1. 24 1. 246 7 1. 0412 1. 0421 1. 0291 1. 0298 1. 0202 1. 0207 1.0 1.0 
.9858 1. 207 7 .9973 1. 2216 .9980 1. 222 5 .9986 1. 2232 1.0 I. '2'2·1 7 
1. 015 6 1. 2484 1. 002 7 1.229 1.002 1. 2278 1. 001 :1 1.2269 1.0 1. 2'21 7 
-+ 00 1.0 1.0 1.0 10 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
1. 2415 1. 2484 1. 0414 1. 0424 1.028 1.03 1.0203 1. 0208 10 1.0 
Table B.5: Market concentration and equilibrium tariff. 
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The numbers in each cell are (q(A+B). ~ J . .
• qF qF 
gIven f3x = f3u = 0.7 and 8 - 8 05 
nx \ ny 
x y " 
1 5 7 10 
-+x 
1 1.0 .9507 .9475 .9452 .9398 
1.0 .94802 .94469 .94223 
.93658 
5 1. 0518 1.0 .9966 .9941 .9885 1. 0548 1.0 .99648 .99388 .98791 
7 1. 0553 1. 0033 1.0 .9975 .9921 1. 0585 1. 0035 1.0 .99739 .9914 
10 1.0579 1. 0058 1. 0024 1.0 .9943 
1. 0613 1. 0062 1. 0026 1.0 .994 
1. 0639 1. 0116 1.0079 1. 0057 1.0 ~ ~ 00 
1. 0677 1. 0122 1. 0087 1.006 1.0 
Table B.6: Market concentration and equilibrium world relative price. 
The numbers in each ~ e l l l are ( U t A + B / U ~ , , UtA+B/UH, U(A+B)/UN, UtA+8/Ut). 
gIven f3x = f3u = 0.7 and bx = by = 0.5. 
nx \ ny 1 5 7 10 -+ 00 
1.00537 1. 00538 1. 00538 1. 00538 1.005379 
1 1.00537 1. 00514 1. 00512 1. 00511 1. 00508 1. 0002 .999683 .999645 .999618 .99955 
1. 0002 1. 00054 1. 00057 1. 0006 1. 00065 
1. 00514 1. 00519 1. 00519 1. 00519 1. 005191 
5 1. 00538 
1. 00519 1. 00517 1. 00516 1. 00513 
1. 00054 1.000008 .99997 .999944 .999881 
.999683 1.000008 1. 00004 1. 00007 1. 000 124 
1. 00512 1. 00517 1. 00517 1. 00517 1. 005171 
7 1. 00538 
1. 00519 1. 00517 1. 00516 1. 005135 
1. 00057 1. 00004 1. 000004 .999978 .99989 
.999645 .99997 1.000004 1. 00003 1. ()()() 112 
1. 00511 1. 00516 1. 00516 1. 005164 1.005167 
1. 00538 1. 00519 1. 00517 1. 005164 1. 00514 
10 1. 0006 1. 00007 1. 00003 1. 000002 .999939 
.999618 .999944 .999978 1. 000002 1. ()()() 062 
1. 00508 1. 00513 1. 005135 1. 00514 1. 005141 
1.005379 1. 005191 1. 005171 1. 005167 1. 005141 
-+ 00 1. 00065 1.000 124 1. 000 112 1. 000062 1.0 
.99955 .999881 .99989 .999939 1.0 
Table B.7: Market concentration and equilibrium welfare. 
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The numbers in each cell are {TA TB 1':' T!' ) (A+a)' (A+a) , ( A ~ a ) ' ' (A+a) 
on the left and (TA, TR, TN, Tt) on the right, 
given {3x = {31J = 0.7 and nx = ny = 9. 
flx \ fly 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 
1. 0867 1. 0411 1. 085 7 1. 040 7 1.083 1.0394 1. 0776 1 . 0 3 6 ~ ~ 1. 11("", 3 1.0325 
0.1 1. 0402 1. 0411 1. 1269 1.1301 1. 2301 1. 2359 1.3648 1. 3741 1. :>6-16 I. : ) i ~ ~ t.i 
1. 0867 1. 0411 1. 085 7 1. 0407 1.083 1. 0394 1.0776 1. 0368 I 0 ....... 3 1.0325 
1. 0402 1. 0411 1. 0315 1. 032 3 1.0234 1.024 1. 0152 1. 015 5 1. 00") 7 \.0059 
1. 2259 1. 1301 1. 2236 1. 1288 1. 2168 1. 1244 1.1976 1. 1162 1. 181 1. 102 I 
0.3 1. 0392 1. 0407 1. 1239 1.1288 1. 224 5 1. 2334 1.3530 1. 37 1. 5518 I. 5 7 2 ~ ) )
1. 0934 1. 032 3 1. 0924 1.032 1.0887 1. 0309 1.0793 1029 1. Oil 2 10256 
1. 039 2 1. 0407 1. 0308 1.032 1.0229 1. 0238 1.0148 1. 015 4 1. 0056 I O U 5 ~ ~
1.358 1. 2359 1. 354 7 1. 2334 1.344 1. 2253 1. 324 3 1. 2103 1. 2904 I . I ~ I i i
0.5 1. 0375 1. 0394 1. 1182 1. 1244 1. 2141 1. 2253 1. 3396 1. 3573 .. 5265 1. 553 I 
1. 0968 1.024 1. 0954 1. 0238 1. 0914 1.023 1. 083 i 1. 0216 1. 071 "2 1. 11\ ~ l l 1 
1. 037 5 1. 039 4 1. 0295 1. 0309 1. 0219 1. 023 1. 014 2 1. 014 9 .. 005 4 1. ow) ti 
1. 5043 1. 3741 1. 4998 1. 37 1. 486 7 1. 3573 1. 4616 1. 333 7 I l1i4 1. " 2 ~ I : 1 1 ~ ) )
0.7 1. 0348 1. 0368 1.1096 1. 1162 1. 1983 1. 210 3 1. 314 3 1. 333 7 .. IXi 3 1.5179 
1. 093 6 1. 015 5 1. 0921 1. 015 4 1. 0868 1. 014 9 1.0779 1.014 I 06-15 I 0 1 2 ~ ) )
1. 034 8 1. 0368 1. 027 4 1.029 1. 0204 1. 0216 1. 013 3 1. 014 1.005 I lIO!) 3 
1.6842 1. 5786 1. 671 2 1. 5725 1. 6574 1. 5534 1.632 1. 5179 1. 5908 14518 
0.9 1.0310 1. 032 5 1. 0973 1. 1021 1. 1755 1. 184 7 1. 277 3 1. 2935 1. 4212 
I 451 ~ ~
1.0723 1. 005 9 1. 0694 1. 0058 1.0624 1. 0056 1. 051 .. 1.0053 1. 0311 I 0048 
1.0310 1. 032 5 1. 0244 1. 025 6 1. 018 2 1.0191 1. 0118 1.0125 100-15 1. 00·1 ~ ~
Table B.B: Degree of market domination and equilibrium tariff. 
The numbers in each cell are ( q ( ~ ; O ) , , ~ ~) , 
given {3x = {311 = 0.7 and nx = ny = 9. 
flx \ fly 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 
.9781 .98751 1. 0181 1.078 1. 1898 0.1 1.0 1. 0096 1. 0408 1.102 1. 2158 
.95777 .96701 .99701 1. 0569 1. 1662 
0.3 
.99044 1.0 1. 0309 1. 0915 1. 204 5 
.92074 .92956 .95817 1. 014 5 1. 1201 
0.5 
.96077 .97004 1.0 1.059 1. 169 1 
.8673 .87542 .90162 .95335 1. 0506 
0.7 
.90743 .91613 .94433 1.0 1. 1046 
.79453 .80333 .8255 .86898 .9491 
0.9 
.82252 .83024 .85537 .90527 1.0 
Table B.9: Degree of market domination and equilibrium world rplat i\"t' p r i l ~ . .
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(UA UB U4 u" The numbers in each cell are (A+4) (A+4) (;\+4) (;\+4») 
U A , U B , U4 ~ ~ u' . N N N N 
given f3x = f311 = 0.7 and nx = ny = 9. I 
bx \ by 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 
1. 0038 1. 0038 1. 0037 1. 0035 1.003 
0.1 .99564 .99566 .99572 .99575 .99588 1. 0038 1. 0038 1. 0037 1. 0035 1.003 
.99564 .99559 .99547 .99521 .99488 
1. 0036 1. 0036 1. 0035 1. 0034 1.003 
0.3 .9935 .99353 .99362 .99381 .9939 1.006 1.006 1. 0058 1. 0053 1. 004 8 
.99352 .99343 .99326 .99309 .99246 
1.003 1.003 1.003 1.003 1. 0028 
0.5 .99208 .99212 .99211 .99212 .99217 1. 0081 1. 0081 1. 0079 1. 007 5 1. 0068 
.99208 .99199 .9917 .99113 .99032 
1.002 1. 0021 1. 0021 1. 002 2 1. 0024 
.99217 .99219 .99202 .99175 .99129 
0.7 1. 0092 1. 0092 1. 0092 1. 0091 1. 0088 
.99217 .99202 .9916 .99071 .98926 
1. 0006 1. 0007 1. 0008 1. 0011 1. 001 7 
.9947 .99497 .99459 .99368 .9918 
0.9 1.0071 1. 0074 1. 0079 1. 0089 1. 0106 
.9947 .99488 .99427 .99287 .98989 
Table B.10: Degree of market domination and equilibrium welfare. 
179 
The numbers in each cell are {TA TB 1':' T!> ,) (A+a)' (A+a) , (A+a)' (A-a) 
on the left and ( T ~ , ,Tt, TN' 'It) on the right. 
nx \ ny 
given {3x = {3y = 0.7 and 8x = 8y = 0.5. 
1 5 7 10 
-+ :x: 
1. 655 7 1. 230 1 1. 695 9 1.245 1. 6985 1. 2459 1. 7005 1. 246 i 1. 7051 1 2.& .... ~ ~
1 1.1828 1. 230 1 1.1668 1. 211 7 1.1658 1. 210 5 1.165 1.2097 1. 163 J 1. ·.?tl7 7 
1. 655 7 1. 230 1 1. 695 9 1.245 1. 6985 1. 2459 1. 7005 1. 246 7 1 7051 1 2484 
1.1828 1. 2301 1. 0315 1. 0394 1. 0222 1. 0278 1. 015 4 1.0193 1.0 1.0 
1. 3574 1. 211 7 1. 3777 1. 2258 1.5715 1. 226 7 1. 3799 1. 227 4 1. J. ... :? 2 1. :?:?9 
5 1. 228 5 1.245 1. 2102 1. 2258 1. 2092 1. 224 6 1. 2081 1. 223 i 1.2061 I 221 I, 
1.1392 1.0394 1. 1503 1. 0418 1. 1513 1. 042 1. 151 7 1. 0421 1. 1531 1. 042 .. 
1. 2285 1.245 1. 0391 1. 0418 1. 0276 1. 0296 1 0192 1.0205 1.0 1 11 
1. 3368 1. 210 5 1. 355 7 1. 224 6 1. 3571 1. 2255 1. 357 i 1. 2262 1.3669 1 2278 
7 1. 232 3 1. 245 9 1. 2138 1. 2267 1.2126 1. 225 5 1. 211 7 1. 224 6 1.2108 I .).).) • .... . ) 
1.1035 1. 0278 1. 1122 1. 0296 1. 1127 1. 029 7 1. 1133 1. 0298 1.11 i:l 103 
1. 2323 1. 245 9 1. 0398 1.042 1. 0281 1. 0297 1. 0195 1.0206 1.0 1 II 
1.3196 1. 209 7 1. 3373 1. 223 7 1. 3388 1. 224 6 1. 3393 1. 22!> 3 1. 3-11 5 1.226 '1 
10 1. 235 3 1. 246 7 1.2167 1. 2274 1. 215 5 1. 2262 1. 214 7 1. 22!> 3 1 2126 1. 22:12 
1. 0761 1.0193 1. 0828 1. 020 5 1.083 1. 0206 1. 0836 1. 020 i 1. 084 3 I. Il:?O ."i 
1. 2353 1. 246 7 1. 0403 1. 0421 1. 0285 1. 0298 1. 0198 I. 020 j 1.11 1 II 
1. 2077 1. 207 7 1. 2216 1. 221 6 1. 2225 1. 222 5 1. 2232 1. 223 2 1 22·1 i 1. 2217 
1. 248 4 1. 2484 1.229 1.229 1. 2278 1. 2278 1. 2269 1. 226 9 1. 2247 1. 224 j 
---+ 00 
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 I II 1.0 
1. 2484 1. 2484 1. 042 4 1. 042 4 1. 03 1. 03 1. 0208 1. 0208 1.0 1.0 
Table B.ll: Market concentration and equilibrium tariff. 
The numbers in each cell are ( q ( ~ ; Q ) , , ~ ~) , 
given {3x = {31L = 0.7 and 8x = 8]L = 0.5. 
nx \ ny 1 5 7 10 -+ ')G 
.83932 .79725 .79457 .79259 .78806 
1 1.0 .94802 .94469 .94223 .93658 
.99396 .94243 .93913 .93669 .93109 
5 1. 0548 1.0 .99648 .99388 .98791 
1. 0077 .95554 .95219 .94973 .94298 
7 1. 0585 1. 0035 1.0 .99739 .9914 
1. 019 .96627 .96287 .96039 .95465 
10 1. 0613 1. 0062 1. 0026 1.0 .994 
1. 0677 1. 0122 1. 0087 1.006 1.0 
-+ 00 1. 0677 1. 0122 1. 0087 1.006 1.0 
Table B.12: Market concentration and equilibriwn world relati\'P pnn·. 
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Th b' (UA UB U· l"-) e num ers ill each cell are (A+a) (A+a) (A+a) (A-G) 
VA , VB , va . c& . 
• \ N N N ... 
gIven {3x = {311 = 0.7 and flx = fly = 0.5. 
nx \ ny 1 5 7 10 
-+ x 
1. 0121 1. 0111 1. 011 1. 011 1. 0109 
1 .97052 .97263 .97277 .97286 .97312 
1. 0121 1. 0111 1. 011 1. 011 1. 0109 
.97052 .97111 .97123 .97133 .97155 
1. 0046 1. 0046 1. 0046 1. 0046 1. 004 6 
5 .98859 .9892 .98924 .98927 .98936 1. 0097 1. 01 1. 010 1 1. 0101 1. 0101 
.98859 .98859 .98863 .98867 .98873 
1. 0036 1. 003 6 1. 0036 1. 0036 1. 0035 
7 .99045 .99097 .99103 .99106 .99111 1. 0084 1. 0087 1. 0088 1. 0088 1.009 
.99045 .9905 .99053 .99052 .99039 
1. 0028 1. 0028 1. 0028 1. 0028 1. 002 8 
10 .99203 .99249 .99251 .99253 .99259 1. 0072 1. 0075 1. 0075 1. 0075 1. 0076 
.99203 .9921 .99212 .99211 .99218 
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
~ o o o 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Table B.13: Market concentration and equilibrium welfare. 
Given {3x = {31/ = 0.7 and nx = ny = 9. 
8x \ 8y 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 
0.1 a a a a B 
0.3 a a a B B 
0.5 a a B B B 
0.7 a B B B B 
0.9 B B B B B 
Table B.14: Degree of market domination and A's best stratt'J{Y. 
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Given {3x = {3u = 0.7 and 6x = f>y = 0.5. 
nx \ ny 1 5 7 10 ~ ~ x-
l a a a a a 
5 B B B B B 
7 B B B B B 
10 B B B B B 
~ o o o B B B B B 
Table B.15: Market concentration and A's best strategy. 
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Appendix C 
Chapter 5 
e.l Proof of (5.39) in the text 
1 [, (fr _ fr)2 _ (OL _7T)'2] < () [( Nt - 1) + N.: + ([ .\'] J 1 -I t -
= Nt(N;+aN)[(Nt ul)+[": taN:. ThereforI', tlH' al)()\'(' cOIlditi()Il will bt' sati!-ilit·" if 
J.Lt (N·+N.tllN)-
t .' 
which I I H ' a l l ~ ~ (,it h('r 
or 
which implies 
or 
S· 0* N*O* Ince -t = (N: +a'N) is the weighted average between 0: and O. ( ( ) ~ ~ t - 8;) < 0 by the 
assumption that 0: < 0 < 0;, which implies 
Therefore, the condition for (5.38) to be satisfied is 
which means the ownership (}i that violates (5.38) in the text is 
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C.2 Proof of (5.46) in the text 
Nt (N: + aN) ((J* _ (J*)2 _ 1 (-- 1)2 
(Nt + N: + aN)2 -t t (N: + 1) [(Nt _ 1) + aN] 8, - 8 < 0 (5.44) 
A - Nt (N;+aN)(N;+l)[(N*-l)+aNJ . .. .. 
t - ( N t + N : + a N ) ~ ~ . Therefore, the above condition WIll be satisfied if 
which means either 
or 
which implies 
or 
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Oi > rot - A ( o ~ . . - 0;)] and II' > [0. + A ( I I ~ , , -II;) ~ ~
J 
Since (o*-t - 0;) < 0, it is implied that 
[0. + A ( I I ~ . . -II;)] < O. < [0. - A ( I I ~ , , -II;) 1 
Therefore, the condition for (5.44) to be satisfied is 
which means the ownership Oi that violates (5.44) is 
01 yTi; ( O ~ t t - 0;) 
O2 - [Ot - A ( O ~ t t - 0;)] 
03 - [Ot + A ( O ~ t t - 0;)] 
(i) Since (O*-t - On < 0, it is clear that 01 < 0. 
(ii) In the symmetric equilibrium,(5.45) becomes 
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(5.46) 
( ~ ~ ~ ' ) ) ):J.:)_ 
B
t 
= _ Nt (Nt + aN). • (2Nt + aN) (O_t - 0t) > 0 
Therefore, 
since ( O ~ t t - 0;) < 0, and, 
o = _ (0* _ 0*) [Nt (Nt + aN) _ /\] 
3 -t t (2Nt + aN) V At < 0 
• Ni(Ni+aN ) 1\ 0 Slnce (2Ni +aN) - V I\t < . 
P f th t Ni(Ni+aN) 1\ 0 Fr (547) Ne(Ne+aN 1\ roo a (2Ni+aN) - V I\t <. om . , (2Nt+aN - v At < 0 is 
Nt (Nt + aN) vNt (Nt + aN) (Nt + 1) [(Nt - 1) + aN] - - - : ; . . . ~ ~ - . - ; . . . . - < 0 (2Nt + aN) (2Nt + aN) 
vNt (Nt + aN) - V(Nt + 1) [(Nt - 1) + aN] < 0 
Nt (Nt + aN) - (Nt + 1) [( Nt - 1) + aN] < 0 
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l-aN<o 
which is true for a > O. 
(iii) From (i) - (ii), it is sufficient to show that -03 < -01 < O2 to complete the 
proof. 
First, 
From (5.52), 
It has been shown that Bt > 0 and ( O ~ t t - 0;) < 0, therefore, the above expression is 
true if ( vx;, - ViIi) > o. 
From (5.40) and (5.47), in the symmetric equilibrium, (vx;, - y7i;) > 0 is 
v'Nt (Nt + aN) (Nt + I) [(Nt - 1) + aN] _ vNt (Nt + aN) (2Nt - 1 + aN) > 0 
(2Nt + aN) (2Nt + aN) 
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which is true. 
Second, 
(Nt + 1) [(Nt - 1) + aN] - (2Nt - 1 + aN) > 0 
Nt (Nt + aN - 2) > 0 
From (5.52) and the exprffision for fh in (ii) above, 
- f'"il ((r - (r) - (0* - 0*) [Nt (Nt + aN) - If"] > 0 
V I-"t -t t -t t (2Nt + aN) V At 
( * *) [ Nt (Nt + aN) /\] 
- 0 -t - Ot y7i; + (2Nt + aN) - V At > 0 
Since ( O ~ t t - On < 0, it is sufficient to show that 
[ 
r,;- Nt (Nt + aN) _ If'] > 0 
V J.Lt + (2Nt + aN) V At 
From (5.40) and (5.47), in the symmetric equilibrium, 
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[
VN;(N;+aN)(2N;-1+aN) N;(N;+aN)] 
(2N; +aN) + (2N; +aN) 
_ yN;(N;+aN)(Nt+1)[(Nt-1)+aN] > 0 
(2N;+aN) 
J(2Nt -1 + aN) + JNt (Nt + aN) - V(Nt + 1) [(Nt - 1) + aS1 > 0 
[ 
(2Nt - 1 + aN) ] > (Nt + 1) [(Nt - 1) + aN] 
+2JNt (Nt + aN) (2Nt - 1 + aN) + Nt (Nt + aN) 
It is sufficient to show that 
(2Nt - 1 + aN) + Nt (Nt + aN) - (Nt + 1) [(Nt - 1) + aN] > 0 
for the above expression to be true. 
2Nt - 1 + aN + (Nt)2 + NtaN - (Ne*)2 - NtaN - aN + 1 > 0 
2Nt > 0 
which is true. 
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